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Two methodologies are presented for analyzing the choice between 
centralized and decentralized energy infrastructures from a least-cost perspective.  
The first of these develops a novel minimum spanning tree network algorithm to 
approximate the shortest-length network that connects a given fraction of total 
system population.  This algorithm is used to identify high priority locations for 
decentralized electrification in 150 countries.  The second methodology utilizes a 
mixed-integer programming framework to determine the least-cost combination of 
centralized and decentralized electricity infrastructure that is capable of serving 
demand throughout a given system.  This methodology is demonstrated through a 
case study of Rwanda.  The centralized-decentralized electrification paradigm is also 
approached from an energy security perspective, incorporating stochastic events and 
probabilistic parameters into a simulation model that is used to compare different 
development paths.  The impact of explicitly modeling stochastic events as opposed 
to utilizing a conventional  formulation is also considered   Finally, a subsidy-free 
lighting cost curve is developed and a model is presented to compare the costs and 
benefits of three different financial mechanisms that can be employed to make 
capital intensive energy systems more accessible to rural populations.  The optimal 
contract is determined on the basis of utility-maximization for a range of costs to the 
providing agency and a comprehensive single and multi-factor sensitivity analysis is 










It is currently estimated that approximately 1.2 billion people in the world do not 
have access to electricity and of these some 85% reside in rural areas [1].  The problem is 
especially pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, where the overall electrification rate falls to 
30%.  The presence of electricity in a region can directly improve a wide range of 
services such as health care, sanitation, education and communication, greatly improving 
quality of life.  As such, enabling effective, large-scale electrification may provide 
significant humanitarian benefit.   
While the benefits of electricity are widely accepted, there is significant debate 
over the best means to carry out the electrification process [2].  Most developed countries 
rely on a centralized electricity generation and distribution system, however it has been 
asserted that developing countries face fundamentally different energy problems than 
those in the industrialized world [3].  In developed countries, electricity is generated at 
scale in large central plants and then distributed to end users through a transmission 
network.  These networks can be expensive and in most cases take many years or decades 
to fully develop.  Additionally, the development of a centralized infrastructure requires 
significant upfront investment that may commit a region to a certain development path 
for years to come.  In developing nations where energy infrastructure is less developed, 
populations are more dispersed and access to capital is limited it is worth considering the 
conditions under which the energy needs could be met more effectively through 
decentralized means.  
Nations or regions seeking electrification have more options today than they had 
20 or 50 years ago, as decentralized generation technologies are now more cost-effective.  
Electricity can be generated in the backyards of remote end users through solar 
photovoltaic cells or wind turbines.  Small scale plants can burn locally produced 
biomass and deliver electricity through village sized micro grids.  Some regions may be 
able to bypass centralized technologies entirely, a concept known as leapfrogging [4].  
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An example of this phenomenon can be seen in today’s telecommunications industry, 
where traditional landline telephone infrastructure is being leapfrogged in developing 
countries in favor of cellular technologies. 
Different electricity generation options are often compared individually on a cost 
basis; however, these analyses do not fully account for the specifics of a given situation 
in which new generation capacity is required.  Such specifics may include population 
distribution, resource availability, geography and the energy services demanded by new 
consumers.  It is also possible that decentralized systems may be implemented and scaled 
more effectively in the absence of a competent central authority.  Additionally, traditional 
cost analysis often assumes the existence of a sophisticated electricity transmission 
infrastructure or includes a simple variable cost of transmission.  This is generally 
appropriate in developed regions where such infrastructure exists, but in developing 
countries the required investment in transmission and distribution infrastructure may 
account for a large fraction of total system costs.   
Chapters 2 and 3 present two methodologies for analyzing the choice between 
centralized and decentralized energy infrastructures from a least-cost perspective.  
Chapter 4 approaches the centralized-decentralized paradigm from an energy security 
perspective, developing a model that simulates stochastic events and probabilistic 
parameters to compare cost and service level of different centralized and decentralized 
development paths.  Chapter 5 develops a subsidy-free cost of lighting curve and presents 
a model for determining the utility-maximizing financial contract that can be used to 
make capital intensive energy systems more accessible to the rural poor.  
The methodology in chapter 2 utilizes a novel network expansion algorithm to 
closely approximate the shortest-length network that connects a given fraction of total 
system population.  It is shown that the choice between centralized and decentralized 
infrastructure is largely dependent on four primary parameters: the marginal increase in 
network length required to serve an additional unit of population, the marginal increase in 
electricity consumption from connecting an additional unit of population to the 
centralized network, the unit cost of transmission infrastructure and the cost difference 
between decentralized and centralized electricity generation.  A metric based on these 
parameters is introduced to quantify the extent to which a given population node could be 
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cost-effectively served by decentralized energy infrastructure and the model is applied to 
150 countries around the world.   
The methodology in chapter 3 takes a more deterministic approach to 
understanding the choice between centralized and decentralized infrastructures from a 
least-cost perspective.  A mixed-integer programming framework is formulated and used 
to determine the least-cost combination of centralized and decentralized systems that is 
capable of serving a given level of electricity demand.  This methodology is 
demonstrated through a case study of Rwanda. The model is also executed using various 
levels of data resolution and the tradeoff between increasingly detailed results and 
increasing computational requirements is analyzed.   
Chapter 4 presents a methodology that builds on chapter 3 by analyzing the 
impacts of several important energy security factors that are faced in the developing 
world.  This methodology simulates various stochastic events, including infrastructure 
outages and disruptions to development budgets, as well as probabilistic parameters, 
including electricity demand and commodity prices.  The model is computationally 
inexpensive and is executed to compare the impact of different proposed development 
paths on the basis of the distribution of their outcomes, instead of the mean outcome.  
The effect of implementing a stochastic, as opposed to conventional , modeling 
formulation is also analyzed.     
In chapter 5, a subsidy-free lighting cost curve for various electric and non-
electric technologies is presented to provide a means of comparing these technologies on 
common ground.  This analysis is used to better understand how subsidies that are 
targeted to enable rural energy service consumption can be allocated most effectively.  In 
addition, a model is developed to compare the three different financial mechanisms that 
can be employed to make capital intensive energy systems more accessible to rural 
populations.  An analysis is performed to determine the optimal contract for a given cost 
to the providing agency on the basis of consumer utility-maximization.  A comprehensive 
single and multi-factor sensitivity analysis is also conducted in order to understand how 
variations in key parameters impact the effectiveness of each financial mechanism.   
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1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Centralized vs. Decentralized Electrification 
Developing countries seeking to increase electrification in rural areas are faced 
with a wide range of different technological options.  These options generally fall into 
two broad categories, centralized systems, which rely on electricity generation at scale in 
large centralized facilities and subsequent distribution through a transmission network,  
and decentralized systems, which generate electricity at or near demand sites and do not 
require significant distribution networks.  Typical first-order analyses of these two 
development paths are focused on determining the least-cost option in various situations 
and geographic regions.  Consequently, there exists a significant body of literature that 
discusses the costs of various centralized and decentralized technologies for rural 
electrification.  A subset of this work makes direct comparisons between these options 
while considering geographic factors such as the spatial distribution of population or 
demand sites.  A broad overview of literature addressing the costs of centralized and 
decentralized electrification options is first provided before offering more detailed 
summaries of work that is particularly relevant to this thesis. 
Many studies focus on comparisons between centralized and decentralized 
options that are based on the levelized costs of generation from various technologies. 
Singh and Singh provide a methodology for determining realistic levelized costs of 
electricity from solar PV systems under various financing options and draw comparisons 
with the cost of electricity from the grid [5].  Nouni et al. estimate the levelized cost of 
delivering electricity that is generated at centralized coal plants to rural areas in India and 
make a direct comparison to the estimated levelized costs of several distributed 
technologies [6].  A study in Cameroon similarly estimates the levelized costs of several 
distributed technologies and uses these results to calculate breakeven grid extension 
distances [7], while another study in Rwanda compares the costs of small solar PV 
systems to grid extension in three rural regions [8].  The optimal design of decentralized 
rural electrification systems has also been studied for general applications in developing 
countries [9], as well as for specific locations, such as Senegal [10, 11] and Vietnam [12].  
Rural electrification has also been modeled at the country-level in India while 
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considering potential environmental impacts [13].  A survey based methodology in 
Bangladesh finds that small solar home systems are financially attractive for small rural 
business and households that demand lighting and entertainment services [14].  Another 
study in Bangladesh proposes a metric to measure the financial viability of solar home 
systems while also considering environmental impacts and finds that solar home systems 
can be attractive options when used for income generating activities [15].   
Several specific studies that are of particular relevance to chapter 2 of this thesis 
are now discussed in more detail.  Sinha and Kandpal developed an early approach to 
analyzing the decision between rural electrification through decentralized systems or 
centralized grid expansion [16]. They propose a set of equations that can be used to 
estimate the cost of grid expansion in India as a function of distance from nearest 33 kV 
line and peak demand levels.  These costs are then compared to various decentralized 
options and it is determined that decentralized technologies could be cost-effectively 
implemented in isolated villages with low load factors.  Their cost data are likely 
somewhat outdated but the methodology provides excellent guidance and inspiration for 
future work.    
Lambert et al. present a computational tool that employs a combinatorial 
optimization routine to determine a near optimal autonomous power system given a set of 
demand points  [17].  They do not perform a direct comparison of grid extension and off-
grid power systems, but rather provide a means for estimating the cost of autonomous 
systems.  They use a two level optimization procedure and two different optimization 
algorithms: a minimum spanning tree algorithm based on Prim [18] and a simulated 
annealing algorithm in which random changes are made to the optimization variables. 
Their analysis is focused on village level systems where each node must be supplied with 
power from either an isolated power source, such as a solar PV unit, or connection to a 
centralized grid.  They proceed to compare the efficacy and computational efficiency of 
several different algorithms and determine that the simulated annealing algorithm has 
several advantages over the others used.   
Kaijuka discusses the use of GIS for rural electricity planning and tries to identify 
patterns of demand areas for priority investment [19].  The author uses a GIS database to 
locate residences and health, education and government centers that require 
 6
electrification in Uganda.  These locations are then allocated “benefit points” to rank their 
importance in terms of social value, willingness to pay for electricity, future consumption 
and long term sustainability.  These structures are aggregated on the sub-county level and 
the total benefit points in each sub-county are used to provide an approximation of the 
importance of providing electricity to that area.  The results are largely qualitative in 
nature and no optimization algorithms are executed to determine optimal electrification 
paths. 
Parshall et al. develop a spatial planning model to facilitate grid expansion in 
areas with low existing coverage [20].  They apply their methodology to a case study of 
Kenya and determine that, in most circumstances, grid connection is less costly than off-
grid options.  They consider two categories of grid expansion, extension of the medium 
voltage “backbone” and connection to the medium voltage backbone with low voltage 
lines.  They find that in regions with a medium voltage backbone, grid extension is often 
cheaper than off-grid options.  In regions without an existing medium voltage backbone, 
they calculate the critical length of medium voltage line such that the overall cost of grid 
extension equals the cost of decentralized options.  They utilize a combinatorial 
algorithm to find the least-cost electricity network given existing lines and demand 
points.  They compare their algorithm to that presented by Lambert et al. [17] and 
conclude that the Lambert approach is more detailed, but computationally expensive, and 
therefore better suited for smaller, sub-national areas.  The method is applied to a 10km 
by10km test region and a case study of Kenya.  An average cost of $1900 per household 
connected is estimated under the realistic penetration scenario in Kenya.   
In a companion paper to Parshall et al. [20], Zvoleff et al. [21] present a 
quantitative model to address the question of how population settlement patterns affect 
the cost of electricity transmission infrastructure.  The model is implemented at the 
village level and applied to nine villages in Africa based on structure data obtained from 
satellite imagery.  Two comparative indices are developed, a homogeneity index and a 
near neighbor index.  An algorithm is developed to minimize the mean interconnection 
distance subject to the requirement that a given penetration rate is achieved.  In the case 
of 100% penetration there is a unique solution to this problem that can be found relatively 
easily with Prim’s algorithm [18].  For a connection rate of less than 100% however, the 
 7
solution becomes dependent on the starting node and no computationally efficient 
algorithm exists to find a unique solution.  The authors develop a composite algorithm to 
address this optimization problem and identify a near-optimal solution.  A comparison of 
the composite Prim’s algorithm (CPA) with a more rigorous algorithm that has been used 
to address a problem known as the k-MST problem in computer science literature is also 
presented [22].  Results show that the CPA is much more easily implemented and the 
results match closely.  The CPA is then applied to the nine villages and the mean 
interconnection distance is plotted as a function of penetration rate for each.  
 Deichmann et al. present a spatial modeling framework that is used to determine 
where “stand-alone renewable generation is a cost-effective alternative to centralized grid 
supply” [23].  A network algorithm is developed to determine optimal locations for 
substations or bulk supply points (BSPs) on the HV transmission grid.  These BSPs are 
assumed to serve all demand points within 120km, which is the typical range of an 11kV 
or 33kV distribution line.  Existing power stations are considered by the model, but the 
existing grid is not incorporated.  The costs of grid expansion are compared to the costs 
of providing electricity through single-household and micro-grid systems considering 
technologies such as, wind, solar PV, diesel and bio-diesel generators.  The levelized 
costs of electricity are estimated for each of these technologies and the methodology is 
applied to case studies of Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya.  They find that decentralized 
renewable technologies will likely play a significant role in rural electrification efforts in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but they will not provide a universal solution.  Even with anticipated 
decreases in the cost of distributed systems, electricity from the centralized grid will still 
provide the most cost-effective option in populated areas.  
 Chapter 2 of this thesis builds upon previous work by proposing a new algorithm 
for network expansion that considers weighted-nodes and has the objective of 
determining the shortest length network that connects a given fraction of the total weight 
in the system.   
1.1.1.1 Generation expansion planning 
Chapter 3 of this thesis complements chapter 2 by developing a mixed-integer 
programming framework to determine optimal electricity infrastructure development 
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strategies, while explicitly considering existing transmission and generation 
infrastructure.  This approach is an example of the widely researched Generation 
Expansion Planning (GEP) problem, which can refer to electricity infrastructure planning 
for a range of geographic and temporal scales and with the application of various 
secondary objectives and constraints, e.g. environmental or regulatory.  The GEP 
literature is too extensive to list comprehensively, but some relevant examples include: 
the application of a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer programming framework by Jin et 
al. to model GEP by optimizing both cost and risk of unexpected operational costs [24], a 
decomposition of the GEP problem faced by utilities into hourly sub-problems [25], a 
game theoretic analysis of GEP in markets with unbundled electricity generation and 
transmission [26], an application of GEP that considers power plant location selection 
[27] and an application of GEP specific to distributed generation and clean technologies 
[28].  Several studies have modeled stochastic events to explicitly consider system 
reliability as a secondary objective in GEP [29–31].  Variations on well-known 
algorithms have been proposed by Park et al. to solve the GEP problem through a hybrid 
approach [32] and by Villumsen and Philpott in the case of switchable transmission 
elements [33].  Mixed-integer programming frameworks have also been applied by Smith 
and Mesa to analyze the tradeoff between various rural electrification objectives in 
Colombia [34] and by Fan et al. to analyze power grid islanding [35].  Foley et al. review 
several proprietary energy modeling software tools that are being used to analyze 
increasingly liberalized markets and new renewable and emissions policy targets [36]. 
The methodology presented in Chapter 3 balances the problem of providing a 
country-level analysis of electricity infrastructure development while maintaining a 
computationally manageable problem space.  To this end, the model does not explicitly 
manage time-dependent power flow through the system, but rather focuses on ensuring 
that sufficient infrastructure capacity is developed to meet both average and peak 
electricity demand levels.  A mixed-integer program is formulated and solved for a range 
of scenarios to broadly examine how the choice between centralized and decentralized 
infrastructures is impacted by changes to sensitive parameters.   
Chapter 4 provides a further extension of this framework that is used to simulate 
stochastic events and explore the potential outcomes of different development paths.  It 
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quickly becomes computationally difficult to obtain solutions to the GEP when stochastic 
parameters are considered.   Previous work addressing stochastic events in GEP has 
generally focused on developing algorithms or methodologies to solve dynamic 
programming problems explicitly.  These formulations may have one or more objectives, 
which generally include minimizing cost, power outages or various negative 
environmental impacts.   Some examples include: a formulation of GEP as an optimal 
control problem where load fluctuations and plant outages are random parameters that 
follow a Gaussian distribution [37], a new heuristic for stochastic programming in GEP 
over a 20-year time horizon [38], a stochastic programming model for generation 
expansion with random demand, generation availability, transmission capacity and 
probabilistic constraints [39], a GEP methodology that incorporates components of 
interval linear programming and fuzzy linear programming [40], a dynamic programming 
framework that balances minimization of cost and environmental impact [41] and a 
model that combines stochastic dynamic programming and game theory to understand the 
impacts of regulatory uncertainty on wind power expansion [42].  Tekiner et al. propose a 
multi-period model that applies Monte Carlo simulation to balance multiple objectives in 
GEP [43], while Pereira and Saraiva use genetic algorithms to model actions of several 
generation agents in the face of uncertain demand and costs [44].  Numerous optimization 
frameworks have been proposed to incorporate parameter uncertainty with applications to 
energy systems management [45–50].  
The analysis in chapter 4 focuses on understanding how the energy security and 
system reliability of different infrastructure development paths are affected by stochastic 
events and parameters.  Of primary interest are the impacts of long construction horizons 
faced by centralized infrastructures, variable commodity prices, random transmission 
generation and transmission outages and budget instability.  In contrast to many other 
studies that develop optimization frameworks to endogenously determine optimal 
development paths, this methodology simulates exogenously defined development plans 
to generate a distribution of results for various comparative metrics, such as cost and 
level of served electricity demand.  Rather than using aggregated metrics and indicators 
to quantify the various different dimensions of grid security, we focus directly on the 
level of enabled electricity consumption and the cost of providing these services.   
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1.1.2 Energy Services and Benefits 
When analyzing the potential impact of different development plans, it is 
important to remember that energy itself is not inherently beneficial. Rather, benefit is 
derived from the energy services (lighting, cooking, entertainment, refrigeration etc.) that 
are enabled by energy access.  This concept was first pioneered by Goldemberg and 
Johansson [4] and continues to receive significant attention today as researchers attempt 
to quantify the impact of various potential development strategies.  A study of the 
relationship between electricity access and socio-economic development in Mozambique 
found that rural electrification can be a powerful tool in enabling structural 
transformation [51].  Similar studies find electrification rate to be an explanatory variable 
of literacy rate in the Indian state of Assam [52], evaluate the effectiveness of rural 
electrification in reducing energy poverty in Brazil [53], find that solar home systems 
provide significant direct and indirect benefits to users in rural Bangladesh [54] and 
determine that access to electricity enables significant increases in productivity and 
income for micro-enterprises in rural Kenya [55].  In Namibia it was determined that the 
socio-economic impacts of electrification through the grid and through solar home 
systems were comparable and the authors propose that subsidies for solar home systems 
are made more equitable with subsidies for electricity from the grid [56].  A broader 
study finds a positive correlation between the UN human development index and per 
capita energy consumption for 120 different countries and determines that small increases 
in energy access can enable large gains in development for the world’s poor [57].  Other 
work reviews the role of infrastructure in economic growth and assesses the impact of 
electrification on income generation in rural areas [58], suggests that electrification is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for economic development [59] and that in practice 
solar home systems often fail to live up to their promises of cost-effectiveness and  
poverty alleviation [60].  
The perspective of understanding the full range of benefits enabled by various 
technologies and development strategies provides motivation for chapters 4 and 5 of this 
thesis, where development strategies are evaluated on factors beyond least-cost.   
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1.1.3 Energy Security 
The concept of energy security is gaining popularity as a means of identifying and 
quantifying the diverse technological, economic and political factors that facilitate the 
provision of energy services.  In industrialized nations, energy security usually refers to 
ensuring a stable supply of imported fuels for energy generation in the face of political 
embargos, fuel price and supply shocks, natural disasters and terrorist attacks.  In 
developing countries a number of other factors may influence the ability to maintain a 
reliable supply of energy services, such as unstable political transitions, corrupt 
government officials, technical limitations, natural resource constraints and system 
sabotage due to civil unrest or war.    
There is much debate as to the precise definition of energy security and numerous 
methodologies and indicators for assessing energy security have been proposed.  It has 
been argued that energy security can take on different dimensions depending on 
geography, timeframe and the energy source being considered [61].  Kruyt et al. provide 
an overview of available energy security indicators, which are classified into four 
categories: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability [62].  Vivoda argues 
that a more comprehensive definition of energy security is necessary and proposes 11 
dimensions and 44 attributes to evaluate energy security in the Asia-Pacific region [63].  
Sovacool provides a response to Vivoda, supporting his work, but also proposing 
additional energy security dimensions [64].  Sovacool and Mukherjee have also proposed 
five main dimensions of energy security availability: affordability, technology 
development, sustainability and regulation and offer 320 simple indicators that policy 
makers can use to evaluate energy security at the national level [65].   In a separate paper 
this framework is used to develop a comprehensive index that is applied to evaluate 
energy security in 18 countries [66].  Cherp provides a critique of Sovacool, citing the 
lack of context in his analysis and stressing a need to discriminate between primary and 
secondary energy security concerns [67].  Sovacool and Brown also calculate an original 
energy security index for 22 countries and conduct a more detailed analysis of energy 
security performance in Denmark, Japan, the United States and Spain [68].  Other studies 
suggest classifying energy security indicators as either ex-post or ex-ante [69], propose 
two new approaches for measuring long-term energy services security [70] and measure 
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the cost of energy security for four energy sources in South Korea [71].  A broad review 
of different characterizations of energy security provides a summary definition as “the 
continuity of energy supplies relative to demand” [72].  Additional work has focused on 
understanding perceptions of and attitudes towards energy security issues through global 
surveys [73, 74].    
 Power outages are common throughout the developing world and supply lines 
distributing fuel for cooking and lighting to unelectrified rural areas are often arduous 
and can easily become disrupted.  The unreliability of centralized electricity networks in 
many developing nations leads consumers to rely heavily on personal diesel generators, 
which are costly, noisy, inefficient and have negative environmental impacts [75].  A 
survey of small enterprises in sub-Saharan Africa found that 49% of respondents 
identified electricity reliability to be a major business constraint and 44% owned onsite 
diesel generators [75].  Across the region, generators account for 13% of surveyed firm’s 
electricity consumption, with this proportion exceeding 50% in Chad, Guinea-Bissau and 
Liberia.   
Many efforts have been made to estimate the economic impact of power outages, 
with results varying significantly in different locations or applications.  Beenstock 
provides a theoretical framework for treating generators as insurance against power 
outages and inferring the cost of outages from revealed preferences [76].  Tishler 
identifies four factors that contribute to outage costs in the commercial and industrial 
sectors: forgone profit, reduction in productivity, damage and labor payments [77].  
Baarsma and Hop find that outage costs are generally higher in developed countries, as 
there are fewer switching options, and they estimate the cost of a one hour outage in the 
Netherlands to be €5.00 for residential customers and €52.30 for industrial customers 
[78].  Nooij et al. also estimate outage costs for different sectors, times of day and regions 
in the Netherlands, with averaged results ranging from €2.70/kWh on weekday nights to 
€12.50/kWh on weekend evenings [79].  In a complementary paper, these data are used 
to determine efficient electricity rationing strategies to be applied when demand exceeds 
supply [80].  A review of 21 studies estimating outage costs in private households, 
primarily in the developed world found data to vary wildly, with a mean cost of 
€9.39/kWh and a standard deviation of €14.72/kWh [81].  In the developing world, 
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outages costs in the industrial sector in Pakistan have been estimated to be approximately 
6.67 Rs./kWh for planned outages and 11.73 Rs./kWh for unplanned outages in 1986 
[82].  This corresponds to $0.54/kWh and $0.96/kWh respectively in present dollars 
when adjusted for inflation.  Bose et al. propose three different methodologies for 
estimating outage costs in the agricultural and industrial sectors in India, with results 
ranging from 2.63 Rs./kWh to 22.10 Rs./kWh, or $.08/kWh and $0.68/kWh respectively 
in present dollars when adjusted for inflation [83].  A methodology has also been 
proposed to consider outage costs in setting electricity tariffs in Chile [84].      
Chapter 4 presents a model to understand how energy security is enabled or 
inhibited by various infrastructure development paths in the developing world.   
1.1.4 Energy Service Delivery Mechanisms 
There are two primary dimensions of increasing access to energy services, 
technical and institutional.  The technical dimension refers to the specific technologies 
that are used to provide energy services, for example lighting can be provided by 
kerosene lanterns, LED bulbs powered by a small rooftop SHS or incandescent bulbs 
powered by a central electric grid.  The institutional dimension refers to the specific 
institutional policies, business practices and financial mechanisms that are employed to 
increase access to energy services.  Examples include direct donations, subsidies, 
equipment rental or leasing programs and microfinance programs.    
1.1.4.1 Solar Home Systems 
Small solar home systems (SHS) are rapidly becoming the most popular 
technology for distributed rural electrification in many parts of the world because they 
forego reliance on electricity provision from a central authority and are easily scalable.  
The distributed generation technology considered in chapters 3 and 4 is modeled after a 
small solar home system with peak generation capacity of approximately 50W.  Chapter 
5 focuses specifically on understanding the economics of solar home systems and the 
institutional mechanisms that can be employed to aid their penetration. 
A number of studies have analyzed the financial viability or socio-economic 
impacts of SHS in various parts of the world, including Bangladesh [14, 15, 54, 85, 86] 
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and India and Sri Lanka [59, 87, 88].  Other studies examine factors that have impeded 
the penetration of SHS [58, 89–92], analyze electricity consumption levels for SHS users 
[93, 94] or discuss user expectations, education and experiences regarding new SHS 
installations [60, 95–97].  Additional studies analyze the institutional dynamics of SHS 
by comparing the relative effectiveness of market versus donor-based SHS programs in 
El Salvador [98] and examining problems faced by public-private partnerships in Africa 
[99].  A set of quantitative quality of life indicators has been proposed to better 
understand the socio-economic impacts of SHS development [100]. Studies have also 
examined the effectiveness of solar electrification in increasing economic productivity of 
rural micro-enterprises [101] and alleviating poverty [102] in Ghana.   
1.1.4.2 Financial Delivery Mechanisms 
While solar home systems are an increasingly popular option for rural 
electrification in developing countries, the cost of these systems has prevented them from 
reaching higher levels of penetration.  A problem is particularly posed by the fact that 
SHS require significant upfront capital investment, whereas electricity from centralized 
sources can generally be paid for on a marginal basis.  In many regions, poor populations 
simply do not have access to the capital required to obtain a SHS.  Chapter 5 considers 
three specific financial mechanisms that can be used to overcome the large capital 
requirement for obtaining an SHS, thereby increasing access to the poor.  These are 
technology subsidies, rental contracts and microloan programs.  For overviews of 
different institutional strategies that have been employed to promote rural electrification 
around the world see Palit and Chaurey [103] and Zerreffi [104].  Miller also discusses 
lessons learnt from early attempts by the World Bank to provide large-scale loans to 
support SHS dissemination in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia [105].  
  Subsidies 
Many governments provide electricity and fuel subsidies to increase energy 
access for low-income populations.  There is evidence that these subsidies are ineffective 
[106–108], negatively distort markets [109] and in many cases disproportionately benefit 
wealthier populations [110, 111].  Solomon and Georgianna present a theorem for 
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determining the optimal subsidy level for new energy sources, find strong evidence to 
support offsetting subsidies on future energy sources [112]. 
Some studies discuss the option of replacing inefficient subsidies with other 
welfare enhancing programs in Iran [113] and India [114].  Other studies examine the 
role of energy subsidies in technology selection for irrigation pumping in rural India 
[115], or bridging the gap between cost and affordability of rural electrification in Nepal 
[116], the impact of energy subsidies on demand and emissions in China [117] and the 
effect of electricity industry reform on cross-subsidization in liberalizing markets around 
the world [118].  It has also been found that subsidies in the form of foreign aid are only 
useful in countries with functional institutional support and sound policies [119].  
Rental 
Rental, or fee-for-service, programs have been employed in a number of countries 
around the world to increase rural electricity access.  These programs can be 
implemented either by enabling rural entrepreneurs to operate as small-scale utilities and 
sell fixed quantities of electricity to consumers, or by providing systems directly to end 
users in exchange for a periodic payment. 
To date, most research of fee-for-service contracts involves analyses of empirical 
observations and results.  Studies have asserted the general need for increased rural 
cooperatives [120] and innovative financing models [121] for rural energy development.  
Lemaire provides two analyses of fee-for-service programs in South Africa [122] and 
Zambia [123].  The first contrasts benefits and limitations of the South African program 
with micro-credit models that have been instituted in other parts of the world, while the 
second focuses on the financial performance of three particular fee-for-service 
enterprises.  Other studies suggest that the fee-for-service model has great promise for 
implementation in Laos [124] and discuss the relative success of small electricity co-
operatives in  rural Tanzania [125] and Bangladesh [126] and the major flaws 
encountered by similar efforts in Fiji [127]. 
Microfinance 
The growing popularity of microfinance has seen a similar growth in academic 
literature devoted to understanding the mechanics of various microfinance strategies and 
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its effectiveness as a tool for poverty alleviation. This literature often seeks to determine 
how effective microfinance is at increasing the wealth or standard of living of 
participants, generally finding positive impacts [128–132].  
Stiglitz examines how peer monitoring transfers risk from the bank to the cosigner 
and improves borrower welfare [133], while Morduch challenges the often promised win-
win nature of microlending [134].  Other studies examine the market dynamics of pro-
poor versus pro-profit microfinance institutions [135], the role of subsidies in the early 
success of microfinance institutions [136] and the trade-off between outreach and 
financial sustainability faced by microfinance institutions (MFIs) [137].  Hoff and Stiglitz 
develop a theoretical economic model of microfinance market dynamics and conclude 
that subsides may have the perverse effect of increasing prices due to increased 
competition and the costs of information sharing [138]. Morduch argues that poorly 
designed subsidies can both hurt the performance of microlenders and undermine social 
objectives [139].  Alternatively, Hudon and Traca find that subsidies up to a certain 
amount can positively impact MFI efficiency, however subsidies in excess of this 
threshold begin to have negative effects [140].  Srinivasan argues that interest subsidies 
offered for loans to purchase solar systems in India are superior to direct government 
technology subsidies [141].  Stiglitz and Weiss also discuss the market inefficiencies that 
can arise as a consequence of market interventions in credit markets, such as 
subsidization and credit rationing [142].   
A number of studies analyze the interaction between formal and informal credit 
finding that formal lending may be less suitable for the agricultural sector [143], the 
availability of cheap formal credit can worsen the terms of informal lending contracts 
[144], government subsidies to formal lenders may reduce profits for both formal and 
informal lenders [145], and that competition between formal and informal lenders can 
lead to information asymmetries and may result in poor clients being worse off [146].  
Aleem finds that the rates offered by informal lenders in Pakistan are less than their 
average costs, but exceed their marginal costs, which supports the premise that the 
informal credit market operates under monopolistic competition and imperfect 
information [147].  Besley outlines a number of key factors that are specific to, or more 
pronounced in, rural credit markets and may cause market failures.  These include lack of 
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collateral, under developed complementary markets, costly enforcement, asymmetrical 
information and correlated default risks [148].  For a comprehensive overview of the 
economic theory and real-world practice of microfinance see Armendariz and Morduch 
[149].   
Chapter 5 presents a methodology to quantitatively compare the cost-
effectiveness of these three institutional mechanisms in promoting energy access and 










LEAST COST NETWORK EVALUATION OF CENTRALIZED AND 
DECENTRALIZED CONTRIBUTIONS TO GLOBAL 
ELECTRIFICATION 
2.1 Introduction 
In the energy sector, it may be that some combination of centralized and 
decentralized technologies could best serve a previously un-electrified country or region.  
Some work has been done to analyze optimal electrification efforts at a local or regional 
scale [17, 150], including a methodology to estimate the cost of a local-level electricity 
distribution network based on network expansion algorithms [21].  Work at the national 
scale tends to focus on policy implementation to aid development [151, 152], though a 
methodology based on network algorithms has also been applied to case study analyses 
of Ethiopia, Ghana and Kenya [23].  Some studies attempt to identify priority locations 
for new electrification [19] and specifically decentralized electrification [6], while others 
attempt to analyze the decision paradigm between centralized and decentralized 
generation infrastructure more generally [20]. 
We present an electricity grid expansion model based on algorithms that solve the 
well-known minimum spanning tree (MST) problem found in computer science, graph 
theory and other network applications [153].  Our model builds upon such algorithms to 
determine a near minimum-length network that connects a desired percentage of the total 
population in a given region.  We apply our methodology to the development and 
planning of high-voltage electricity transmission infrastructure at the country level.  
However, the model could also easily be applied to smaller scale systems if appropriate 
cost and population data were obtained.    
In this study we develop a general methodology to estimate the costs of 
centralized electricity generation infrastructure, which can be compared to the costs of a 
comparable decentralized electricity generation infrastructure.  We then analyze the cost-
benefit tradeoff between the low cost of centralized generation and the high cost of its 
distribution and the relatively higher cost of decentralized generation but lower cost of 
distribution.  This information is used to determine the conditions under which a region 
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might be most cost-effectively served by centralized or decentralized electrification 
options.  Our model is applied to 150 countries around the world and the results are 
aggregated and presented along with three case study analyses of the choices between 
centralized and decentralized electrification in Botswana, Uganda and Bangladesh.   
2.2 Methodology 
Given a region with discrete weighted nodes, it is desirable to determine the 
shortest length network that can connect a given percentage of the total weight.  We 
present a two-step algorithm for determining a near minimum-length network that meets 
this criterion.  
2.2.1 Graph Theory 
In the context of mathematics and computer science, graph theory is the study of 
the pair-wise relations between objects in different sets or groups.  More formally, a 
graph G is defined as a collection of vertices V (also called nodes) and edges E, where an 
edge connects two vertices in G. A fundamental problem in graph theory is determining 
the minimum spanning tree (MST) of a given graph, or the subset of edges that connect 
all of the vertices in the graph into a single continuous network with the shortest possible 
length.   
2.2.2 MST  Algorithms 
Prim’s algorithm is a well known computational algorithm that can be used to 
solve the MST problem [18].  Prim’s algorithm is useful for a wide range of applications, 
but it only guarantees an optimal solution for a tree spanning all of the nodes in a given 
set.  In some cases it may be desirable to find the shortest tree that spans only a certain 
number of the nodes in a set.  This is referred to as the k-MST problem, which is known 
to be NP-hard [154] and there is no known computationally efficient algorithm capable of 
solving the problem.  An alternative approximation heuristic has been presented 
specifically for applications in structure level electrical grid expansion [21].  This is 
referred to as the Composite Prim’s Algorithm (CPA).  In the CPA the original Prim’s 
Algorithm is executed until a desired percentage of the nodes have been connected, at 
which point the algorithm is truncated.    
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It is also interesting to consider situations in which nodes have associated 
weights, so that the inclusion of some nodes in the connected network is valued more 
highly than the inclusion of others.  This class of problems was introduced as the Node 
Weighted Steiner Tree Problem (NWST) [155] and has been expanded as the Prize 
Collecting Steiner Tree Problem (PCST) [156].  A PCST is the profit-maximizing 
connected sub-graph of an edge- and node-weighted graph, where each edge has an 
associated cost and each node has an associated benefit or weight.   
2.2.3 Weighted Composite Prim’s Algorithm 
We address a problem that varies slightly from the traditional PCST and is 
applicable to the development of electricity transmission networks.  In this problem the 
weight or ‘prize’ associated with each node represents its population and our goal is to 
find the minimum length network that connects a given portion of the total population of 
the entire graph or region.  Whereas the traditional PCST determines the total connected 
weight endogenously as a consequence of profit maximization, we exogenously provide a 
target connected fraction and seek to minimize the cost of achieving that connection 
level.  Additionally, while a traditional Steiner Tree allows for intermediate edges and 
nodes to be added to the graph, we do not consider such connections.  This reduces the 
computational intensity of the algorithm and, given the relatively dense nature of the 
node data used, does not significantly affect the results.  
A two-phase algorithm for a near-minimum length network connecting a given 
percentage of a set of weighted nodes is now presented.  This will be referred to as the 
Weighted Composite Prim’s Algorithm (WCPA).   
In the first phase, a starting node is chosen and the weight-to-distance ratio is 
calculated between the starting node and all remaining unconnected nodes.  In practice 
the algorithm generally performs most effectively when the initial node is chosen to be 
one of the most heavily weighted.  A connection is then made between the starting node 
and the node for which the greatest weight-to-distance ratio exists and this node is 
brought into the connected set.  In the context of grid expansion applications, this 
provides the most efficient means of providing grid access on a cost per person basis.  
This process is continued similarly to Prim’s Algorithm; each time the weight-to-distance 
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ratio is calculated between all nodes in the connected set and all nodes in the unconnected 
set.  When a desired percentage of the total weight has entered the connected set, the first 
phase of the algorithm is terminated. 
In the second phase, the nodes that were connected by the network in the first 
phase are isolated and Prim’s Algorithm is executed on only these connected nodes.  This 
process eliminates inefficient ‘doubling back’ effects that often result from the first phase 
of the algorithm. The result of the two-phase algorithm is the MST which is guaranteed to 
optimally span the nodes selected in the first phase.  As the generated network depends 
on the choice of starting node in the first phase, the algorithm can be executed multiple 
times from different initial nodes, and the minimum length network from all these 
executions can be selected.  This algorithm can be expressed as follows. 
1. Given a non-empty graph G with vertices V and edges E, where V’ and E’ are the 
sets of connected vertices and edges,  is the length of edge (i,j) and W(k) is the 
weight of node k. 
2. Choose desired percentage of total system weight to be connected, r. 
3. Choose an initial node x so that V’={x} E’={ }  
4. Let i’, j’ be the pair that solves i’, j’ = 

 	 ,  ′ ∈  ′, 	 ′ ∉  ′   
5. Add j’ to V’ and i’, j’	to E’ 
6. Repeat steps 4-5 until ∑  ′′∈′ 	≥ 	 ∙ ∑ ∈  








Figure 2.1: The first phase of the WCPA is applied to a new network which is illustrated 
with its associated node weights and intermodal distances in a.  In b. an initial node is 
chosen and the weight to distance ratios between it and all adjacent nodes are calculated.  
In c. the connection with the largest such ratio is made and a new node is brought into the 
connected set making the total connected population 16.  This process is repeated in d. at 
which point the total connected population reaches the target of 20 and the first phase is 




























































    
Figure 2.2: In the second phase of the WCPA, Prim’s Algorithm is applied to the 
isolated set of nodes that were connected in the first phase, which are depicted in a.  In b. 
an initial node is chosen and the distances between it and all remaining nodes are 
calculated.  In c. the shortest of these connections is made and a new node is brought into 
the connected set.  This process is repeated in d., at which point the isolated nodes are 
spanned by a network of length 6.  
2.3 Cost Calculation 
We now develop a metric to assess the relative feasibility of decentralized 
electrification in a given population node.  The metric, which is referred to as y*, is the 
breakeven electricity consumption level at which a node is economically indifferent 
between centralized and decentralized electrification.  A high y* value implies that a 
node is relatively well-suited for decentralized infrastructure.  We assume that 
decentralized generation is more costly than centralized generation before transmission 
costs are considered.  In situations where the cost of centralized generation without 
transmission surpasses the cost of decentralized generation, it will of course always be 
optimal to provide decentralized infrastructure.  The y* value in such regions can be 
thought of as being infinite and specific examples of this possibility will be discussed 
later in more detail.  
Our algorithm estimates the minimum network length required to connect a set of 
nodes containing a given percentage of the total system weight, but it does not consider 
connections that may be made on a scale smaller than the node resolution.  Therefore 
these networks should be understood to represent ‘large’ transmission or distribution 
lines, where ‘large’ is relative to node resolution. Decentralized electricity generation 

























the generation source to each consumer.  A similar local transmission infrastructure is 
necessary for centralized generation to deliver electricity from high voltage lines to end 
users. For the purpose of a general analysis, we assume that local transmission 
infrastructure required within a node will be the same for either centralized or 
decentralized generation; site specific applications would require refined data for these 
and other parameters.  Here, the costs of centralized generation plus the transmission 
costs determined by the WCPA will be compared to the costs of decentralized generation 
without transmission costs.  
2.3.1 Levelized Cost of Electricity 
The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is a metric that is commonly used to 
encompass the full costs of electricity generation into a unit price.  It is the ratio of the 
present value of all costs associated with electricity generation to the time-discounted, 
lifetime output of a generation system, as shown in Equation 2.1.  For an overview of 
LCOE literature and a more detailed account of the levelized cost calculation used in this 
analysis see Borin et al. [157].  
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Borin et al. present a range of levelized costs for various generation technologies 
based on costs of recent projects in the United States.  Costs range from about 6 
cents/kWh for natural gas combined cycle to 11 cents/kWh for biomass.  
Because many of the factors that influence the cost of electricity, such as the costs and 
availability of fuel, labor and materials, are location dependent the LCOE of different 
forms of electricity generation may vary significantly across regions.  Deichmann et al. 
[23] report estimates of the LCOE of centralized generation in Kenya, 10.70 cents/kWh, 
Ghana, 7.23 cents/kWh and Ethiopia, 5.80 cents/kWh.  They also present estimates of the 
LCOE of decentralized generation options in Ethiopia, including 15.5 cents/kWh for 
larger wind, 25.5 cents/kWh for small wind, 25 cents/kWh for diesel and biodiesel, and 
about 75 cents/kWh for combined PV and wind.  
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Buchholz and Da Silva [158]  estimated that small-scale wood-based biopower 
could be provided in rural Uganda for 11 cents/kWh with grid based hydropower costing 
5 cents/kWh, individual solar panels costing 19 cents/kWh and distributed fossil 
generators costing 39 cents/kWh.  
In India, the LCOE of centralized electricity generation before transmission from 
coal/gas thermal, hydro and nuclear have been estimated to be approximately 4 
cents/kWh, 4.5 cents/kWh and 6 cents/kWh respectively [6].  LCOE values from several 
decentralized sources are also estimated to be approximately, 30-58 cents/kWh for small 
biomass, 31-50 cents/kWh for diesel generators, 10-20 cents/kWh for small hydro 63-110 
cents/kWh for solar photovoltaic and 15-103 cents/kWh for small wind generators. 
The choice between centralized and decentralized electricity generation does not 
depend on the absolute costs of electricity generation options, but rather on the difference 
in cost between decentralized and centralized electricity generation.  We explore cost 
difference values ranging from 0 to 25 cents/kWh, with some examples at a cost 
difference of 10 cents/kWh.  
2.3.2 Electricity Transmission 
Most electricity is transmitted by alternating current (AC), though direct current 
(DC) is used for some transmission systems, particularly over long distances.    The 
presence of economies of scale is evident by the decreasing average cost on a $/MW-km 
basis of a transmission line as capacity increases [159].  It is generally more cost efficient 
to utilize a smaller number of high capacity lines than a greater number of low capacity 
lines. 
Transmission lines over 230kV are typically considered to be extra-high voltage 
(EHV) while lines between 33kV and 230kV are considered high voltage (HV).  Medium 
(1kV to 33kV) and low voltage lines (<1kV) may also be used for more localized 
distribution.   
2.3.2.1 Levelized Cost of Transmission 
To express grid expansion costs on the same basis as distributed electricity, we 
formulate the annualized levelized cost of transmission, CT, as shown in Equation 2.2.  
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Here one unit of output is considered to be one year of operation, so CT can be thought of 
as time discounted cost of operation for one year when accounting for the full lifecycle 
costs of the transmission infrastructure.  This cost can then be compared on common 
ground to the cost of generating enough electricity to meet one year of demand.  We use 
the financial parameters listed in` 2.1, which are on par with those typically used to 
determine levelized costs of large scale electricity generation infrastructure development 
(Borin et. al. 2011).  Countries are divided into three categories based on their level of 
development and discount rates of 5%, 10% and 15% are assumed for the most 
developed group, middle group and least developed group respectively.  
 
Table 2.1: Financial parameters used for calculation of transmission costs. 
Parameter Value 
Carrying Charge 15% 
Usable Lifetime 50 years 
Book Life 30 years 
Annual O&M 1% of overnight cost 
Real Discount Rate 5-15% 
 
Depending on the discount rate, these parameters imply a CT of $136-$158/km-
year for every $1000/km of overnight transmission cost, or an annual levelized cost of 
13.6%-15.8% of the total overnight transmission cost.  Data on transmission costs, 
reviewed in section 5.3, may range from roughly $50,000/km to $500,000/km and a cost 
of $200,000/km is used in our baseline scenario.  A transmission line with an overnight 
cost of $200,000/km would translate to a CT of $27,000-32,000/km-year for discount 
rates of 5 to 15%.  
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2.3.3 Total Infrastructure Costs 
The WCPA is first executed for a country or region and the minimum generated 
network length is determined as a function of centralized fraction.  These data are then 
supplied to the following economic analysis. 
2.3.3.1 Centralized 
There are two components to the cost of meeting electricity demand through 
centralized generation: the infrastructure cost of transmission lines, CT, and the variable 
cost of generating electricity from centralized generation technologies, CC.  These can be 
compared as levelized costs, which are expressed in terms of cents/meter-year of 
transmission line and cents/kWh respectively.  The total annual levelized cost of 
centralized generation ("() is calculated as follows.  Let  @( be the minimum network 
length as calculated by the WCPA, and let A(( be the total annual electricity 
consumption of the connected population.  Both are functions of the fraction of the 
population served by centralized electricity (. 
 "(( , #; , #- = 	@( ∙ 	#; +	A(( ∙ #-																																												2.3           
                                            
2.3.3.2 Decentralized 
The total annual levelized cost of decentralized generation (") is calculated 
similarly.  As discussed previously we do not consider small scale transmission costs for 
decentralized or centralized electricity; therefore, the total decentralized levelized cost is 
a function only of demand for decentralized electricity A and the levelized cost of 
decentralized electricity (#). 
 ", # = 	A ∙ #																																																											2.4          
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2.3.3.3 System Cost Minimization 
Given a total electricity consumption level, A; = A(( + A(, the minimum 
system cost of an electricity infrastructure that consists of a centralized network serving ( percent of the total population is given by Equation 2.5.  
 						minGH4IHJ 			[@( ∙ 	#; +	A(( ∙ #-] + [A; − A(( ∙ #]																					2.5       
                       
Equation 2.6 shows that after differentiation the problem reduces to equating the 
marginal costs of centralized and decentralized infrastructure at a given electrification 
rate. 
 [@′( ∙ 	#; +	A(N( ∙ #-] = [A(N( ∙ #]																																						2.6	       
                                                
The result depends on four input variables: the marginal increase in the network length @′ required to serve an additional unit of weight that is generated by the WCPA, the 
marginal increase in centralized electricity consumption from the network addition A′(, the levelized transmission overnight cost, and the cost difference between 
decentralized and centralized electricity generation, which we will call ΔC. A′( can also be expressed as the average per capita consumption of the newly 
connected population, R(, multiplied by the number of people added to the centralized 
network, p. 
 [@′( ∙ 	#; + 	R( ∙ S ∙ #-] = [R( ∙ S ∙ #]																																						2.7	          
                                             
We can define the breakeven per capita electricity generation level, y∗, for each 
centralized fraction.  Solving Equation 2.7 for y∗	yields the following relation. 
 
y∗( = WX4I∙(YZ∙[( 																																																																											2.8   
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For any node, y* is the maximum per capita electricity generation level for which a 
decentralized distribution network is less expensive than a centralized network.  Take for 
example a y∗of 1000 kWh/person.  This implies that if the actual per capita electricity 
consumption level in a node is greater than 1000 kWh/year, a centralized infrastructure 
will be cheaper overall.  If the actual consumption level is less than 1000 kWh/year, a 
decentralized infrastructure will be cheaper.  A higher y∗ implies that a region is better-
suited for decentralized electricity infrastructure.   
Network connections are made in the order of their efficiency on the basis of 
weight added per unit length so the incremental network length required to connect an 
additional unit of weight will increase as the network expands.  As a result, @( will be 
a convex function when considered on the macro scale.  We also find this condition to 
hold in general for the empirical data generated by the WCPA and later present a method 
for smoothing the network length data to generate a close fitting function that is convex 
throughout the whole domain.  
The second order condition guarantees an optimal minimum value for the system 
cost provided that Equation 2.9 holds. 
 
	RN( < 	 	WXX4I∙	(Y?∙^( 																																																																			(2.9) 
 
As  @NN( > 0, Equation 2.9 will always hold if RN( is negative, or if per capita 
electricity consumption levels decrease as the network expands to less densely populated 
areas.   
The convexity of	@( implies that as the centralized network expands the 
incremental cost of connecting an additional person to the network will increase and 
decentralized electrification will become increasingly cost-effective.   
2.3.4    Approximation of Marginal Network Length                                 
Equation 2.8 shows that the network length function, @(, is not a direct input 
into the economic analysis; only its derivative, @′( , is required.  The following curve-
fitting methodology is used to smooth out small-scale fluctuations in the calculated 
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network length and develop a suitable approximation of @′( that is positive and 
monotonically increasing.  This serves as an input to the economic analyses.   
A smooth approximation of @′(	is found by first taking the convex hull, H, of @(,	which is the minimal convex set containing	@(.   
 
  a = b∑ c ∙ dJ 	e		f	@(, cfℝ, c ≥ 0, ∑ cdJ = 1,			 = 1,2, … 											2.10 
 
An approximation of the derivative of the length function, @Nh(, is then calculated at 
the k hull points, , directly from the piecewise linear function defined by the hull. 
 
  @Nh = WijklWiijkli 								 = 1, 2, … ,  − 1																																					2.11 
 
Derivative approximations for the rest of the domain are determined by linearly 
interpolating between hull points.  
 @Nhm ∙  + 1 − m ∙ nJ = m ∙ @Nh 	+ 	1 − m ∙ @NhnJ		 ∀	m	f[0,1],				 = 1, 2, … ,  − 1																																													2.12  
 
We found this methodology to provide a more consistent fit to the generated network 
lengths across the full range of centralized fractions than a least squares approach.  The 
process smoothes out small fluctuations in the generated network lengths and provides a 
continuous, positive and increasing function for @′( from which y* can be calculated.                     
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Population 
All the country specific population data used in this analysis are from the Gridded 
World Population Project [160].  This project maintains two separate databases; one 
consists of over 50,000 known population settlements while the other divides the world 
into regular grids and contains information on the population residing in each.   Our 
model first uses the settlement data, with each known settlement treated as a node with 
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weight equal to its recorded population.  All settlements in the database have a population 
greater than 1000 people and may be classified as either urban or rural.  For grids that do 
not contain a recorded settlement, we use the gridded database that has a resolution of 15 
arc minutes on a side, corresponding to an area of roughly 770 km2 at the equator and 550 
km2 at 45 degrees latitude.  The result is a set of nodes that are highly concentrated in 
populated regions but also adequately represent the distribution of population in less 
populated regions.    
2.4.2 Electricity Consumption 
The potential demand for electricity in areas that currently are not electrified may 
be influenced by a number of factors such as electricity prices, consumer income, 
electricity availability and reliability, as well as the presence of services that require 
electricity. We do not attempt to explicitly model future electricity demand throughout 
currently unelectrified regions.  Rather, we first briefly discuss select literature relevant to 
the estimation of electricity demand in developing regions.  We then present results 
covering a wide range of potential consumption levels and provide some specific results 
under the assumption that newly electrified regions will consume electricity at the same 
rate as the currently electrified population in each country.   We will henceforth refer to 
the levels of electricity consumption per capita (ECPC) as well as electricity consumption 
per capita electrified (ECPCe).   The ECPEe is the per capita electricity consumption 
level of only the population that has access to electricity, or a country’s ECPC divided by 
its electrification rate.  Data for country level electrification rates are taken from the 
International Energy Agency Electricity Access Database [161].  For countries for which 
such data are not available, electrification rates are assumed to be equal to the regional 
average.   
It has been estimated that 10 W of power can provide a small household with 
sufficient lighting for reading and other simple tasks, as well as enough electricity to 
power basic communication services, such as a cell phone or a radio [162].  A 10 W 
power output used for four hours per day corresponds to about 15 kWh of electricity 
consumption per year.  Another estimate suggests that domestic household electricity 
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consumption of 75 kWh per year (8.6 W) is necessary to meet the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals [162].   
An analysis of rural electrification options in Uganda has assumed domestic 
household electricity demand of 30 kWh/month (40 W) [158] as, in 2003, electricity 
consumption under 30 kWh/month was subject to a significantly lower tariff [163].  
Combined with the electricity needs of shared community services, such as schools and 
health centers, as well as commercial usage, Buchholz and De Silve estimate that this 
corresponds with per capita consumption of 55 kWh/year. 
A summary of recent annual reports from the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority (ZESA) finds that low-income consumers use approximately 50 kWh of 
electricity per household per month, primarily for lighting and radio usage [164].   In 
some rural communities in South Africa 50kWh/month of electricity are provided to low-
income households free of charge [165].  Participants in a rural electrification program in 
Tanzania consumed approximately 35 kWh per capita in 2002 [125]. 
In 2008, the per capita electricity consumption in most of the developed world 
was greater than 5000 kWh/year and exceeded 50,000 kWh/year in Iceland [166].  Per 
capita electricity consumption (ECPC and ECPCe) values for all considered countries are 
presented in the appendix 
Our analysis is framed to calculate the level of electricity consumption for which 
the costs of centralized and decentralized infrastructures are equal for a given population 
node; as such we do not make explicit estimations of electricity demand in different 
regions.  Rather, for each country we present the fraction of population residing in nodes 
which could be cost-effectively served wholly by decentralized infrastructure for a range 
of different consumption levels from 25 kWh/year to 25,000 kWh/year.  These results do 
not require that consumption is constant throughout each considered country, but instead 
identify nodes that would be cost-effectively served by decentralized infrastructure for 
given consumption rates.  
2.4.3 Transmission Costs 
The costs of electricity transmission infrastructure depend on a number of 
external factors and reported or estimated prices can vary significantly on a case by case 
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basis.  Transmission line capacity is also a function of many factors, but generally 
increases with increasing voltage.  Capacity limitations for a specific transmission line 
may be dictated by thermal capacity (MW) for shorter segments or voltage drop (MW-
km) for longer segments.   
A regression analysis of publically available data filed to the U.S. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) between 1994 and 2000 concluded that transmission 
costs per unit capacity decrease with the total nominal capacity in a roughly logarithmic 
fashion [159].  These results indicate that a typical new 138kV line with 100-200MW of 
transmission capacity would cost on average roughly $125,000-$200,000/km.  Similarly, 
lower voltage lines with capacities of 10-25MW would cost on average roughly $15,000-
$40,000/km.  However, this data set also demonstrates a high level of variability between 
the costs of different projects with the same nominal capacity.  Other data suggest the 
cost of a new 132kV transmission line to be $435/MW-km, or $43,500-$87,000/km, in 
New South Wales Australia, including land but not substation cost [167].  Data from 
Colombia suggest a new 138kV transmission cost of $310/MW-km, or $31,000-
$62,000/km and a new 220kV transmission cost of $160/MW-km, or $48,000-
$80,000/km, including land and substation costs [167].   
A study that combines data from recent transmission expansion projects in Europe 
estimates the baseline cost of new transmission over flat land for a single 220kV line to 
be $242,200/km and for a single 380kV line to be $361,440/km [168].  Another study 
that analyzes the costs of grid expansion in the United States present cost assumptions of 
$63,000/km to $250,000/km for 115kV lines and $187,000/km to $1,000,000/km for 
230kV lines [169].  
Deichmann et al. [23] report an estimated cost of $90,000/km for 132kV 
transmission lines and $192,000/km for 220kV lines.  These estimates are for 
implementation in sub-Saharan Africa and do not include the costs required for 
compensators, capacitors and transformers.  An analysis of transmission infrastructure in 
West Africa presents cost estimates of several grid expansion projects that vary from 
approximately $90,000/km to $500,000/km, with most falling between $150,000/km and 
$250,000/km [170].   
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In the analysis that follows, we consider transmission costs ranging from $50,000 
to $500,000 per km, with a number of examples at a cost of $200,000/km. This range is 
intended to model the potential costs of high voltage lines in the range of 66kV to 230kV.   
2.5 Results 
The WCPA is applied to analyze centralized electricity development in 150 
countries.  In each case the existing electricity transmission infrastructure is ignored and 
the algorithm is allowed to develop near minimum-length networks in 1% intervals from 
0% to 100% centralized electricity infrastructure.  This approach provides a data set that 
can be used to isolate the effect of population distribution on network expansion and the 
choice between centralized and decentralized generation infrastructures. 
The WCPA is executed starting from each of the five most densely populated 
nodes in a given country; the shortest length network generated from these five iterations 
is used for each centralized fraction.  The WCPA does not consider the possibility of 
using of multiple disaggregated networks with individual generation sources to connect a 
population.  This could be achieved by dividing a region into disconnected sub-regions.  
Our analysis considers each country as a whole and finds a single low-length network to 
span each centralized fraction. 
2.5.1 Case Studies  
We present case study analyses of centralized grid development in three countries, 
Botswana, Uganda and Bangladesh.  These countries are chosen because of their 
relatively low current electrification rates and their differing population distribution 
profiles.   
For these case studies we establish ranges of potential values for the overnight 
cost of transmission infrastructure and the extra cost of decentralized generation. 
We make assumptions for transmission costs and the extra cost of decentralized 
generation in the middle of these potential ranges and analyze the sensitivities of our 
results around these key parameters.  The transmission cost parameter is taken to be 
constant throughout each individual network and can be thought of as the average 
transmission cost per kilometer.   
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Each analysis is presented as a 3x3 color plot matrix of the y* value in each node 
in a given country.  Three values of the difference between centralized and decentralized 
generation cost, ∆C, are varied along the x-axis, while three values of transmission 
overnight cost are varied along the y-axis.  The resultant figure depicts nine potential 
scenarios for each combination of these two parameters. 
2.5.1.1 Botswana 
Botswana is a country in southern Africa with a population of approximately 1.5 
million people and 560,000 km2 of total land area, for a population density of 2.6 
people/km2; one of the least densely populated countries of the 150 considered by this 
analysis.  Per capita electricity consumption is 1,282 kWh/year and currently 45% of 
households have regular access to electricity, implying an ECPCe of 2849 kWh/year 
[161, 171].  Both of these values are significantly higher than average for sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Botswana imports large quantities of electricity from South Africa; however the 
country has significant coal resources and is expanding its domestic centralized 
generation infrastructure.  Rural electrification is also underway to meet expected 
increases in rural demand.  Diesel generators and solar photovoltaics are the most 
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common decentralized technologies considered for these applications.       
 
Figure 2.3: Matrix plot of breakeven electricity consumption per capita for different 
overnight transmission costs and extra costs of decentralized generation in Botswana. 
 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates how the low population density of Botswana makes 
much of the country relatively well suited for decentralized electrification.  It can be seen 
that in the baseline scenario, at the center of figure 2.3, much of the western part of the 
country would be cost-effectively served wholly by decentralized infrastructure even for 
electricity consumption levels of 10,000kWh/year or greater.  Exceptions can be seen in 
several settlements located in otherwise sparsely populated regions of the country.  The 
most notable of these is small city of about 50,000 people called Maun, located in the 
north central part of the country. If this settlement consumes electricity at the same rate as 
the rest of the electrified population in Botswana, it would be most cost-effectively 
served by a centralized infrastructure even in the cases of a transmission overnight cost of 
$200,000/km and ∆C of 5 cents/kWh (right-most map on middle row) or a transmission 
overnight cost of $500,000/km and a ∆C of 10 cents/kWh (central map on top row).   
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2.5.1.2 Uganda 
Uganda is a country in East Africa with a population of approximately 32 million 
people and 213,000 km2 of total land area, for a population density of 155 people/km2.  
The per capita electricity consumption is 60 kWh/year and currently only 9% of 
households have regular access to electricity, one of the lowest electrification rates in the 
world [161, 171].  This implies an ECPCe of roughly 667 kWh/year.  Currently, only 1% 
of total energy consumption in Uganda is from electricity, while over 90% is derived 
from burning traditional wood-based fuel [172].  Growth in electricity demand is 
outpacing supply, which is being largely met by electricity imports. There are also 
significant untapped hydro resources in the country and several large hydroelectric 
projects have been proposed which could provide up to 1GW or more of generation 
capacity [173].  
   
Figure 2.4: Matrix plot of breakeven electricity consumption per capita for different 
overnight transmission costs and extra costs of decentralized generation in Uganda. 
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Figure 2.4 shows how the relatively low electricity consumption makes much of 
Uganda well-suited for decentralized electrification.  Under the baseline scenario in the 
center of figure 2.4, there are a number of regions with y* values that exceed the 689 
kWh/year ECPCe level currently consumed in Uganda.  However, the higher population 
density makes Uganda much less suited for decentralized electrification than Botswana 
for similar levels of electricity consumption.  It can be seen that in the baseline (central) 
figure, there are no nodes with a y* value greater than roughly 2000 kWh/year.  This 
implies that there are no regions that would be served wholly by decentralized 
technologies under the baseline scenario if per capita electricity consumption grew to 
levels greater than roughly 2000 kWh/year.   
2.5.1.3 Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is a country in south Asia with a population of approximately 163 
million people and 144,000 km2 of total land area.  This makes Bangladesh the most 
densely populated sizable country in the world with a population density of 1136 
people/km2, almost three times greater than the second most densely populated, South 
Korea (421 people/km2).  Average per capita electricity consumption is 151 kWh/year 
and currently 41% of households have regular access to electricity, resulting in an ECPCe 
of 368 kWh/year [161, 171].  Bangladesh has minimal reserves of oil and coal, but 
significant natural gas resources that are not fully utilized.  State owned electricity 
generation currently provides 4700 MW of capacity [174].  Many households in 
Bangladesh are not connected to the centralized grid and the country has seen a recent 
surge in small-scale decentralized generation.  As of 2011, over one million homes are 
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powered by rooftop solar systems [175].     
 
Figure 2.5:  Matrix plot of levelized cost differential for different overnight transmission 
costs and electricity demand levels in Bangladesh. 
 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates how the high population density of Bangladesh makes it 
less well-suited for decentralized electrification than either Botswana or Uganda.  Under 
the baseline scenario there are few nodes that would be served by decentralized 
electricity for average electricity consumption levels greater than 300 kWh/year.   
Even though the economic analysis indicates that centralized electricity would be more 
cost effective than decentralized electricity, it is decentralized electricity that is growing 
rapidly. The expansion of rooftop solar technologies in Bangladesh has created 
economies of scale that allow small-scale systems to be installed in a period of days 
instead of years and enable these products to be financed at relatively low interest rates 
through the backing of microfinance organizations.  The relative merits of decentralized 
electricity in terms of accessibility, ease of installation, and reliability are outweighing 
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the cost advantages of unrealized centralized generation.  This situation may be repeated 
in other countries.  
2.5.2 Aggregated Data 
We now aggregate data from over 150,000 nodes in all 150 considered countries.  
Figure 2.6 depicts the y* value of each node as a function of its population under the 
baseline assumptions of a $200,000/km average transmission infrastructure overnight 
cost and 10 cents/kWh extra cost of decentralized generation.   
 
Figure 2.6:  Plot of maximum per capita electricity consumption for which decentralized 
electricity generation would be less expensive than a centralized system, as a function of 
population for nodes worldwide, in the case of $200,000/km average transmission 
overnight cost of and 10 cents/kWh extra cost of decentralized generation.  The relative 
suitability of decentralized electrification in a given node increases with increasing values 
of y*. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows an underlying linear behavior with negative slope in this log-log 
representation. This reflects the formulation of Equation 2.8, which can be rewritten as 
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y∗( ∙ S = WX4I∙(Y[( ~qrstu
su																															2.13  
 
In this example, with CT = $30,000/km-yr, ∆C=0.10$/kWh and, considering plausible 
inter-settlement distances, an incremental network length X’ on the order of 10-100 km, 
the right side of Equation 2.13 is approximately constant in the range of 3 x 106 – 107 
kWh/yr.  This basic line forms the backdrop of figure 2.6, mediated by the details of 
population distribution and geography that is incorporated in the network analysis of 
transmission lengths.  
Figure 2.7 shows the percentage of population and area of each country that can 
be cost-effectively served wholly by decentralized systems, if those areas were to 
consume electricity at the same rate as the currently electrified population in each 
country.  In reality, consumption levels in newly electrified areas will not necessarily 
mirror those in areas that are already electrified, and as such results for each individual 
country should be interpreted in context.  However this assumption provides a reasonable 
baseline for analyzing the broader relationship between decentralized fractions and 
electricity consumption density.  These results show a clear correlation between potential 
electricity consumption density, which is calculated by multiplying current ECPCe in 
each country by the population and dividing by the total area of the country. The plot 
assumes the baseline values of $200,000/km average transmission line costs and a 10 
cents/kWh extra cost of decentralized generation. 
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Figure 2.7:  The percentage of population and area that can be cost-effectively served 
wholly by decentralized electrification for 150 countries as a function potential electricity 
consumption density.  Potential electricity consumption density is calculated by assuming 
countrywide electricity consumption levels equal to the average consumption of currently 
electrified populations and dividing by the country’s total area. 
 
These plots show that there is a ‘saturation point’ of potential consumption 
density around 200,000 kWh/year-km2 at which point decentralized percentages of both 
population and area drop to near zero in most cases.  This reflects Equation 2.13; the 
metric of kWh/yr-km2 can be interpreted as per-person consumption kWh/person-yr 
times the population density people/km2.  A table with decentralized electrification 
percentages and potential population densities for each considered country is given in 
appendix A.  
Table 2.2 shows the 11 countries for which more than 50% of the population can 
be cost-effectively served by decentralized infrastructure, while table 2.3 shows the 13 
countries for which more than 90% of the nodes can be cost-effectively served by 
decentralized infrastructure.  Both tables assume a $200,000/km transmission overnight 
cost, 10 cents/kWh extra cost of decentralized generation and electricity consumption 
equal to the current consumption of the electrified population. 
 
 43
Table 2.2: Countries for which greater than 50% of the population can be cost-effectively 
served wholly by decentralized infrastructure.
 
 
Table 2.3: Countries for which greater than 90% of the nodes can be cost-effectively 
served wholly by decentralized infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the cumulative fraction of world population that resides in a 
node with a y* value at or above a certain level.  For example, if the extra cost of 
decentralized generation were 10 cents/kWh, roughly 3-4% of world population could be 




























Chad 91.7% 9 9 29% 31                 268           
Equatorial Guinea 76.3% 16 39 29% 134               2,139         
Sierra Leone 76.1% 79 14 29% 48                 3,833         
Afghanistan 75.8% 49 8 14% 57                 2,807         
Central African Republic 75.5% 7 22 29% 76                 556           
Mali 72.9% 12 34 29% 117               1,435         
Guinea-Bissau 70.9% 38 38 29% 131               4,963         
Somalia 64.9% 20 26 29% 90                 1,828         
Sudan 56.0% 15 76 31% 245               3,765         
Eritrea 55.5% 44 38 32% 119               5,257         
Niger 50.0% 14 36 29% 124               1,776         
Country 

























Central African Republic 99.8% 7 22 29% 76                 556               
Chad 99.5% 9 9 29% 31                 268               
Mongolia 98.7% 2 965 67% 1,440             2,712             
Afghanistan 98.0% 49 8 14% 57                 2,807             
Sierra Leone 97.7% 79 14 29% 48                 3,833             
Mali 97.4% 12 34 29% 117               1,435             
Mauritania 96.4% 4 118 29% 407               1,453             
Guinea-Bissau 96.2% 38 38 29% 131               4,963             
Somalia 95.1% 20 26 29% 90                 1,828             
Niger 95.1% 14 36 29% 124               1,776             
Guyana 93.6% 3 896 93% 963               2,832             
Sudan 93.5% 15 76 31% 245               3,765             
Equatorial Guinea 92.5% 16 39 29% 134               2,139             
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at a rate of 1000 kWh/person-year.  
 
Figure 2.8: The cumulative world population residing in a node with a y* value at or 
above each value on the x-axis.  This figure can be used to interpret the fraction of the 
world population that can be cost-effectively served wholly by decentralized 
infrastructure for a given rate of electricity consumption per capita. 
 
Figure 2.9 shows the percentage of population that can be cost-effectively served 
by decentralized infrastructure in each country, if that population were to consume 
electricity at the country’s ECPCe.  It can be seen that in most of the developed world 5% 
or less of the population lives in regions that would be classified as decentralized by our 
analysis.  There is more potential for decentralized infrastructure in the developing world, 
particularly in Africa.  This is largely due to the relatively low current levels of electricity 
consumption in these regions.  
Figure 2.9: Color coded map of the percentage of population that could be c
effectively served entirely by decentralized infrastructure if they were to consume 
electricity at the same rate as the currently electrified population in the country, using 
baseline parameters of 200,000/km overnight cost and 10 cents/kWh extra cost 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Global electrification can use both centralized and decentralized electricity 
generation technologies.  We have shown that there are a number of countries, 
particularly in Africa, for which decentralized electricit
centralized for a substantial fraction of the population and land area.  The variables that 
favor decentralized electricity 
and low cost increment compared to centra
structure of the relationship can be seen in F
hyperbolic decrease in the consumption rates that are suitable for decentralized 
generation.  However, this basic rel
distribution and geography.  Application of the network algorithm developed here 
provides a more detailed assessment of the regions of a country in which decentralized 
generation is likely to be more cost e
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decentralized generation. 
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lized electricity – are well known.  The basic 
igure 2.6: as population increases there is a 
ationship is mediated by variations in population 





detailed project planning, but does indicate the specific regions and populations for which 
decentralized generation may be more cost-effective.  The case studies of Botswana, 
Uganda, and Bangladesh illustrate both the basic characteristics of low population density 
and low consumption favoring decentralized generation, and also the algorithm-based 
result of the optimal network for centralized electricity and corresponding regions for 
decentralized electricity.  
The choice of centralized or decentralized electricity may not be decided on the 
basis of cost alone.  Centralized generation may be developed even when more expensive 
than decentralized generation, potentially to ensure universal access or to promote 
substantial increases in electricity consumption.  Decentralized generation may be 
developed if the central utility authority does not provide adequate or reliable electricity. 
Of the three case study countries, Bangladesh was the one for which decentralized 
electricity was least cost effective, due to the very high population densities.  Yet, with 
centralized electricity not meeting demand, there is considerable decentralized electricity 
development in Bangladesh.  This analysis considers only system costs and assumes 
competent, reliable electricity development and management, but when centralized 
electricity is not available or reliable, decentralized electricity systems may be preferred.  
The general analysis shows that for the majority of the world’s population and 
area, centralized electricity, at typical current prices, is the most cost effective approach.  
The analysis also shows that decentralized electricity can make a substantial contribution 
to global electrification.  There are many regions, particularly in Africa, where 





A MIXED INTEGER PROGRAMMING MODEL FOR 
ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMET 
3.1 Introduction 
The costs of different electricity generation technologies are often compared on 
the basis of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), which incorporates the full lifecycle 
costs of a generation technology into a single metric.  The literature is replete with 
different methodologies for performing these calculations and comparisons [157, 176–
180].  Such calculations have also been specifically applied to determine the levelized 
costs of decentralized generation technologies, such as solar photovoltaics, under a 
variety of different financial assumptions [5, 181].  However, it has been argued that the 
levelized cost metric may be inappropriate for comparing intermittent generation 
technologies with varying dispatch profiles, such as wind or solar [182].  Therefore, 
analyses beyond simple levelized cost comparisons are likely necessary to fully evaluate 
the choice between generation technologies, particularly when intermittent technologies 
are being considered.  
In developing countries with low electrification rates, it is important to consider 
the cost per household of new connections to a centralized electric grid [20, 21].  The cost 
of new transmission and distribution infrastructure can also be combined with a levelized 
cost of generation analysis to identify regions that may be more or less suitable for 
decentralized infrastructures [23, 183].  
We present a methodology for determining the lowest cost electricity generation 
and transmission infrastructure that can serve electricity demand in a given region.  Our 
work focuses on developing the specific details of such an infrastructure system 
(transmission line voltages, generation facility locations), as opposed to examining the 
economic feasibility of different options from a broader perspective.  In contrast to some 
earlier studies, we apply our methodology to large-scale, country level planning 
involving both centralized and decentralized generation facilities and relatively high 
voltage transmission lines (30+ kV).  However, the model could easily be used to analyze 
the development of smaller-scale networks as well.   
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A case study of electricity infrastructure development in Rwanda is presented to 
illustrate an application of the methodology at the country level.  The infrastructure data 
informing the model are based on existing electricity generation and transmission 
facilities in Rwanda as well as potential or proposed projects.  We present sensitivities 
around a range of different levels of average power demand and costs of decentralized 
technologies.  Additionally, we examine how the generated network is affected by 
changes in the resolution of the population data, and analyze the tradeoff between more 
precise results and faster computation time.  
Centralized electricity offers the advantage of a generally lower unit cost of 
generation; however centralized facilities also require relatively large generation 
capacities to achieve such an economy of scale.  Decentralized generation generally has a 
greater unit cost of electricity generation, but offers the flexibility of smaller facilities that 
can be located close to demand sites.  As such, costly high-voltage transmission networks 
are not required to deliver decentralized electricity to the end user.  Therefore, despite the 
generally higher unit cost of decentralized electricity, decentralized systems may provide 
a cheaper overall option in some locations when considering the combined costs of 
generation and transmission.   
The case study is primarily meant to illustrate our methodology and provide a 
high-level analysis of the choice between centralized and decentralized electricity 
infrastructure development in Rwanda.  The results can be used by planners to inform 
high-level development strategies and policies.  An analysis to be used for specific 
project implementation would benefit from more detailed data, specifically regarding the 
capacities and costs of transmission lines in Rwanda, as well as explicit modeling of 
time-dependent grid load.  
3.2 Methodology 
We formulate a mixed-integer program (MIP) for planning an electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure.  The primary objective is to 
determine the lowest-cost combined centralized and decentralized infrastructure that is 
capable of serving electricity demand in a region.  The power flow in this formulation is 
dictated by constraints that ensure there is an energy balance at each demand node.  As 
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such, the model does not explicitly model time-dependent demand, but rather finds the 
minimum-cost infrastructure that ensures there is sufficient generation and transmission 
capacity throughout the system to meet both average and peak demand levels.  This 
formulation was chosen to minimize computational requirements while also ensuring that 
sufficient infrastructure is available to serve demand.  A linear direct current (DC) 
approximation of alternating current (AC) power flow could also be employed at the cost 
of some additional computational requirements.   
Power generation facilities are characterized by peak generation capacity as well 
as capacity factors that dictate average generation levels.  Constraints require that total 
generation capacity is sufficient to satisfy both peak power demand and system-wide 
yearly energy demand.  The required transmission infrastructure is largely independent of 
load shape, and is rather dictated primarily by the peak load level.  The binding 
transmission constraint requires that there is sufficient capacity to transmit peak levels of 
power demand.  The locations of centralized generation facilities are also considered.  
The economics of centralized and decentralized options are compared on the basis 
of the present value of the full lifecycle costs of each technology including overnight 
cost, financing, operations and maintenance, and fuel.   These various cost streams 
associated with the construction and operation of a generation facility are discounted over 
the plant lifetime to determine the present value of lifetime operation.  Our calculations 
are applied over a 50 year time horizon, which is the assumed operational lifetime for 
centralized technologies and transmission infrastructure.  Solar home systems are 
assumed to have a 25 year lifetime and therefore must be replaced once over a 50 year 
horizon.  A real annual discount rate of 5% is used and the MIP is solved to minimize the 
total discounted lifetime cost of meeting system-wide peak and average power demand.   
3.2.1 Mixed-Integer Program 
A mixed-integer program is formulated to find the combination of centralized and 
decentralized infrastructure that minimizes the total cost of meeting system-wide 
electricity demand in a region.  The region is modeled as a set of nodes or demand points, 
each of which may be connected to any of its neighbors by a transmission line.  The 
formulation below includes the option of developing either a high or low voltage 
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transmission line on each edge; however, arbitrarily many classes of transmission lines 
could be included at the cost of additional computational resources.     
3.2.1.1 Decision variables 
Decentralized electricity generation may be implemented at any node without 
restriction, while new centralized generation facilities are restricted to pre-identified 
projects.  The decision variables are described and classified according to their type 
below.  Continuous variables are represented by x while binary variables are represented 
by y, m is the number of possible edges in the system, n is the number of nodes and r is 
the number of potential new centralized generation facilities.  
• J,J…J,/: Average transmission power level in each edge 
• v,J…v,w: Peak transmission power level in each edge 
• Rx,J…Rx,w: Indicator for a high voltage transmission line on each edge 
• Ry,J…Ry,w: Indicator for a low voltage transmission on each edge 
• z,J…z,/: Average centralized consumption in each node  
• {,J…{,/: Peak centralized consumption in each node  
• R|,J…5,/: Indicator for a local centralized distribution network in each node 
• },J…},/: Decentralized capacity in each node  
• R~,J…R~,4: Indicator for each centralized generation facility 
Additional parameters used in the formulation are outlined below; the index i refers to 
edges while the index j refers to nodes and k refers to centralized facilities. 
• : Length of edge i in kilometers 
• ,	3: Power capacity of high and low voltage transmission lines  
• #, #3: Cost per kilometer of high and low voltage transmission lines  
• #: Cost of decentralized generation technology, per kW capacity 
• #: Present value of lifecycle cost of centralized facility k 
• #&: Cost of connecting one person to the transmission line within a node 
• : Reserve requirement for transmission lines, includes the effects of 
transmission losses 
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• #: Capacity factor of decentralized generation technology 
• #: Capacity factor of centralized generation facility k 
• : The set of all edges feeding into node j 
• $: The set of all edges feeding out of node j 
• : Average electricity power demand in node j 
• &: Peak electricity power demand in node j 
• (: Power generation capacity of centralized facility k 
• : The population of node j 
3.2.1.2 Objective function 
The objective of this optimization problem is to minimize the total cost of 
meeting electricity demand in a given system.  The objective function can be expressed 
as follows, 
 
min  ∙ #wdJ ∙ Rx, 	+	 ∙ #3
w




dJ ∙ }, 	+#
4
dJ
∙ R~,	 			3.1 
 
Here the first and second terms respectively represent the cost of new high and low 
voltage transmission lines.  The third term represents the cost of distribution line infilling 
within each demand node that is connected to the centralized grid.  The fourth and fifth 
terms respectively represent the costs of new decentralized and centralized generation 
facilities.  Recurring cost streams are discounted and encapsulated into a present value 
equivalent over a 50 year time horizon.  
3.2.1.3 Constraints 
The objective function is minimized subject to the following constraints. 
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A first constraint ensures that the flow of power into and out of each node is consistent.  
That is, the flow of power into a node plus the generation in that node must be greater 
than consumption plus the power flow out; this holds for both average and peak power.  
Decentralized generation is not considered to be connected to the grid and is therefore not 
included. 
 
J,	∈ −  J,	∈> − z, +  # ∙ 	( ∙ R~,	∈60/ ≥ 0			∀					3.2 
v,	∈ −  v,	∈> − {, +  	( ∙ R~,	∈60/ ≥ 0			∀				3.3 
 
The next constraint ensures that centralized and decentralized consumption in 
each node combine to meet both average and peak demand.  The reserve requirement 
applies to centralized consumption to ensure proper resiliency in the transmission lines 
and also includes the effects of transmission losses.  The purpose of the reserve 
requirement is to provide a buffer of additional generation and transmission capacity to 
ensure that service is still provided in the event that demand marginally exceeds 
anticipated peak levels.  The reserve requirement can also provide resiliency in the event 
that a generation facility goes offline.  In developing countries electricity generation is 
often unreliable and plant outages may be fairly common.  This effect can be accounted 
for by including a relatively high reserve requirement to ensure that service is provided 
even if certain infrastructure components temporarily cease to function.  Decentralized 
solar home systems include a controller that strictly limits the power being drawn from 
the system.  As the load of each individual system cannot exceed this level, a reserve 
requirement is not necessary to ensure resiliency due to unanticipated demand.  
Decentralized systems may also go offline due to malfunction or required maintenance; 
however, this analysis does not consider a backup option for such systems.  
 1 ∙ z, + # ∙ 	}, ≥  			∀				3.4 1 ∙ {, +	}, ≥ & 			∀				3.5 
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A third constraint requires that a node must be connected to the transmission 
backbone by a local distribution network in order for centralized power to be consumed 
throughout that node.   
 z, −  ∙ R|, 	≤ 0			∀				3.6 {, − & ∙ R|, 	≤ 0			∀				3.7 
 
An additional constraint ensures that no more than one transmission line is 
constructed on each edge.  
 Rx, + Ry, ≤ 1		∀				3.8 
 
A final set of constraints ensures that the capacity of each line is greater than the absolute 
values of both the average and peak power levels. 
 eJ,e − Rx, ∙  − 	Ry, ∙ 3 	≤ 0			∀				3.9 ev,e − Rx, ∙  − 	Ry, ∙ 3 	≤ 0			∀				3.10 
 
All variables are non-negative with the exception of J, and v, where the 
direction of power flow is defined by their sign.   
3.3 Rwanda Case Study 
Rwanda is a landlocked country in East Africa with a population of approximately 
10 million people that has one of the least developed electricity infrastructures of any 
country in the world.  The country is represented as a set of demand centers, or nodes, 
which are derived from population data available from The Gridded World Population 
Project [160].  In this case study, we utilize population data with a node resolution of 2.5 
arcminutes as our original data set, and consolidate this set as desired to form 
geographical representations of population dispersion in Rwanda with node resolution of 
3, 6, 12 and 24 arcminutes.  Each node has associated average and peak power demands, 
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which must each be satisfied through a combination of centralized and decentralized 
electricity.  
3.3.1 Electricity Services 
In rural communities, small quantities of electricity are often first used to replace 
kerosene lighting with electric lights.  Kerosene can be costly and provide poor quality 
light.  Additional electricity may be demanded to provide power for a radio, television or 
a cellular telephone.   
A case study of rural village energy use in Kenya found that widely used kerosene 
lamps produced an average output of about 20 lumens, which generally enables only 
basic activities and is not enough for comfortable reading [162].  These lamps can be 
replaced by 7 W compact fluorescent bulbs that provide 300 lumens, enough for reading 
and the illumination of a small room.  Additional electricity may be used to power a radio 
or cellular telephone, which can be accomplished with about 3 W of power.  This 10 W 
peak demand level might be considered the minimal practical electric load for a single 
household in a rural setting.  As a household may include five or more inhabitants, as 
little as 2 W of power per capita could be sufficient to significantly affect quality of life 
in many un-electrified regions.  In 2005 it was estimated that a 20 W solar system in 
Kenya would cost $150 to $200 [162].    
The growth of small-scale solar electrification has perhaps been most rapid in 
Bangladesh over the past decade, which now has over one million homes powered by 
solar systems and is on pace to pass 2.5 million by 2014 [175].  This effort has been led 
by Grammen Shakti, an organization that provides individual solar home systems ranging 
from 10-135 W in output capacity. These systems include a battery, all necessary 
controllers and cables and CFL bulbs.  The systems cost approximately $6/W to $7/W 
and are designed to provide electricity for four hours per day.  A typical 50 W system 
provides a 12 volt DC power output that can operate four 7 watt CFL bulbs and a 17 inch 
black and white television and includes a battery with 80 amp-hours of storage capacity; 
it is sold in Bangladesh for 29,500 taka ($350) [184].  The battery provides a maximum 
energy storage capacity of .96 kWh, which is sufficient to service a 50 W load for 19.2 
hours on a single full charge.  In rural settings, a significant portion of energy services are 
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consumed in the form of evening lighting after the sun has set.  This battery helps ensure 
that the solar home system can provide a consistent power output after sunset when the 
photovoltaic panel is no longer able to directly generate electricity. 
3.3.1.1 Average and Peak Demand 
Our model finds the minimum cost infrastructure that satisfies both average and 
peak power demand levels.  We define the peak factor of any given node to be the ratio 
of peak power demand to average power demand.  The peak factor of the centralized 
electricity network in Rwanda was 1.75 in 2003 and this has been projected to drop to 
1.67 in 2011 [185].  In order to avoid outages, enough generation capacity must be 
available in order to serve peak demand.  Therefore systems with higher peak factors will 
incur greater costs due to lower average utilization.  We assume a peak factor of 1.7 for 
loads that are served by new centralized infrastructure as well as for those served by new 
decentralized systems.  This model does not consider temporal load curve resolution 
beyond the average and peak demand levels as these are the two parameters that will 
primarily influence infrastructure investment decisions.  More detailed load curve 
information could be included at the cost of additional computational requirements. 
Variations in the peak factor over a reasonable range of values have a modest impact on 
results.   
We apply our methodology to understand how the variations in electricity demand 
influence the decision between different generation technologies.  Electricity demand of 
the currently electrified population is based on recent consumption data, while demand 
levels for newly electrified populations will be varied to determine how these changes 
affect the optimal development strategy. 
3.3.1.2 Current Infrastructure 
As of 2009, Rwanda has approximately 55 MW of available centralized electricity 
generation capacity, spread fairly evenly between hydroelectric and oil thermal plants 
[186].  There is also a small amount of microhyrdo generation as well as a 250 kW solar 
array near the capital, Kigali.  The electric grid in Rwanda has two high voltage 
backbones, with approximately 285 km of 110 kV and 64 km of 70 kV lines, and there is 
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also a significant 30 kV network as well as 15 kV and 6.6 kV distribution lines [187].  
The current level of generation capacity is not sufficient to adequately serve demand in 
Rwanda and the shortages have led to dramatic increases in electricity prices and utility 
scale implementation of diesel generators.  Currently only 6% of the population has 
access to electricity and the Rwandan government has laid out an aggressive target to 
increase the electrification rate to 35% by 2020, with an emphasis placed on rural areas.  
As a result, electricity demand per capita is also expected to increase from 30 kWh/year 
to 100 kWh/year over that time [186].  Combined with an expected 30% growth in 
population, total countrywide electricity demand could increase by a factor of four or five 
in the next decade.  
Our case study of Rwanda includes nine existing centralized generation facilities 
with a total operating capacity of approximately 55 MW.    
3.3.1.3 Future Infrastructure 
Centralized Generation 
It has been estimated that unutilized power generation resources in Rwanda could 
amount to 1,200 MW, more than enough to meet increasing demand [186].  These 
include significant untapped hydroelectric resources and large methane gas deposits that 
are known to exist at the bottom of Lake Kivu on the western border of the country.  
Solar irradiation in Rwanda is relatively high at an average of 5.2 kWh/m2day [187].  
Rwanda also has an estimated 170-320 MW of geothermal power potential as well as 
wind resources, but further investigations are necessary before these technologies are 
implemented [187]. 
Methane deposits in Lake Kivu have been discovered which may be able to 
provide as much as 700 MW of power and discussions have targeted realizing 350 MW 
of this in the next decade [187].  An initial 25 MW plant has been announced with future 
planned expansions to 100 MW [188].  The additional, targeted but unplanned, capacity 
of 250 MW is also included in our model at a comparable unit cost.  As the proposed 
large hydroelectric projects at Rusizi and Rusumo would each be shared between three 
countries, these figures represent the Rwandan share of power and costs.   
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Rwanda is geographically situated on the East Africa Rift, a region with significant 
potential for electricity generation from underground geothermal heat.  It has been 
estimated that more than 300 MW of geothermal power could be generated in the western 
part of the country near Lake Kivu.  Initial feasibility explorations are now underway, 
and the Rwandan Energy Ministry is targeting 310 MW of new geothermal power 
capacity over the next seven years at a cost of $935 million; however a third-party cost 
analysis has not been performed.  We include an additional 20% in the cost to account for 
the required feasibility studies and potential optimism in the government estimate. 
We consider 13 potential new generation facilities with total capacity of approximately 
840 MW for future construction.  The capacities and costs for these potential generation 
sites are listed in table 3.1 and represent best estimates based on a variety of information 
sources.  Cost calculations for centralized technologies assume a 15% carrying charge 
applied over a 30 year book life and annual operations and maintenance costs equal to 
3% of the overnight cost.  The Lake Kivu project includes the costs of infrastructure to 
extract methane from the lake and it is assumed that no additional fuel costs will be 
incurred.  
 






Lake Kivu I 25 140 Methane Thermal 
Lake Kivu II 75 185 Methane Thermal 
Lake Kivu III 250 620 Methane Thermal 
Mukungwa II 2.5 7.5 Hydroelectric 
Mukungwa III 2.2 6.6 Hydroelectric 
Nyabarongo  27.5 97.7 Hydroelectric 
Rukarara  9.5 20 Hydroelectric 
Rubavu  3.2 9.6 Hydroelectric 
Rugezi  2.2 6.6 Hydroelectric 
Rusizi III 48 150 Hydroelectric 
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Rusizi IV 68 212 Hydroelectric 
Rusumo 20 57 Hydroelectric 
Lake Kivu 310 1120 Geothermal 
 
As our model only includes requirements to meet average and peak demand, the 
time-dependent output profiles and each generation technology are not explicitly 
modeled.  The ability of each generation technology to met peak demand is defined by its 
rated generation capacity, while its ability to meet average demand is defined by its 
capacity factor.  Thermal technologies are assumed to operate at an 85% capacity factor 
and hydroelectric technologies at a 40% capacity factor.  These effects are accounted for 
through constraints in the MIP formulation.    
Decentralized Generation 
The decentralized technology considered by the model is a small, solar home 
system, which offers peak generation capacity of 50 W and includes a 12 volt battery 
with 80 amp-hours of storage capacity.  The maximum load on each system is assumed to 
be equal to the peak generation capacity, or approximately 4 amps for a 50 W system. 
This implies that a fully charged battery can provide roughly 20 hours of uninterrupted 
power to a system operating at the maximum load level. Solar home systems are gaining 
popularity throughout the developing world as a viable alternative to centralized options 
that are easily scalable to meet peak demand levels greater than 50 W and can be 
implemented relatively quickly.   
We analyze sensitivity around the cost of this technology, with scenarios 
assuming installed costs of $5, $6 and $7 per watt.  In each scenario the systems are 
assumed to be financed at 8% interest over three years with annual maintenance costs 
equal to 1% of the overnight cost and require one system replacement after 25 years.  It is 
assumed that these systems operate at a 16% capacity factor and are located at demand 
sites; therefore they do not require distribution infrastructure.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, electricity generated from decentralized technologies is assumed to be a perfect 
substitute for electricity generated from centralized technologies.  
Transmission and Distribution 
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In the case study, the term ‘transmission’ will be used to refer to lines of 30 kV or 
greater while ‘distribution’ will be used for lines of less than 30 kV.  The current 
electricity transmission infrastructure in Rwanda is made up of 30 kV, 70 kV and 110 kV 
lines.  Our grid extension model only considers adding new 30 kV and 110 kV lines so as 
to limit computational complexity.    
Our model explicitly characterizes the expansion of transmission infrastructure 
(30 kV and 110 kV), while the costs of extending distribution infrastructure (<30 kV) to 
individual demand centers within each node are considered on the basis of a fixed cost 
per household.  An analysis of electric grid expansion in Kenya estimated the cost of 
connecting households to a nearby medium voltage transmission line within the same 
demand node to be $1246/household [20].  We assume a comparable cost of 
$1250/household in our analysis, or $250/person assuming five people per household.  In 
this analysis, the entire population of a node is considered to be centralized if such a 
distribution network is developed. 
The capacity and overnight cost of each transmission line class are consistent with 
values used in other similar studies of electric grid expansion in Sub-Saharan Africa [20, 
23] and an empirical study of the costs of transmission infrastructure [159].  The costs of 
transmission lines are further augmented to account for the costs of transformers and 
other transmission infrastructure, which are not explicitly modeled by our methodology.  
These costs typically account for roughly 60% of total transmission costs.  We do not 
have access to data that would allow us to account for geographic factors and terrain 
features, which may affect the unit cost of each individual transmission segment.  
Therefore a homogenous, average cost of transmission is applied to all potential segments 
throughout the region.  
The present cost of transmission infrastructure is calculated based on the 
assumption of a 15% carrying charge over a 30 year book life and annual operations and 
maintenance costs equal to 1% of overnight cost.  Capacity and cost of transmission and 





Table 3.2: Transmission line parameters 
Voltage Maximum Capacity Overnight Cost 
110 kV 100 MW $150,000/km 
30 kV 7.5MW $15,000/km 
3.4 Results 
In applying our model to a case study analysis of Rwanda, we seek to understand 
how the decision between centralized and decentralized infrastructures is affected by 
variations in the potential electricity demand of new consumers and the cost of 
decentralized generation technologies.  Sensitivities are analyzed around two key 
parameters; average per capita electricity consumption for newly electrified populations, 
and the cost of decentralized generation technologies.  We also explore the effect of 
scaling the model formulation to include more or less detailed population data, in terms 
of both results and computation time.  Results are presented for 15 scenarios 
encompassing combinations of five different demand levels and three different 
decentralized generation costs.  These 15 scenarios are also executed at four different 
node resolutions.  All results were generated by solving the MIP with a target optimality 
gap of 1% and a maximum runtime of 25,000 seconds.    
3.4.1 Electricity Development in Rwanda 
Figure 3.1 shows the fraction of the population that would be served by 
centralized electricity infrastructure under each scenario.  A node that is served by 
centralized infrastructure may also produce decentralized generation, but this is not 
observed to occur significantly in our results.  A single star denotes a solution that failed 
to converge within 1% of optimality in the 25,000 second time limit, while a double star 
denotes a scenario that failed to converge within 5% of optimality. 
It can be seen that at a cost of $5/W or $6/W, Rwanda could be largely served by 
decentralized generation for average consumption levels at or below 4W per capita.  At a 
cost of $7/W Rwanda could be largely served by decentralized generation for 
consumption levels at or below 2W/capita.  The results for scenarios executed at each 
node resolution are largely consistent, with the exception of two 3’ scenarios.  However, 
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neither of these solutions ($5/W decentralized cost with 6W/capita consumption and 
$7/W decentralized cost with 4W/capita consumption) converged to the within 1% of 
optimality within the time limit.  Early termination will generally result in a partially 
developed transmission infrastructure.  This is likely the cause of the discrepancy 
between these scenarios at 3’ resolution and the other resolutions.   
These results show that only the capital of Kigali, which contains approximately 
7% of total countrywide population, would be served by centralized infrastructure when 
consumption is below these thresholds.  When using population data with 24 arcminute 
resolution, the single largest node contains roughly 14% of the total population, which 
accounts for the difference that is observed.  Other slight differences are present between 
the scenarios executed with different node resolution, however the same broad trend 
generally holds in each case.   
It’s also notable that there are very few combinations of parameters that lead to a 
combined network with significant portions of both centralized and decentralized 
electrification.  In each cost scenario there are certain tipping points, where the optimal 
countrywide electrification plan shifts from almost an entirely centralized infrastructure 
to an almost entirely decentralized infrastructure.  The tipping point is also generally 
consistent across scenarios executed at each node resolution.  This suggests that less 
detailed population data may be used to identify these tipping points just as effectively as 
more detailed population data, while requiring far fewer computational resources. 
  
 
Figure 3.1: Percent of population served by decentralized electricity infrastructure in the 
Rwanda case study. * >1% optimality gap ** >5% optimality gap. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the present value of total system wide cost of the combined 
centralized and decentralized infrastructure that serves the given demand level.  It can be 
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seen that total costs tend to decrease somewhat as the distance between nodes increases, 
however the results are fairly consistent.  The differences are likely explained by the 
lower total network length required to serve a set of fewer nodes, combined with the fact 
that the per household cost of local distribution infrastructure is assumed to be the same 
for scenarios executed at each resolution.    
 
Figure 3.2: Total system cost for electricity development in the Rwanda case study 
(billion $). 
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the new centralized and decentralized generation 
capacity that is required in each scenario.  As might be expected, scenarios with low 
levels of new centralized capacity generally have high levels of decentralized capacity 
and vice versa.  The values in these figures correspond with the tipping point between the 
country being largely powered by centralized and decentralized systems as was observed 
in figure 3.1.  The 10W per capita scenarios generally call for 100 MW of new methane 
thermal capacity at Lake Kivu, as well new hydroelectric capacity at Nyabarongo, Rusizi 
and Rusumo as well as a number of other small new developments; though some 
variations are present between scenarios and resolutions.  The 8 W per capita scenarios 
call for the 100MW addition at Lake Kivu and new capacity at Rusizi, while the 6 W per 
capita scenarios call for only 100 MW at Lake Kivu and several other smaller facilities.  
These results are generally quite consistent across the different node resolutions, with the 
exception of the two 3’ resolution scenarios that were previously discussed. 
These results are similar to the results of Levin and Thomas [183], in which a 
network algorithm was used for 150 countries to find the optimal fraction of the 
population for centralized and decentralized electricity. For Rwanda, at 6 W/capita (50 
kWh/person-year) the network algorithm finds 7% decentralized, and at 8 W/capita (69 
kWh/person-year) it finds 3% decentralized. This study differs from that previous study 
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not only in algorithm, but also in having more detailed transmission and centralized 




Figure 3.3: New centralized generation capacity (MW) for the Rwanda case study 
 
 
Figure 3.4:  New decentralized generation capacity (MW) for the Rwanda case study 
3.4.2 Computational Requirements 
We also analyze the computational resources required to solve the MIP when 
different data resolutions are used.  The MIP is formulated in MATLAB and solved using 
CPLEX 12.2 and Concert 2.6 technology on 2.4 to 2.8 GHz processors. 
Table 3.3 shows the number of nodes, edges and variables present in the MIP 
formulation for each node resolution.  Figure 3.5 shows the runtime of each scenario as a 
function of the fraction of population decentralized in the optimal network for that 
scenario.  All scenarios were executed with a target 1% optimality gap and a maximum 
run time of 25,000 seconds.  It can be seen that scenarios with optimal networks that are 
primarily centralized require more computational resources to solve, as the specifics of 
the entire transmission network must be determined.  Formulations using population data 
with 12 or 24 arcminute resolution were able to determine a solution within 1% of 
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optimality in a few seconds, where as those with 3 or 6 arcminute resolution often could 
not achieve the same optimality after the maximum allowed 25,000 seconds.   
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Figure 3.5:  Run time required to achieve a 1% optimality gap as a function of percent 
decentralized, for spatial resolution of 3, 6, 9, and 12 arcminutes.  All runs were limited 
to 25,000 seconds. 
 
Figures 3.6-3.9 depict the minimum-cost infrastructure under various 
























dashed lines are used to denote new transmission infrastructure, while solid lines denote 
existing infrastructure.  
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 illustrate how the model may generate optimal networks that 
differ slightly but are largely consistent when executed with population data at different 
resolutions.  Figure 3.6 shows the optimal network under the assumption of $6/W 
decentralized generation overnight cost and 4 W per capita average power consumption 
for newly electrified populations when executed with 6 arcminute node resolution.  No 
new centralized generation capacity is developed, and the existing transmission network 
is expanded to serve only one additional node.  Many of the nodes that are currently 
connected by a transmission line do not develop local distribution networks and 86% of 
the population is served by decentralized generation.  Figure 3.7 shows similar results for 
the same scenario when executed at 12’ node resolution.  No new centralized generation 
capacity is developed, no extensions are made to the existing transmission grid and 85% 
of the population is served by decentralized generation. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Electricity system for the Rwanda case study, for decentralized generation 
cost of $6/W and average electricity consumption of 4 W/capita for newly connected 




Figure 3.7: Electricity system for the Rwanda case study, for decentralized generation 
cost of $6/W and average electricity consumption of 4 W/capita for newly connected 
consumers. Spatial resolution is 12 arcminutes. 
 
Comparison of figure 3.6 and 3.7 with figures 3.8 and 3.9 show how a small 
increase in average power demand for new consumers can cause the optimal network to 
tip from being primarily decentralized to almost entirely centralized.  The increase in 
demand leads to investment in new centralized generation and transmission 
infrastructure, most notably, 100 MW of methane thermal generation capacity at Lake 
Kivu.  Only a small number of nodes, encompassing 1% of total countrywide population, 
are served by decentralized systems.  The results are largely consistent when the same 
scenario is executed at 12’ resolution as opposed to 6’ resolution.  The same centralized 
generation facilities are developed and in this case less than 1% of the total population is 
served by decentralized generation.    
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Figure 3.8: Electricity system for the Rwanda case study, for decentralized generation 
cost of $6/W and average electricity consumption of 6 W/capita for newly connected 




Figure 3.9: Electricity system for the Rwanda case study, for decentralized generation 
cost of $6/W and average electricity consumption of 6 W/capita for newly connected 
consumers.  Spatial resolution is 12 arcminutes. 
3.5 Discussion 
We have presented a methodology that can be easily implemented to model the 
decision between centralized and decentralized electricity infrastructure development and 
help understand how this decision is affected by the sensitivity of key parameters.  To 
demonstrate this methodology, we have applied it to a case study of electricity 
infrastructure development in Rwanda.  We wish to be clear that results specific to the 
Rwandan case should be interpreted in the context of the various assumptions that were 
made.  
It is shown that in the case of Rwanda, there are few combinations of parameters 
that result in optimal networks with significant contributions from both centralized and 
decentralized infrastructures.  Rather, there appear to be tipping points where the optimal 
infrastructure shifts from being largely centralized to largely decentralized.  For 
reasonable cost of decentralized systems, this tipping point appears to occur at an average 
electricity consumption level of approximately 4 W per capita, or 20 W for an average 
five person household.  Given a typical solar home system that operates for four hours 
per day, this consumption level corresponds to a household system with a peak capacity 
of approximately 120 W.  Our results suggest that broadly speaking, higher demand 
levels would be more cost-effectively served by centralized infrastructures.  However, 
our model only optimizes the total anticipated lifetime cost of a given countrywide 
electricity network, and there are a number of other factors that may influence the 
decision between different infrastructures and technologies.  Decentralized infrastructures 
may be preferred despite higher costs for a variety of reasons including lack of a 
competent central authority, ease and speed of installation, improved system reliability 
and increased autonomy and independence.  The current rapid penetration of new solar 
home systems in Bangladesh is an example of this phenomenon.  
We also demonstrate that using population data of different resolutions may affect 
the specific details of the optimal network.  However the broad trends of either 
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decentralization or centralization generally remain consistent across the considered node 
resolutions.  We also show how the data resolution affects computational time.  Our 
methodology may be applied to better understand how changes in key parameters can 
lead to potential tipping points from primarily centralized to primarily decentralized 
infrastructures.  
As rigorous sensitivity analysis requires the formulated MIP to be solved 
numerous times to consider all potential combinations of parameters, it is important to 
formulate the MIP so that it may be solved in a reasonable timeframe.  We find that a 
formulation with 65 nodes can generally be solved in 10 seconds or less given our 
computational resources.  Formulating the MIP with 224 nodes significantly increases the 
computational requirements, with some scenarios unable to converge to a solution within 
1% of optimal in 25,000 seconds.  However, both formulations identify the same tipping 
points in our case study of Rwanda, and other results are also largely consistent between 
scenarios executed at these resolutions.  Therefore, we find that in the case of Rwanda, 
any potential benefits resulting from increasing data resolution from 12’ to 6’ do not 
justify the increased computational requirements.   
The number of nodes in the formulation will of course also be affected by the size 
of the region being analyzed.  Rwanda is a relatively small country; an analysis of larger 
countries would have to be formulated with less dense node resolution in order to be 
solved in a similar timeframe.  We recommend that for expedient analysis, the network 
should be limited to approximately 200 nodes. However, larger formulations can also be 
analyzed if more computational resources are available or larger optimality gaps are 
tolerable.  Additionally, formulations that allow for more classes of new transmission 
lines can be considered; however this increases the number of binary variables in the MIP 
and will significantly affect the computational requirements.  This tradeoff should 
therefore be considered when formulating the system that will be analyzed.     
We chose to demonstrate our methodology by analyzing the sensitivity of the optimal 
network to changes in two key parameters, decentralized generation cost and average 
new electricity consumption.  However, the methodology could also be used to analyze 
the effect of changing a number of other parameters, such as cost of transmission and 
 70





SIMULATION OF ENERGY SECURITY AND RESILIENCY 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 present two methodologies for determining the least-cost 
combination of centralized and decentralized electricity infrastructure that is capable of 
serving demand in a given region.  In chapter 2 it was shown that Bangladesh could be 
served most cost-effectively by a primarily centralized infrastructure, largely due to the 
high population density of the country.  However, according to some experts, Bangladesh 
has been experiencing “the fastest deployment of solar energy anywhere in the world” 
and the country is expected to reach 2.5 million system installations by 2014 [175].  This 
evidence strongly suggests that there are factors beyond those modeled in chapter 2 that 
influence development paths, and chapter 4 presents a new model for electricity 
infrastructure planning that addresses some of these issues.     
There are many possible explanations for this discrepancy between modeling 
results and observed data.  Large scale centralized development plans require significant 
capital to execute, and even with the benefit of private investment or foreign aid many 
countries do not have access to sufficient funds.  Even in cases where adequate funding is 
made available, development plans are often executed poorly or not at all due to 
ineffectual central authorities or corrupt governments.  Additionally, many developing 
countries are constrained by limited availability of natural resources.  Many development 
models, such as those outlined in chapters 2 and 3, also assume that centralized 
infrastructures will provide reliable service to those who are connected, however the 
reality in developing countries often is quite different.  A World Bank sponsored survey 
of small enterprises found that 49% of respondents in sub-Saharan Africa identified 
electricity reliability to be a major business constraint, with 13% total of their electricity 
consumption coming from onsite diesel generators [75].   
Another factor that is often overlooked in quantifying the potential impact of 
different development strategies, is the lead time required for a proposed infrastructure to 
be implemented.  Centralized electricity generation and transmission systems may take 
years or even decades to fully develop.  In developing countries this lead time can be 
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further amplified by limited access to capital, conflicting political goals, poor central 
management and corruption.   
In the developing world, delayed consumption of goods or services may also 
significantly impact the consumer’s health, education or income generation, whereas a 
similar delay in the developed world may simply cause a minor inconvenience.  As a 
result, poor populations in developing countries are often observed to have higher rates 
than their counterparts in developed countries.  This as can be seen through their 
relatively low savings rates and willingness to accept high interest rates on loans [143, 
192].  This implies that these populations highly value the ability to consume services in 
the present, as compared to potential future consumption.  As such, long lead times that 
delay consumption will have a greater relative impact on poor populations. 
Large, centrally planned electrification networks generally benefit from 
economies of scale to produce electricity at a lower unit cost. However, these cost 
benefits may not be justified if the centralized systems are inefficiently planned or slowly 
implemented.  Additionally, poorly planned or underdeveloped centralized networks are 
subject to frequent power outages which can impose a considerable cost to end users.  
Distributed systems do not require significant centralized planning or coordination, can 
be disseminated and scaled more readily through small private enterprises and are 
generally reasonably reliable.  A shift towards distributed systems transfers decision 
making away from central authorities and puts it in hands of consumers, enabling free 
market forces to more quickly determine the optimal allocation of systems.  On the other 
hand, distributed systems may have limited expansion capacity, may be more expensive, 
and may receive less subsidization than centralized systems.  
 Chapter 4 presents a methodology for analyzing the impacts of infrastructure lead 
time, unreliability and other important energy security factors that are faced in the 
developing world.  This methodology incorporates the impacts of stochastic events 
including random electricity demand and commodity prices, generation and transmission 
outages and rare events such as political instability.  The model is computationally 
inexpensive and can be executed quickly to generate a distribution of possible outcomes 
for each proposed development path, including the total lifetime cost of a system and its 
ability to serve demand.  In contrast to many other studies that develop optimization 
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frameworks to endogenously determine optimal development paths, this methodology 
simulates exogenously defined development plans to generate a distribution of results for 
various comparative metrics, such as cost and level of served electricity demand.  Rather 
than using aggregated metrics and indicators to quantify the various different dimensions 
of grid security, this analysis focuses directly on the level of enabled electricity demand 
and the cost of providing these services.   
The impact of explicitly simulating stochastic events and drawing probabilistic 
parameters from a distribution, as opposed to assuming constant mean parameter values, 
is also analyzed.  These stochastic events include outages to generation facilities or 
transmission line segments, disruptions to available development budgets and variations 
in commodity prices.  Through simulation of these parameters and events the impacts of 
long construction horizons and budget overruns, which are often faced by large-scale 
infrastructure development projects, are also examined.  
4.2 Methodology 
As discussed in chapter 1, there are numerous methodologies and algorithms that 
can be used to formulate and solve stochastic programming problems related to network 
expansion in the face of uncertainty.  Unfortunately, it is computationally expensive to 
explicitly solve complex stochastic programs.  Additionally, in order to generate an 
optimal development strategy, a modeler must first define an objective function.  In some 
situations this is a simple task, as often the goal is simply to minimize the cost of 
reaching a certain development target.  However, when multiple competing objectives are 
present, the modeler must create a composite objective function or develop a multi-
objective programming formulation.  It is also not always clear how the various 
objectives should be balanced or weighted and this can lead to a somewhat arbitrary 
definition of what constitutes an optimal solution.  Furthermore, the solution is generally 
based on the expected mean value of the objective function, which makes it difficult to 
consider the full range of potential outcomes. 
We present an alternative approach where exogenously defined development plans 
are simulated through a periodic model that incorporates stochastic variables.  As such, 
computationally expensive stochastic programming techniques are not required and it 
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becomes possible to execute repeated simulations and generate a distribution of potential 
results for several comparative metrics, namely cost and service level.   
The structure of this model is similar to the one presented in chapter 3; a region is 
represented as a set of demand nodes, each of which may be connected to any of its 
neighbors by a transmission line.  Electricity generation facilities are present at a number 
of predefined locations and electricity is delivered from these generation sites to demand 
nodes through the transmission network.  The rules governing the flow of electricity 
through the network are the same as were employed in chapter 3.  At any given node the 
flow of power into the node plus the generation in that node exceed demand in that node 
plus the flow of power out of the node.  There are also key differences between this 
model and the one presented in chapter 3.  Whereas the methodology in chapter 3 found 
the minimum cost network capable of serving different demand levels, this methodology 
makes no assumption that demand is met.  Rather, it compares exogenously defined 
development plans on the basis of their cost, ability to effectively serve demand and other 
comparative metrics.  A linear programming (LP) framework is employed to minimize 
the amount of unserved electricity demand each period and to and ensure that the flow of 
power through the system is consistent.  However, decisions regarding the construction of 
new transmission and generation infrastructure are provided as inputs by the user and are 
not included in the LP formulation.    
The model is executed over a 20-year time horizon with four periods in each year 
and two timesteps in each period to simulate base and peak demand levels.  In each 
timestep a linear program is solved in order to determine the flow of power through the 
network and subsequent servicing of electricity demand.  As was discussed in chapter 1, 
many efforts have been made to estimate the economic cost of unserved electricity, 
however results vary widely based on the environment and situation [81].  We choose to 
not make explicit assumptions about this cost, and instead simply minimize the quantity 
of unserved energy in each period.  This keeps the cost and reliability metrics segregated 
rather than attempting to combine them into a potentially ambiguous composite function. 
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4.2.1 Decision Variables 
The decision variables, which are all continuous in this formulation, are the 
electricity consumption and generation in each node as well as the power being 
transmitted on each network edge.  Note that capital investments, such as new generation 
facilities or transmission lines, are not decision variables as these are provided by the 
modeler. 
 
• xj: electricity consumption level in node j 
• gj: electricity generation level in node j 
• yi: transmission power level in edge i 
Other parameters used in the formulation are outlined below. 
• : electricity demand in node j 
• Ci: transmission capacity of edge i 
4.2.2 Objective Function and Constraints 
The objective function is formulated to minimize the quantity of unserved 
electricity demand across all nodes in the system. 
 
min − ∈ 					4.1 
 
The following constraints are also imposed.  First, electricity consumption in each node 
must be less than demand in that node and greater than zero.   
 0	 ≤  ≤  							∀	 ∈ ( 							4.2 
 
Second, the flow of power throughout the system must be consistent.  Electricity can be 
generated by large centralized plants or decentralized technologies such as solar home 
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systems or diesel generators.  Here  represents the set of all edges leading into node j 
and $ represents the set of all edges leading out of node j. 
 
R 	∈ −  R	∈> −  +  ≥ 0			∀					4.3 
 
Finally, the capacity of each line must be greater than the quantity of power being 
transmitted by that line. |R| − # 	≤ 0			∀				4 
 
Electricity demand in nodes that are not connected to the grid can be met through 
individual decentralized technologies, such as solar home systems, or left unserved.    
4.2.3 Stochastic Events and Parameters 
The stochastic events and parameters that are considered by this analysis are listed 
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.  Each stochastic parameter is drawn from a normal distribution 
with the defined mean and standard deviation, and stochastic events occur with the 
defined probability each quarterly period.  The price of fuel oil is randomly updated each 
period in accordance with geometric Brownian motion, as in Equation 4.5, where S+ is 
the price in period t,  is the expected mean annual growth rate,  is the standard 
deviation of this growth rate and n is the number of periods per year.  0,1 represents a 
random variable generated from the standard normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a 










Table 4.1: Stochastic parameter values. 
Parameter Mean Standard Dev. 
2011 on-Grid Electricity Demand (kWh/person) 600 60 
2011 off-Grid Electricity Demand (kWh/person) 100 10 
2030 on-Grid Electricity Demand (kWh/person) 1200 120 
2030 off-Grid Electricity Demand (kWh/person) 500 50 
Annual Development Budget (million $) 250 62.5 
Annual Oil Price Increase 2.5% 0.5% 
Transmission Loss Rate 20% 5% 
 
Table 4.2: Stochastic event probabilities. 
Event Probability 
Generation Facility Outage 10% 
Transmission Line Outage 10% 
Political Unrest 5% 
 
S+nJ = S+ + S+ ∙ s + √s ∙ 0,1					4.5 
 
The modeler also defines a set of development objectives which can include new 
centralized generation facilities, transmission lines, local distribution lines and distributed 
solar or diesel generation systems.  These are placed in a development queue and 
contributions are made towards their construction each period.  Each period, there is a 
limited budget that can be applied to constructing new projects and repairing existing 
infrastructure that requires maintenance.  In each period, this development budget is 
generated as a normal random variable with predefined mean and standard deviation.  
This reflects the natural variability in the length of time it takes to complete different 
infrastructure projects.  In addition, a number of stochastic events have a modeler-defined 
probability of occurring in each period.  These include outages at each generation site, 
outages on each transmission edge, and instances of government political instability.  
Outages require repairs to be made, diverting development capital from other projects in 
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the queue and delaying their construction.  Instances of political instability result in no 
development capital being available for that period, also adversely impacting the 
expedient construction of new infrastructure.   
 
4.2.4 Model Simulation 
 Each period is simulated according the following steps, 
 
1. Probabilistic parameters are generated, including  
a. Available development capital 
b. Changes in commodity prices 
c. Demand in each node during each time step  
2. Stochastic events are simulated, including  
a. Disruption to generation facilities 
b. Disruption to transmission lines 
c. Disruption to available development budget 
3. Repairs are performed on infrastructure that is out of service  
4. Construction is performed on new projects in the development queue 
5. Demand is served for each node and each timestep  
 
This model is driven by random variable generation and a simple linear program, 
which require relatively few computational resources compared to the MIP methodology 
presented in chapter 3.  As a result, it is possible to perform a number of simulations and 
obtain distributions of the resulting total system cost and quantity of unserved electricity 
over the entire 20-year time horizon for each proposed development path.  This provides 
insight into the impact of stochastic events on the cost and availability of energy services 
through analysis of the full range of potential outcomes, rather than focusing on 
estimating the mean result.    
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4.3 Rwanda Case Study 
A case study analysis of Rwanda is now presented to demonstrate an application of 
the model.  This analysis complements previous work, which provides a deterministic 
MIP formulation for determining the least-cost combination of centralized and 
decentralized electrification infrastructure that is capable of meeting demand [193].  We 
build upon this work by adding time periodic and stochastic elements in order to 
understand how these factors influence the cost of a given infrastructure and its ability to 
serve demand.  
Rwanda is a small, landlocked country in East Africa with a population of roughly 
10 million people.  In our model, the country is represented as a set of 224 demand nodes 
in an evenly spaced grid with an intermodal distance of six arcminutes or approximately 
11 km.  Each node has an associated electricity demand that evolves over time and can be 
met through electricity from the grid, or decentralized technologies such as a solar home 
system (SHS) or diesel generator.     
In 2004, Rwanda had an electrification rate of 6%, which grew slightly to 7% by 
2009.  However, most of the electrified population is located in the capital of Kigali, with 
less than 1% of the rural population having access.  An aggressive electrification 
campaign combined with significant external funding increased this rate to 10% by early 
2012 and is on track to reach 16% in 2013 [194].  We use 2010 as the base year of our 
analysis and do not directly incorporate any more recent development.  A total of 55 MW 
of centralized generating capacity is considered, consisting mostly of hydroelectric and 
oil thermal generation facilities.  There is also a 250 kW solar array near Kigali and an 
assortment of micro-hydro generation throughout the country [186].  The grid in Rwanda 
has two high voltage transmission backbones of 100 kV and 70 kV and a network of 30 
kV, 15 kV and 6.6 kV distribution lines [187].  Eleven potential new generation facilities 
are considered by this analysis, which are outlined in Table 4.3.  Construction on some 
these facilities may have recently commenced; however, we do not include such recent 





Table 4.3: Potential centralized generation sites considered by this analysis [186–191]. 
Location Capacity (MW) Overnight Cost (M$) Generation Type 
Lake Kivu I 25 140 Methane Thermal 
Lake Kivu II 75 185 Methane Thermal 
Mukungwa II 2.5 7.5 Hydroelectric 
Mukungwa III 2.2 6.6 Hydroelectric 
Nyabarongo  27.5 97.7 Hydroelectric 
Rukarara  9.5 20 Hydroelectric 
Rubavu  3.2 9.6 Hydroelectric 
Rugezi  2.2 6.6 Hydroelectric 
Rusizi III 48 150 Hydroelectric 
Rusizi IV 68 212 Hydroelectric 
Rusumo 20 57 Hydroelectric 
4.3.1 Baseline Parameters 
The baseline values of transmission line parameters are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Baseline parameter values for transmission infrastructure [193] 
30kV 70kV 110kV 220kV 
Capital Cost ($/km) 15,000 75,000 150,000 400,000 
Transmission Capacity (MW) 7.5 40 100 400 
Repair Cost ($/km) 1,500 75,000 15,000 40,000 
Construction Time (years) 1 1 1 1 
Repair Time (months) 3 3 3 3 
 
In addition to relatively high voltage transmission lines, low voltage distribution 
networks are also required within each node to connect individual demand points to the 
centralized grid; a process referred to as distribution infilling.  A fixed cost of $2000 per 
household throughout the country is assumed, which is based on previous estimates in 
Kenya [20], though in practice this figure may vary regionally based on local geography 
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and other factors.  Solar home systems are also considered as a potential decentralized 
generation technology at a cost of $7 per Wp (peak watt), including a controller, battery 
and all wiring.  This price is comparable with that of a 50 Wp SHS that is currently 
widely available in Bangladesh ($320 USD) [195].   
Under baseline conditions, roughly 53% of the population lives in a node that is 
connected to the grid, but only 7% of the population actually has immediate grid access.  
Most of the electrified population in Rwanda is located in the capital of Kigali, where it is 
assumed that 50% of the population has immediate access to the grid.  Initial electricity 
demand in grid-connected nodes is based on historical data that recorded 240 GWh of 
total consumption in 2009, 80% of which was in Kigali [171].  Assuming a 50% 
electrification rate in Kigali and 8% in other grid connected nodes, this corresponds with 
a per capita demand of roughly 600 kWh for consumers in Kigali who currently have 
electricity access, and 100 kWh for consumers outside of Kigali who have electricity 
access.  We assume that all un-electrified populations have equivalent potential demands 
for electricity, and that these demand levels grow linearly to 1200 kWh and 500 kWh per 
capita by 2030 in Kigali and outside of Kigali respectively.  Population is also assumed to 
grow at 3% per year, consistent with historical trends.   
The model is executed over a 20-year time horizon, with four periods each year.  
Each period is also subdivided into two time steps to represent base and peak demand 
levels.  The ratio of peak power demand to base levels in Rwanda was 1.75 in 2003 and 
this has been projected to drop to 1.67 in 2011 [185].  We assume that peak power 
demand is 1.70 times the base level and that the peak period lasts for 10% of total time. 
4.3.2 Development Scenarios 
Two development scenarios are considered in addition to a baseline scenario 
where no new development is made.   
 
1. NONE 
In this scenario no new centralized generation and transmission or decentralized 
generation capacity is added to the current infrastructure.  Current facilities are 




In this scenario, solar home systems are developed with the goal of providing a 250 
Wp SHS to 75% of households that do not currently have immediate grid access. No 
new centralized generation facilities, transmission lines or distribution infilling lines 
are constructed.  
 
3. GRID 
In this scenario, the centralized grid is expanded with the goal of connecting all nodes 
in Rwanda.  In addition, local distribution infilling is developed to provide 75% of the 
population in Kigali and 50% of the population in all other nodes with grid access.  
No solar home systems are developed, and all proposed centralized generation 
facilities (Table 4.3) are queued for development.   
 
These two scenarios were specifically selected to explore the differences between 
centralized and decentralized development paths.  This modeling framework could also 
be used to compare numerous variations on these two scenarios, by adjusting the 
penetration rate and average unit size of the SHS scenario, or the considered centralized 
generation facilities and extent of grid expansion in the GRID scenario.  Hybrid scenarios 
that implement a combination both centralized and decentralized technologies could also 
be examined.  The two chosen scenarios are analyzed to demonstrate a potential 
application of the model.  However they are by no means intended to represent to full 
range of development options available to a country such as Rwanda.   
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Conventional 
The model is first executed for all three scenarios over a 20-year time horizon, 
with four annual periods and baseline parameter values.  The model is executed 
conventionally, meaning that there are no random events and the standard deviation of all 
probabilistic parameters is set to zero.  All generation facilities operate consistently at a 
predetermined generating capacity, transmission lines have a constant transmission 
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capacity and the development budget is also constant each period.  Oil prices also 
fluctuate conventionally, increasing by 2.5% each year.  The values of several parameters 
are adjusted from their baseline values so that they are equal to the mean expected result 
when stochastic events are considered.  For example, the capacity factor of each 
centralized generation facility is reduced by 10% in the conventional formulation to 
reflect the 10% chance of an outage each period when stochastic events are considered.  
Similarly, the transmission capacity of each line is reduced by 10% and the annual 
development budget is reduced by 5% to reflect the possibility of political unrest.  Fixed 
annual repair costs are also added, which are equal to the mean expected costs when 
outages are explicitly modeled.  
 
Figure 4.1: The annual costs of each development scenario over the 20-year time horizon 
under conventional conditions 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the annual expenditure for each development scenario under 
conventional formulation.  The SHS scenario requires nine years of capital expenditures 
equal to the full annual budget of $250 million in order to install new solar home systems 
for in regions without electricity access.  This period is followed by lower annual capital 
expenditures to keep pace with population growth.  The GRID scenario requires a longer 
period of sustained capital investment to construct new transmission infrastructure and 
generation facilities.  Once new centralized infrastructure is constructed there is also a 
need for additional repairs and maintenance.  The total capital expenditures required by 
the grid scenario are greater than they are for the SHS scenario.  However, the GRID 
scenario also serves more electricity demand over the 20-year time horizon, so these extra 
costs do not necessarily imply that the SHS development path would be preferred option.  




Figure 4.2: Served demand for each scenario over the 20 year time horizon.  Dashed 
lines represent fixed per capita consumption levels and relfect the fact that, for each fixed 
level, total consumption increases over time in accordance with population growth. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the average level of served demand for each scenario over the 
20-year time horizon, dashed lines represent fixed per capita consumption levels.  When 
there is no development, the service level remains essentially constant, as no new 
consumers are provided with electricity access and no new generation capacity is 
constructed.  In the SHS scenario, new generation capacity is added immediately, 
reaching initial electrification targets and 85 MW of average served demand by 2019.  At 
this point SHS development continues at a slower pace through 2030 to keep pace with 
increasing population, reaching an average consumption level of 120 MW.  Under the 
GRID scenario there is a three year delay before new generation capacity comes online, 
which represents the minimum anticipated lead time of these new facilities.  New 
generation begins to come online in 2014 and continues through 2016, at which point 
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capital investments are directed towards new transmission infrastructure.  Average served 
demand grows to 195 MW in 2023 and increases further to 210 MW in 2030.   
 
 
Figure 4.3: Discounted served demand and discounted cost of each scenario under 
conventional  conditions. 
 
Figure 4.3 depicts the present cost and corresponding present quantity of served 
electricity demand for each scenario.  The ratio of these two terms gives the levelized 
cost of electricity, several fixed values of which are indicated with dashed lines.  The 
NONE scenario is able to provide electricity at the lowest levelized cost of the three 
scenarios.  However, as no new infrastructure is developed, only a relatively small 
quantity of discounted demand, 1850 GWh, is served.  The SHS scenario serves more 
discounted demand, 5259 GWh, at a greater unit cost than the NONE scenario, $0.38 per 
kWh compared to $0.19 per kWh.  The GRID scenario serves still more discounted 
demand, 7450 GWh, at a lower unit cost than the SHS scenario, $0.32 per kWh. 
It is perhaps more useful to consider the cost and service level of the SHS and 
GRID scenarios that occur in addition to what is experienced under the NONE scenario.  
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The new served demand and new system cost are calculated by subtracting the average 
service level and cost experienced under the no development scenario.  This isolates the 
cost of new electricity generation and provides a constructive metric for comparing the 
costs of new generation under each scenario.  Taking the ratio of these two values gives 
the levelized cost of new electricity (LCOEnew), which reflects the unit cost of any 
additional service that is provided by these two scenarios.     
 
"#$%/0 =	&<l&<&(l&(         (4.7) 
 
 When considering only new costs and generation, the relative cost-effectiveness 
of the GRID scenario increases slightly relative to the SHS scenario.  The LCOEnew of the 
SHS scenario is $0.48 per kWh, while the LCOEnew of the GRID scenario is $0.37 per 
kWh.  This occurs because the relatively cheap electricity generated under the NONE 
scenario is no longer included and as a result the average generation cost of the SHS 
scenario increases more significantly. 
 The levelized carbon emissions of each development scenario are shown in Figure 
4.4.  These are calculated similarly to the levelized cost of electricity by taking the ratio 
of discounted lifetime carbon emissions and discounted lifetime electricity generation.  
Under baseline conditions, .52 kg of CO2 are emitted for each kWh of electricity that is 
generated, equivalent to total annual emissions of roughly 27,000 tonnes.  Under the SHS 
scenario, no new carbon emitting electricity generation is developed and, due to the new 
solar generation, the levelized emissions rate falls to .18 kg per kWh.  The GRID scenario 
adds a number of hydroelectric generation facilities that do not generate emissions, but 
also adds new methane plants at Lake Kivu that do result in additional emissions.  The 
levelized emissions rate under the GRID scenario is .46 kg per kWh, with total annual 
emissions growing more than 4-fold versus the SHS scenario to approximately 120,000 
tonnes of CO2 in 2016 and beyond.  The same methodology that was used to calculate the 
LCOEnew values can be applied to yield .32 kg of CO2 emissions for each new kWh of 




Figure 4.4: Levelized carbon emissions for each development scenario. 
4.4.2 Stochastic 
We now analyze the effect of explicitly modeling stochastic events as opposed to 
considering fixed generation and transmission capacities, commodity prices and annual 
development budgets.  Under this formulation, each generation facility and transmission 
line has 10% chance of going offline in any period, at which point a repair cost is 
incurred.  Parameters are chosen so that the expected mean capacity factor, transmission 
capacity and repair cost is the same under these stochastic conditions as they were under 
the conventional formulation.  Commodity prices also fluctuate according to Geometric 
Brownian Motion, with mean annual cost change equal to the constant rate applied under 
conventional conditions.  We are, therefore, able to explore how well a conventional 
simulation using mean values is able to replicate a more explicit stochastic simulation.   
 Each scenario is executed over 50 iterations and, for each iteration, random events 
are held consistent across all three scenarios.  For example, if during the first iteration of 
the NONE scenario a particular generation facility experiences and outage in year 2018, 
then the same outage will occur during the first iteration of the SHS and GRID scenarios.  
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Therefore it is possible to analyze how each scenario manages the same set of random 
occurrences.   
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the range of outcomes across the 50 iterations for each 
scenario.  The lifetime discounted cost varies from $1.90 billion to $2.30 billion for the 
SHS scenario, and from $2.25 billion to $2.75 billion for the GRID scenario.  The level 
of discounted demand varies from 4650 GWh to 5150 GWh and from 5000 GWh to 6700 
GWh for the SHS and GRID scenarios respectively. 
Figure 4.7 shows the LCOEnew values for each iteration of the SHS and GRID 
scenarios under stochastic simulation.  The horizontal black line represents the LCOEnew 
values obtained under conventional modeling, $0.48 per kWh and $0.37 per kWh for the 
SHS and GRID scenarios respectively.  The LCOEnew values of the SHS scenario are 
essentially identical to the deterministic results for all 50 iterations.  This is explained by 
the fact that new solar home systems are not affected by random generation outages or 
transmission disturbances.  All stochastic events affecting the grid that are experienced 
under the SHS scenario are also experienced during the same iteration of the NONE 
scenario.  These effects therefore cancel out in the calculation of LCOEnew for each SHS 
iteration.      
The GRID scenario shows more variable results, with LCOEnew values ranging 
from $0.44 per kWh to $0.53 per kWh, and a mean result of $0.49 per kWh.  Perhaps 
more significant is the fact that for all 50 iterations, the LCOEnew of the GRID scenario is 
greater under stochastic simulation than under conventional modeling.  In 30 out of 50 
iterations the LCOEnew of the GRID scenario also exceeds the LCOEnew of the SHS 
scenario, when stochastic events are explicitly modeled.   




Figure 4.5: Discounted new served demand and discounted new cost of each 
model iteration under stochastic conditions.  Dashed lines indicate fixed levelized costs 





Figure 4.6:  The boxed region of Figure 4.5 is shown in more detail to highlight 




Figure 4.7: LCOEnew for each iteration of the solar home systems and grid expansion 
scenarios.  The horizontal black lines represent the LCOEnew values from the 
conventional formulation.   
 
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
The model is also executed with variations in two key parameters to understand 
the sensitivity of each development scenario to changes in these parameters.  These are 
the annual development budget and the discount rate.  We consider both the stochastic 
and conventional results for the GRID scenario, and omit the conventional SHS result 
because of its similarity to the stochastic result. 
4.4.3.1 Discount Rate 
The choice of a discount rate can heavily influence the results of a long-term cost-
benefit analysis.  A discount rate can be thought of as the time value of money, or as the 
opportunity cost of tying up funds and being forced to passing on other potential 
investments.  A higher discount rate places more relative weight on consumption and 
expenditure in early periods.  Discount rates are often based on the interest rate paid by 
an investment that is perceived to be risk-free, such as a U.S. Treasury Bill or other high-
quality corporate bonds [196].  A social discount rate can also be applied to account for 
the relative value of present social benefit as compared to future social benefit.  A 
common application of social discount rates can be found in environmental impact 
analyses, which must place a quantitative value on present and future environmental 
well-being [197, 198].  This same method can also be applied to the consumption of 
energy services, which may in turn improve health and generate economic output [199].  
The choice of a social discount rate may be based on the appropriate financial discount 
rate [200]; however, there is more latitude in this choice as social benefit is a more 
subjective concept than financial performance.   
In the developed world a discount rate of 3-7% is commonly applied, while in the 
developing world, where investment uncertainty is often higher and credit markets are 
less liquid, a higher discount rate of 8-15% may be used [192].  However, discount rates 
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can also vary significantly within countries or between different consumers.  In this 
analysis a baseline discount rate of 10% is applied and the sensitivity of results to a 
discount rate ranging from 0% to 25% is also analyzed. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Sensitivity of LCOEnew to changes in the discount rate under baseline 
parameter assumptions and stochastic formulation. 
 
Figure 4.8 shows the average LCOEnew across all 50 iterations for each 
development scenario, while varying the consumer discount rate from 0% to 25% and 
holding all other parameters at their baseline values.  As was seen previously, under the 
baseline consumer discount rate of 10%, the average LCOEnew of the SHS and stochastic 
GRID scenarios are fairly similar, $0.48 per kWh and $0.49 per kWh respectively.  
While, the LCOEnew of the convention GRID result is significantly less, $0.37 per kWh.   
As the consumer discount rate increases, the LCOEnew of both GRID results 
increase relative to the SHS scenario; the opposite holds for decreasing discount rates.  
This is explained by the fact that the GRID scenario requires upfront capital investment 
to, but delays the provision of additional generation for several years until new generation 
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infrastructure is constructed.  Alternatively, the initial capital investments in the SHS 
scenario enable additional demand to be served immediately.  When the discount rate is 
high, this early consumption is weighted relatively more heavily, leading to a lower 
levelized cost.  Therefore, capital investments that do not immediately produce tangible 
benefits will generally be relatively more attractive for consumers and investors with 
lower discount rates.  When the consumer discount reaches 25%, the LCOEnew of the 
SHS scenario ($1.57) is significantly less than that of the stochastic GRID result ($2.03) 
and comparable to that of the conventional GRID result ($1.49).  It can be difficult to 
precisely determine the actual discount rate of different consumers, and as such, 
estimations or approximations are often made when conducting economic analyses.   
These results illustrate how significantly the choice of a discount rate can influence the 
findings of such analyses, while also highlighting the differences between the 
conventional and stochastic formulations of the GRID scenario. 
4.4.3.2 Development Budget 
Large-scale infrastructure development projects in developing countries may 
experience delays, run over budget or be restricted by limited availability of capital.  
These variations in lead time can significantly impact the realized cost and benefit of a 
given development plan, particularly when consumer discount rates are high.  We now 
analyze how variations in the average annual development budget affect the cost and 
service level of both the SHS and GRID development scenarios.  The development 
budget analysis is conducted by varying the mean annual budget from $50 million to 
$500 million while holding all other parameters constant. For each fixed development 





Figure 4.9: Discounted new cost and new served demand for the SHS and stochastic 
GRID and conventional GRID scenarios as the average annual development budget is 
varied from $50 million to $500 million.  The numerical labels denote the development 
budget in millions for the corresponding data point .  
 
Figure 4.9 shows how the discounted new cost and level of new served demand 
changes as the average annual development budget is varied from $50 million to $500 
billion.  The GRID scenarios are more affected than the SHS scenario by changes in the 
annual development budget.  With an annual development budget of $50 million the 
stochastic GRID scenario serves 460 GWh of discounted new demand, compared to the 
770 GWh that are served under the SHS scenario for a similar cost.  Under conventional 
formulation the GRID scenario serves significantly more discounted demand, 2500 GWh, 
at a greater discounted cost ($750 million vs. $400 million).  The stochastic GRID 
scenario continues to serve less demand than the SHS scenario when the annual 
development budget is less than $200 million.  For budgets in excess of $200 million the 
discounted service level of the stochastic GRID scenario exceeds that of the SHS 
scenario.     
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These results are explained by the fact that centralized infrastructure development 
requires large, sustained investments in order to provide future generation several years 
in the future.  As a result, a limited development budget can significantly delay project 
completion so no electricity is generated in early periods.  Additionally, centralized 
generation facilities involve so-called ‘lumpy investments’.  This means that the entire 
benefit of a new generation facility is only realized after it is completely developed, while 
no benefit is realized for partial development.  Alternatively, the size of each 
development unit is much smaller for SHS scenarios (a 50 Wp system), and therefore a 
partial level of development still results in a proportional level of generation and benefit.    
Specifically, assuming a three year minimum construction time for each facility, 
the annual development cost of simultaneously constructing all of the considered 
centralized generation plants (Table 4.3) is approximately $300 million.  Therefore, the 
baseline $250 million annual budget is roughly sufficient to enable completion of all new 
generation plants by 2015, when also accounting for some immediate transmission 
upgrades and required repairs.  At this point the entire budget then becomes available for 
transmission expansion and further capacity upgrades to ensure that the new generation 
capacity is able to reach consumers.  A $500 million annual budget enables all the new 
generation sites to be constructed in their minimum three year construction times.  This 
allows new centralized generation to reach consumers more rapidly, and this early 
consumption is therefore discounted less heavily in the calculation of total discounted 
served demand.  Increases to the annual budget beyond $250 million do not significantly 
increase the level of discounted demand served under the SHS scenario.  This is 
explained because there is not sufficient electricity demand in early periods to justify 
such a significant level of investment.   
The additional benefit of a large budget is more pronounced under the 
conventional formulation of the GRID scenario, than the stochastic formulation.  This can 
be partially explained by the fact that a consistent and predictable annual budget is 
generally preferable over an annual budget with the same mean that varies unexpectedly 
from year to year.  Most development plans are designed with a specific budget in mind, 
and therefore unexpected budget reductions can cause delays and lead to inefficient 
spending.  On the other hand, resources may not be available to efficiently take advantage 
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of unexpected budget windfalls, and in our analysis these funds are not carried over to 
future periods.  This reflects political reality, where departments or organizations with 
excess funds may see their future budgets reassigned to other needier areas.   
 
 
Figure 4.10: LCOEnew for the SHS scenario and both formulations of the GRID scenario 
as the average annual development budget is varied from $100 million to $1 billion.  
 
Figure 4.10 shows how the LCOEnew values for the SHS scenario and both 
formulations of the GRID scenario change as the average annual development budget 
increases from $50 million to $500 million.  When the annual development budget is $50 
million, the LCOEnew of the SHS scenario ($0.52) is less than the LCOEnew of both the 
stochastic ($0.89) and conventional ($0.58) formulations of the GRID scenario.  As the 
development budget increases, the LCOEnew of the both GRID scenario formulations 
gradually decrease, and for a budget of $250 or greater the LCOEnew of the stochastic 
result is equal to, or marginally less than, that of the SHS scenario.  The LCOEnew of the 
SHS scenario is largely unaffected by changes in the development budget. This is 
explained by the fact that every unit of expenditure under the SHS scenario results in a 
proportional, and immediate, amount of new electricity generation.   
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4.5 Conclusions 
We have demonstrated a stochastic model for simulating the service of electricity 
demand when considering various stochastic events and parameters, through a case study 
of Rwanda over a 20-year time horizon.  This model provides a basis for comparing the 
cost of different electricity infrastructure development paths and their ability to electrify 
new populations and serve increasing electricity demand.  We present an analysis of two 
specific development paths to demonstrate a potential application of the model.  We also 
compare the impact of explicitly simulating stochastic events and parameters as opposed 
to assuming constant mean parameter values.  Finally, we examine sensitivities around 
the discount rate and annual development budget.  
The purpose of our analysis is not to suggest specific development plans or budget 
levels for Rwanda, but rather to use this case study as a tool for demonstrating our 
methodology and understanding the impacts of utilizing different modeling frameworks.  
It would, therefore, be prudent to explore more options and utilize more detailed input 
data before using the results to drive long term policy implementation.   
Our results suggest that the SHS scenario enables more immediate electrification of 
new populations, but the GRID scenario provides greater quantities of electricity over the 
long term.  Given our baseline assumptions, the levelized cost of a new unit of electricity 
generation is similar for both the SHS scenario and the stochastic formulation of the 
GRID scenario.  It is also shown that the GRID scenario presented in this analysis results 
in increased CO2 emissions of .32 kg per new kWh of generation as compared to the SHS 
scenario.  We do not attempt to directly value the environmental cost of these extra 
emissions (and other externalities associated with electricity generation from fossil fuels), 
instead allowing the reader to interpret these results in the context of their own valuation.  
As a result, the optimal development path of these two options may fluctuate depending 
on various chosen parameter values including the development budget, discount rate, 
infrastructure costs, outage probabilities, demand levels and the value placed on 
environmental degradation.  It is also possible that some combination of these two 
development paths could serve demand more efficiently than either individually.   
We find that reductions in the annual development budget and increases in the 
discount rate hinder the effectiveness of the GRID scenario more significantly than the 
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SHS scenario.  We therefore suggest that additional caution should be taken when 
implementing a large-scale centralized infrastructure development project in favor of a 
decentralized counterpart that may appear to be more expensive or have comparable cost.  
While the centralized plan may seem to be the cheaper option, it may also be more 
susceptible to unforeseen random events, such as political transitions and budget 
disruptions that are often characteristic of developing countries.  This is partially 
explained by the fact that a distributed infrastructure can generally be implemented more 
quickly than a centralized infrastructure that requires significant quantities of coordinated 
capital investment, planning and organization.  As a result, the benefit of an investment in 
distributed technologies is realized more immediately, whereas with a centralized 
infrastructure, a sustained long term investment is required to realize the promise of 
future benefits.  Therefore, the disruption, alteration or cancellation of a long-term, large-
scale centralized project, may result in large expenditures that do not create any added 
benefit to investors and potential consumers.  
Additionally, we find that conventional modeling of centralized development may 
understate the true costs of electricity provision, when stochastic events and probabilistic 
parameters are present.  As an example of this effect, consider a high voltage 
transmission line with 100 MW of capacity that typically transmits no more than 80 MW 
of power and is assumed to require 10% downtime for maintenance and repairs.  If the 
conventional approach is taken, and it is assumed that 10% downtime results in a 
consistent capacity of 90 MW, there will be no reduction in the amount of power that is 
transmitted.   However, if outages are directly simulated, periods of downtime will occur 
when the line is not capable of transmitting any power, resulting in disruptions and 
reduced service levels.  Another example can be seen in the case of a large generation 
facility that periodically requires repairs or maintenance at significant cost.  Under 
conventional conditions it may be the case that there is always a sufficient budget to fund 
the assumed average cost of such repairs.  However, when probabilistic parameters are 
modeled, a service disruption may occur during a period of limited budget availability.  
As a consequence, the generation facility may experience a longer than expected period 
of downtime.  An effort can be made to account for this effect by adjusting the expected 
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repair time of a given facility.  However, it can be difficult to accurately estimate the 
effects of such interactions without the benefit of explicit stochastic modeling. 
We also show that the choice of consumer discount rate heavily impacts the 
optimal choice of development path, with high discount rates favoring decentralized 
development plans that are less ‘lumpy’ and can be implemented more quickly.  Access 
to electricity provides rural populations with new economic opportunities, increased work 
hours, and improved education, health, security and entertainment.  Many studies have 
attempted to quantify the social and economic benefits of rural electrification, and there is 
significant evidence to suggest that rural electrification has a positive impact on enabling 
structural transformation and development [51, 57, 201], reducing poverty [53] and 
enabling other social and economic benefits [55, 56, 58].  In developing countries, where 
consumer discount rates are high, the extra time required to develop a comprehensive 
centralized network can result in an opportunity cost to these consumers, which would be 






BASIC LIGHTING FOR THE BOTTOM BILLION 
5.1 Introduction 
Access to electricity is a widely cited development goal, but opinions often differ 
on the optimal means of extending electrification to regions that are not currently served.  
It has been seen in previous chapters that a number of parameters can affect this decision, 
both from least-cost and other tangential perspectives.  However, electricity on its own 
does not have an intrinsic value: electricity creates value to the consumer through the 
energy services that it enables [201].  As such, it has been suggested that development 
plans focus first on determining which energy services support development goals, before 
then working to understand which energy carriers can provide these services [162].      
Previous chapters have focused primarily on comparing various options for rural 
electrification, but do not directly address non-electric alternatives for providing similar 
energy services.  Evidence from numerous empirical studies suggest that lighting is one 
of the first energy services enabled by rural electrification [51, 54, 56, 86, 89, 93].  
Lighting can be provided through a variety of non-electric means, including paraffin 
candles, kerosene lanterns and battery powered flashlights all of which are commonly 
used in un-electrified areas today.  These various technologies can be directly compared 
on the basis of their cost of providing 1000-lumen-hours of lighting service [202]. 
Chapter 5 addresses the costs of providing lighting services considering electric 
lighting through grid-based centralized systems, distributed electricity systems and non-
electric lighting systems.  Section 5.2 evaluates the cost of electricity from grid expansion 
and from decentralized systems as a function of annual per capita electricity consumption 
and the per-household cost of grid connection.  It also evaluates the subsidies for grid 
expansion by comparing the cost of electrification with the price charged to consumers.  
Section 5.3 evaluates the cost of subsidy-free lighting, comparing LED lighting powered 
by grid electricity and distributed electricity with lighting from solar lanterns, battery-
operated flashlights and kerosene lamps.  Section 5.4 evaluates financing mechanisms for 
providing distributed electricity on the basis of their ability to increase consumer utility 
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for a given cost to the providing agency.  The considered financial mechanisms are direct 
subsidies, rental programs, and microloans. 
 
5.2 Decentralized Electricity vs. Grid Expansion 
The costs of different electricity generation technologies are often compared on 
the basis of their levelized cost, a metric that encapsulates the total lifecycle costs of 
electricity generation into a single cost per unit of generation.  While levelized cost is a 
useful comparative metric, it also has limitations.  For example, it has been argued that 
levelized cost is not appropriate for comparing centralized generation technologies with 
those that have intermittent output profiles, such as solar or wind, as levelized cost 
analyses do not account for the time-dependent value of electricity [182].  In addition, 
levelized cost calculations do not generally include the costs of transmission 
infrastructure that are required by centralized generation technologies.  These costs may 
represent a significant portion of the total cost of electricity, particularly in regions with 
low levels of electricity consumption. As such, centralized technologies, which offer a 
small variable cost but require a large fixed transmission cost, may be cheaper in high 
consumption regions, while decentralized technologies may be cheaper in low 
consumption regions.  Instead of comparing the levelized costs of centralized and 
decentralized technologies in absolute terms, it may be appropriate to consider the 
consumption level at which the least-cost option switches from decentralized to 
centralized [183].  For low electricity consumption levels, a distributed technology may 
provide the most cost effective option even if generation costs are relatively high on a per 
unit basis.   
The costs of grid extension depend on a number of factors, including the 
geographical distribution of the target population.  Previous studies have looked at how 
various factors impact the decision between developing new centralized or decentralized 
infrastructures [9, 21, 23, 183, 203, 204].  As a basis for examination of electrification 
services and financing, we model the decision for new electrification by analyzing a 
range of potential costs of both grid extension and solar home systems. 
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A previous analysis of grid expansion costs in Kenya has estimated a cost of 
$10,600/km in 2007 dollars for low voltage (LV) transmission lines used to connect rural 
households with peak power demand less than 1 kW to the nearest MV backbone, in 
addition to a fixed $150 connection cost per household [20].  Applying a spatial planning 
model to a randomly distributed population with density of 250 people/km2, the average 
cost of connecting a new household is estimated to be $1780 under 100% penetration and 
$1250 under a realistic penetration scenario.   
  Equation 5.1 can be used to calculate the cost per household of electricity 
distribution infilling in various different situations.  Here  represents the distance of the 
initial connection required to connect a community to a transmission backbone,  
represents the average distance between households,  represents the number of 
households in the community,  represents the per kilometer cost of LV lines and  
represents the fixed connection cost per household. 
# =  +  ∙  + 											5.1 
For example, assuming a transmission line cost of $10,600/km and a fixed connection 
cost of $150 per household, a community 5km from the MV backbone with 20 
households that are on average 50m apart could be connected to the grid for a cost of 
$3,330 per household.    
For rural electrification, the unit cost of electricity delivered from the grid is 
highly dependent on consumption levels, or the quantity of electricity over which the 
fixed costs of transmission infrastructure can be spread.  In Figure 5.1 the levelized cost 
of electricity from a SHS and the grid are shown as a function of average annual 
household consumption for a range of different marginal household connection costs.  
The fixed annual costs of grid expansion and a SHS are calculated based on financial 
parameters and SHS capital costs that are typical of Ghana; these are summarized in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 [205].  It is assumed that solar home systems are indefinitely scalable 





Table 5.1: Parameters for calculation of fixed annual costs from a SHS and the grid 
[205]. 
  SHS Grid 
Loan Term (years) 2 30 
Interest Rate 28% 15% 
Discount Rate 15% 5% 
Annual Maintenance $5/year 1% of capital cost 
Lifetime (years) 25 50 
Battery Replacement Frequency (years) 5 --- 
Marginal Generation Cost ($/kWh) 0 0.05 
 
Table 5.2:  Full and subsidized capital costs of a 15 W, 50 W and 100W SHS.  Solar 
home systems are often packaged with appliances, such as lighting, televisions and fans 
that are specifically designed for use with the system.  These prices represent best 
estimates of the cost of a system including a solar panel, controller, battery and wiring, 
but not including any accompanying appliances [205].  
Power 
Capacity List Price 
Subsidized 
Price Battery Cost 
15 W $450  $300  $68  
50 W $725  $425  $109  
























15 Wp 50 Wp 100 Wp >100 Wp
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Figure 5.1:  The levelized cost of electricity from an unsubsidized SHS is compared to 
the levelized cost of centralized electricity when accounting for varying marginal 
household grid connection costs. 
 
It can be seen from Figure 5.1 that a 15 W or 50 W SHS is a cheaper option for 
corresponding levels of electricity consumption if the marginal household grid 
connection costs exceed $1000 per household.  A fully utilized 100 Wp system is the 
cheaper option if marginal connection costs exceed roughly $1200 per household.  For 
higher levels of consumption electricity from the grid becomes increasingly cost effective 
and for consumption of 1000 kWh per year a SHS is only the cheapest option if marginal 
connection costs exceed $10,000 per household.  These results indicate that for low 
consumption levels, solar home systems may provide a more cost-effective option in 
targeted communities than grid expansion.  
In rural, low-consumption, grid-connected regions, it is unlikely that the full cost 
of grid expansion would be passed on the consumers through grid tariffs.  Figure 5.1 
indicates that the true cost of grid electricity in rural regions can easily exceed $1.00 per 
kWh if consumption levels are low or connections costs are high.  Governments often 
consider electricity access to be a basic service that should be universally provided.  
Therefore direct subsidies or cross-subsidies are commonly offered for centralized 
electricity consumption in rural areas, and this full cost of electricity provision is often 
not passed on to consumers.  For example, in Brazil [206], Cambodia [207], Ghana [208] 
and South Africa [209], rural grid tariffs do not generally exceed $0.30 per kWh. These 
rates imply a level of subsidization in grid connected regions where connection costs are 
high or consumption levels are low.  Figure 5.2 illustrates the magnitude of this subsidy 
as a function of household electricity consumption, based on the rural grid tariff of 
roughly $0.30 cents per kWh in South Africa.  This subsidy would be greater in countries 
such as Brazil and Ghana where the rural grid tariff is equal to or less than the tariff in 
more urban regions.  If the government would otherwise largely finance the costs of grid 
expansion, it may be more cost-effective to provide subsidized or even free SHS for areas 




Figure 5.2:  The subsidy of electricity from the grid to rural customers in South Africa is 
shown as a function of annual electricity consumption for a range of marginal household 
connection costs.   
 
5.3 Cost Comparison of Lighting Technologies 
The value of electricity derives from its ability to provide energy services. 
Lighting is one of the most important energy services enabled by rural electrification, and 
can be provided by electricity from either the grid or a SHS, a solar lantern, a flashlight 
with standard alkaline batteries or other non-electric technologies such as kerosene or 
paraffin lamps.   
High-efficiency electric lighting technologies include light emitting diodes 
(LEDs) and compact fluorescent lights (CFLs).  We consider a small three-watt LED 
light source as our benchmark electric lighting technology for rural applications.  
Commercially available warm white LED packages had an estimated efficiency of 70 
lumens per watt (lm/W) in 2009, and a corresponding first cost of $36 per kilolumen 
(klm).  These figures were anticipated to improve dramatically to 128 lm/W and 11 $/klm 
by 2012 and 234 lm/W and 1.10 $/klm by 2020 [210].  We conservatively assume 2009 
values of 70 lm/W and $36/klm, which may more accurately reflect technologies that are 
currently widely available in developing countries.  Therefore a typical 3 W LED light 
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source would provide a light output of 210 lumens, roughly equivalent to a 15 W 
incandescent bulb.  
In addition to grid connection and three different SHS capacities, we consider a 
small solar lantern that is powered by a 1.5 Wp solar panel, produces a maximum light 
output of 40 lumens and costs $40.  Lanterns such as this one are becoming widely 
available in developing countries, and these specifications represent a typical product that 
is currently available in Ghana [205].  We also consider two additional lighting 
technologies: battery powered incandescent flashlights and simple kerosene lamps.  The 
LED flashlights are assumed to run on AA batteries that cost $0.25 each and have 3 Wh 
capacity.  The kerosene lamp is assumed to cost $2.00 and provide eight lumens of light 
output.  The parameter assumptions for these lighting technologies are outlined in Table 
5.3 and Table 5.4.    
 
Table 5.3: Fuel and efficiency assumptions for considered lighting technologies  
Parameter Value 
LED Efficiency  70 lm/W 
LED Cost $35/klm 
AA Battery Capacity 2 Ah 
AA Battery Cost $0.25  
Kerosene Fuel Cost $0.60 / L 
 
Table 5.4: Cost of lighting calculation before cost of electricity is applied 





Capital Cost ($) $7.35 $3.45 $2.00 $40.00 
Lifetime (years) 5 5 5 5 
Electric Power (W) 3 1 0 1.5 
Electricity Used (kWh/year) 4.4 1.5 0 2 
Fuel Used (L/year) 0 0 13 0 
Annual Fuel Cost ($) $0.00 $0.00 $7.80 $0.00 
Annual Replacement Cost ($) $1.47 $0.69 $0.40 $8.00 
Total Annual Cost ($) $1.47 $0.69 $8.20 $8.00 
Light Output (lm) 210 70 8 40 
Annual light output (1000 lm-hours) 307 102 11 58.4 
Cost w/o electricity ($/1000 lm-h) $0.005 $0.007 $0.720 $0.137 
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   Each technology has an associated variable cost of operation that comes from 
required part replacements, fuel, batteries or electricity.  This cost is the same for each 
unit of generated light output.  In addition, each technology requires an upfront fixed 
investment such as the cost of a light bulb, lantern, solar home system or grid connection, 
which is spread over the entire lifetime of usage.  Therefore, in general, the unit cost of 
light output decreases as consumption levels increase.  Rather than applying a fixed cost 
to each kWh of centralized electricity consumption, we consider the true cost of 
electricity provision as a function of consumption level and household connection cost, as 
outlined in Figure 5.1.   Our economic analysis is framed in the context of electric 
delivery systems (SHS or grid) being used exclusively to provide lighting.  These systems 
can also be used to provide other energy services, in which case the consumer would be 
substituting potential light consumption for another more highly desired service such as 
television, radio or cell phone charging.  However, in order to compare electric and non-
electric lighting technologies on common ground we frame our discussion and analysis in 
terms of light consumption.  
Figure 5.3 shows the cost of light output from various technologies as a function 
of annual light output.  Vertical lines indicate the annual light output from a single 
kerosene lantern and one or ten 3 W LED sources operating for 4 hours per day, as well 
as the average household light consumption in India and throughout the entire world, 
assuming five people per household [211]. 
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Figure 5.3:  The total cost of light output is shown for a various lighting technologies as 
a function of annual light production. Data on the costs of electricity from SHS the grid 
are from Tables 5.1 and 5.2.  
 
Simple kerosene lanterns provide the cheapest lighting for very small 
consumption levels, less than 10 klh per year, due to their low capital requirement.  LED 
flashlights are a marginally more expensive lighting source than kerosene lanterns for all 
consumption levels, though this relationship could easily reverse if kerosene prices or 
LED efficiencies increase.  Solar lanterns are the cheapest off-grid lighting option for 
annual light production less than 700 klh, at which point a 15 W SHS becomes the 
cheapest option.  A $500 per household grid connection also has roughly the same cost 
for this level of light production.   As annual lighting production approaches 15,000 klh, 
the average level in India, a $2,000 per household grid connection becomes a lower-cost 
option than solar technologies.  For production levels equal to the world average of 
101,000 klh, a grid connection is the least-cost option as long as the connection cost is 
less than $10,000 per household.      
As has been discussed previously, grid tariffs in rural, low-consumption regions 
often do not reflect the true cost of electricity provision.  Electricity consumption for 
these consumers is therefore subsidized, whether consciously or otherwise.  Figure 5.4 

























































option.  Cost assumptions for electricity from the grid are based on the tariff structure in 
South Africa; however, this calculation could be similarly applied to other countries.  The 
resultant subsidy levels will be somewhat conservative compared to potential calculations 
in other regions as South Africa has a relatively high grid tariff compared to other 
countries that have been discussed, such as Brazil and Ghana.  As an example, according 
to Figure 5.3, a household that costs $2,000 to connect to the grid and consumes 2,100 
klh of light output (or equivalent other electric services) annually could have that service 
provided most cost-effectively by a 50 W SHS for about $147.  A similar service could 
be provided through grid connection for a true cost of roughly $286 per year; however 
the realized cost to consumer in rural South Africa would only be about $9.  Therefore, if 
this consumer is provided with grid access they are receiving an annual subsidy of $277, 
which is equal to roughly 188% of what it would cost to provide the same service with a 
SHS.    
This analysis does not consider potential changes in demand over time.  If 
demand were expected to increase significantly, an investment in grid expansion would 
become more cost-effective.  However, this analysis also ignores some of the drawbacks 
of grid expansion, such as the required lead time.  In many cases rural consumers must 
wait years for a grid connection to be provided by a central authority, whereas an 
independent and autonomously operated SHS could be obtained and installed in a month 
or less.      
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Figure 5.4: The subsidy provided for grid electricity is shown as a percentage of the cost 
of providing the same service from the least-cost distributed technology. 
 
5.4 Financial Delivery Mechanisms 
5.4.1 Overview 
We have discussed how distributed technologies can often be less expensive than 
grid expansion; as shown above, small solar home systems may provide the lowest cost 
lighting services for lighting levels between about two LED lights and the average 
lighting level in India, depending on grid connection costs.  However, for a variety of 
reasons low cost distributed electricity technologies are beyond the reach of many 
potential consumers.  Technologies such as a SHS or solar lantern require a relatively 
large upfront capital investment in exchange for long-term provision of energy services at 
a low variable rate.  The cost savings over the entire usage period may justify the 
investment, however, many rural consumers simply do not have access to the capital or 
credit required to make the initial purchase.  This suggests that innovative credit 
mechanisms and business models could help consumers overcome the capital-intensive 





















































































Here we present a model to compare three specific financial mechanisms that can 
be used to overcome the large capital requirement for obtaining a SHS on the basis of 
their ability to increase consumer net utility.  These are technology subsidies, rental 
contracts and microloan programs.  This model can be applied to determine the utility 
maximizing financial contract given a desired level of subsidization or cost to the 
providing agency – e.g. government, NGO or aid organization.  We calculate the utility 
gain realized by a consumer under each delivery mechanism for a range of expenditures 
by the providing agency to determine the most cost-effective means of increasing 
consumer utility.  We make no attempt to determine the optimal level of subsidization, 
and include situations where the desired subsidy level may be zero or even negative in 
our analysis.  We provide a framework for determining the optimal delivery mechanism 
for a given cost (or profit) to those providing electricity services to consumers.  The 
decision of whether or not to subsidize electricity systems and the extent of this potential 
involvement is left to each organization or government. 
Previous work comparing different contracts for financing energy development 
includes a study by Srinivasan that compares the direct capital subsidy offered by the 
Indian government for solar PV systems with the interest subsidy offered for solar water 
heating systems [141].  Srinivasan finds the interest subsidy to be the superior option as, 
contrary to a direct subsidy, it does not have to be customized for a specific product 
offering and can be disseminated through existing capital markets.  Chandrasekar and 
Kandpal similarly develop a mathematical framework for comparing the effective capital 
cost of solar technologies when different financial incentives are provided; such 
incentives include capital subsidies, low interest loans and accelerated tax depreciation 
[212].  They present threshold values below which the loan is preferred over the capital 
subsidy, finding that a loan offered at a 2% interest rate is equivalent to a 14.32% capital 
subsidy.   
Much additional research in the context of financing for rural energy development 
is focused on analyzing empirical findings from programs that have been implemented in 
recent years.   There is also a large body of literature discussing the general economic 
theory of subsidies, and a growing literature discussing the theory of subsidized and 
unsubsidized microloans.  However much of this work focuses on one particular contract 
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or mechanism, as opposed to directly comparing multiple different options.  An overview 
of relevant previous work specific to each of the three considered financial mechanisms 
was provided in chapter 1.  A discussion of the experiences with real-world use of SHS 
and implementations of these financial mechanisms in several different countries is also 
provided in section 5.5.      
5.4.2 Methodology 
Consumers are allocated a fixed monthly income and may apply their money either 
to the purchase of a SHS or to other expenditures.  Consumers receive utility for each 
unit of electricity they generate and also for each unit of income they apply to cash 
expenditures.  The utility from each opportunity is a concave function with diminishing 
marginal returns, so that the utility gained from each successive unit of expenditure is 
marginally less than from the previous unit.  Here x is the monetary expenditure in a 
given period and y is the electricity consumption level.  All of the variables appearing in 
this section are listed in Table 5.5. 
  = 
 ∙   + q ∙ R1																		5.2 
 
In this analysis, the value of a is fixed at one, meaning that the first dollar of 
expenditure each month provides one unit of utility.  Because the system is assumed to 
produce a fixed quantity y of electricity in each period that it is operational, it is more 
convenient to directly calculate the utility gained from this level of consumption.  This 
can be expressed in terms of the monetary expenditure that would provide the same level 
of utility,      
 
 =   +∙ ′ 							5.3																		 
where ′ is such that, 
′ 		 = q ∙ R1 									5.4																 
 
A sensitivity analysis will later consider a range of possible values for ¡ and ′. 
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5.4.2.1 Baseline 
Two client scenarios are considered as reference points.  In the first, the client 
does not purchase a SHS but rather spends their entire monthly income on other 
expenditures.   




In the second, the client saves the entirety of their monthly income until they are 
able to afford a SHS at full list price, at which point a purchase is made.  The purchase 
period is represented by t* and disposable income during the SHS lifetime is equal to 
total income less maintenance and battery replacement costs.  The client also generates 
electricity throughout the lifetime of the SHS.   All equations presented here assume that 
the lifetime of the SHS is greater than the time horizon, T.   
 
¢£2¤ =	 	 ′ 1 + -+
;
+d+∗ +




u∗ = ¦§qrtu ¨§ 																	5.7 




The reference scenario is taken to be the utility-maximizing choice of these two 
decision paths.  There is no cost to the agency in the reference scenario.  Our analysis 




A basic technology subsidy is perhaps the simplest option for reducing the initial 
investment required to obtain an individual SHS.  By reducing the required initial cost, 
clients who choose to save their income are able to obtain systems sooner and apply more 
of their future income to other expenditures.   
The calculation of client utility under a subsidy is essentially the same as under 
the reference scenario where a SHS is purchased, except that the subsidy enables the 
client to purchase the system sooner.  The disposable income under a subsidy contract © 
is equal to the disposable income under the second baseline scenario as expressed in 
Equation 5.8. 
 
£ª¢ =	 	 ′ 1 + -+
;
+d+∗ +
© 1 + -+ 				5.9 
 
u∗ = ¦§qrtu − t ¨§ 									5.10 
 
The cost incurred by the agency is simply the time-discounted value of the subsidy 
allocated in period t*. 
#£ª¢ =	 t1 + 7+∗ 											5.11 
5.4.2.3 Rental 
Under a rental contract, consumers pay a monthly fee for a SHS that is 
independent of their consumption level.  The rental contract allows the consumer to 
obtain a SHS in the first period.  The consumer is no longer responsible for maintenance 
and battery replacement, so their disposable income during the rental contract is simply 
their total income less the rental fee.  After the expiration of the rental contract, the 
consumer applies their entire income to other expenditures. 
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 ­ =  − 															5.13 
 
 Under a rental contract, the agency is responsible for battery replacements, 
monthly maintenance and administrative costs for operating the program.  There is a 
fixed cost for each rental contract that is realized in the first period and a variable cost 
that is realized during each period that the SHS is being rented.  The agency also 
purchases the SHS in the first period and receives a salvage value when each SHS is 
returned.  The salvage value assumes flat depreciation over the lifetime of the SHS and is 
further adjusted by the salvage ratio.   
 
#«2;¬ = qrtu + ±41 + 7 +  ²	
su + ¡
u + ³4 − 	1 + 7+ ´
+­®¯°
+dJ −
µu40/+1 + 7+­®¯° 				5.14 
 
Here  µu40/+ is the SHS salvage value at the termination of the rental contact. 
 
µu = u3=0 − uu3=0 ∙ t ∙ qrtu				5.15 
5.4.2.4 Microloan 
A microloan contract provides clients with capital for an immediate SHS 
purchase.  Clients are then responsible for making regular monthly loan repayments 
which include interest.  Similar to the rental contact, the agency faces fixed and variable 
management costs to administer the loan and collect monthly payments.  The contract 
differs from the rental contract in that clients own their system outright and are therefore 
responsible for any maintenance and battery replacements once the system warranty 
expires.  Clients can also default on their loan, causing the agency to lose out on future 
payments and forcing them to repossess the SHS, obtaining a salvage value in return.  
After clients default they apply their full income to other expenditures.     
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Calculations for client utility and cost to the agency under the microloan contract 
are similar to the rental contract.  The client makes a monthly payment p during each 
period until the loan is paid off in full at the conclusion of the loan term.  
   
S = qrtu ∙ 1 − 1 + l+¶·¸¯ 				5.16 
The client’s utility can be calculated as follows, 
 
¬> =		′  + ¶ 1 + -+
1+
+dJ +  ¹1 −  ∙ 	





The client is responsible for system maintenance and battery replacement throughout the 
lifetime of the SHS, but they only make a loan payment through the loan term.  Their 
disposable income is therefore defined as,  
 
¶ = »  − 
su + ¡
u + S:		u ≤ u3)7/ − 
su + ¡
u 							 ∶ 	u > u3)7/		§ 				5.18 
 
Under a microloan contract, the agency is responsible for administrative costs of 
operating the program.  There is a fixed cost for each microloan contract that is realized 
in the first period and a variable cost that is realized during each period that loan 
payments are being collected.  The agency must also purchase the SHS in the first period. 
#¬> = qrtu + ±31 + 7 +	 ³4 − S1 + 7+
1+
+dJ +  ²1 −  ∙ 	
³4 − S1 + 7+´
+¶·¸¯
+d1+ + 	
∙ µu1 + 71+ 			5.19 
 
5.4.3 Contract Comparison 
 We now directly compare the utility levels and costs of each contract to analyze 
the conditions under which one contract will be preferred to another.  A direct 
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comparison of Equations 5.9 and 5.12 shows that the subsidy contract provides greater 
utility than the rental contract when,  
−­  + ′ 1 + -+ 		
+∗
+dJ +	 
©  − ­ 1 + -+ 		
+­®¯°
+d+∗nJ + 





The first term of Equation 5.20 represents the utility lost under the subsidy contract by 
requiring the consumer to save income for several periods in order to purchase the SHS.  
Thereby, under a subsidy contract, consumption and expenditures are delayed until 
period t*, whereas under the rental contract they begin immediately.  The second term 
represents the period during which the SHS is operational under both contracts.  The net 
utility here comes from the difference between disposable income under the subsidy and 
rental contracts, IDs
b and IDr
b respectively.   The subsidy contract will provide greater 
disposable income when monthly maintenance and battery replacement costs are less 
than the monthly rental fee.  This will usually be the case as the rental contract has to 
cover maintenance and battery replacement expenses in addition to any administration 
costs of the rental program.  The third term represents the period after the rental term has 
expired but while the subsidized SHS purchase is still operational.  The second and third 
terms will generally result in positive net utility from the subsidy contract compared to 
the rental contract.  Therefore, the subsidy contract will provide greater utility when the 
additional utility gained in these periods exceeds the utility lost between periods one and 
t*.   This will be the case when the consumer discount rate is low and utility in later 
periods is therefore valued more heavily.  The net utility difference between the subsidy 
and rental contracts will also increase as the difference between the monthly rental fee 
and the costs of maintenance and battery replacement increases.   
A similar comparison of Equations 5.9 and 5.17 shows that the subsidy contract 
generates greater utility than the loan contract when 
 
	−′  + ¶ 1 + -+
+∗
+dJ +	 
§©  − ¶  §1 + -+ 	+  ©







The first two terms are largely analogous to the first two terms of Equation 5.20, 
accounting for the early period consumption and expenditure enabled by the loan 
contract, and the difference in disposable incomes after the subsidized SHS has been 
purchased.  The third term accounts for the risk of loan default.  When the default rate is 
0%, this term is identical to the second term.  The second and third terms will generally 
result in a net positive utility for the subsidy contract compared to the loan contract.  The 
subsidy contract will generate greater total utility than the loan contract when then the 
positive contributions from these two terms outweigh the utility lost under the subsidy 
contract in periods one through t*.  Therefore a low consumer discount rate will benefit 
the subsidy contract more than the loan contract, as will an increasing loan default rate.   
A comparison of Equations 5.12 and 5.17 shows that the rental contract will 
provide more utility than the loan contract when 
	­  − ¶ 1 + -+
1+
+dJ +	 
­  − 1 −  ∙ ¶  +  ∙ ′  −  1 + -+
+­®¯°
+d1+





The rental and loan contracts are analogous in many ways, as both involve a 
monthly payment in exchange for SHS service.  However, there may be differences in the 
monthly payment amount, the payback period, the consumption period and administrative 
costs.  When the loan term and rental term are equal and both greater than T and the loan 
default rate is zero then the two contracts are in fact functionally identical; both provide 
equal utility for any given cost to the agency.  However, variations around these 
parameters lead to differences between the two contracts.  The preferred contract will be 
the one that encourages longer periods of usage and can be administered more cheaply.  
For example, an increased average rental term or increased loan default rate will result in 
the rental contract being preferred over the loan contract.  
Additionally, as the loan term decreases, the corresponding monthly payment will 
increase.  If the consumer has a higher discount rate than the agency, this compression of 
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payments into a shorter period will adversely affect the consumer more than it will 
benefit the agency.  If the required monthly payment exceeds a consumer’s monthly 
income, they will not be able to participate in the loan program.   
The fact that a loan cannot be offered with an interest rate below 0% also makes 
the loan contract impractical when high levels of subsidization are desired.  In practice a 
loan with a negative interest rate could be offered, however as this does not lead to full 
cost recovery, such an arrangement would more closely resemble a rental contract.   
Unlike the loan contract, the rental contract requires the agency to pay for 
maintenance and battery replacements.  However, in general this simply shifts both client 
expenditure and agency cost upwards without fundamentally affecting the utility that can 
be provided for a given cost.  Another key factor in distinguishing the rental and 
microloan contracts is the potential difference in administrative costs between them.  If 
one contract is cheaper to administer then the net utility that can be provided for a given 
cost will increase.  
5.4.4 Numerical Analysis 
 The above methodology is designed to calculate the total cost and net 
consumer utility gain of each contract for a given set of static parameter values.  Each 
delivery mechanism has one decision parameter that heavily influences the cost to the 
agency; these are the subsidy amount, the monthly service fee (rental) and the microloan 
interest rate.  In practice, these parameter values would generally be chosen by the 
agency in order to achieve their desired level of subsidization or profit.  We now present 
an analysis that calculates the net utility gain realized by a consumer and the cost to the 
agency across a range of decision parameters values, while holding all other parameters 
constant.  The values of the parameters required for this calculation will vary greatly 
based on macroeconomic conditions and other market dynamics.  The following 
application of this model uses the baseline parameter values outlined in Table 5.5; we 
stress that discretion should be exercised when attempting to broadly apply these results 
to specific situations.  This analysis is framed by the baseline assumptions that lead to 
near indifference between the loan and rental contracts.  As discussed previously, if the 
average consumption period under a rental contract exceeds the average consumption 
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period under a loan contract then the rental contract will likely be preferred in all 
situations, and vice versa.  Starting from this perspective of near indifference allows us to 
more closely examine the parameter combinations that cause the optimal contract to tip 
from a loan to a rental contract.  Figure 5.5 shows the increase in utility and cost as the 
decision parameter is varied for each delivery mechanism; other sensitive parameters are 
fixed at baseline values.  Net utility is calculated as the difference between the utility 
from each contract and the baseline scenario.  The net utility for each contract is a 
mostly-linear function of cost to the agency; these lines will be referred to as cost-benefit 
frontiers.  This figure demonstrates an example application of this methodology with 
fixed parameters and also provides a baseline for further analysis.  A direct comparison 
of these functions then yields the optimal (utility-maximizing) contract for each cost.  
The dynamics of these contracts are highly sensitive to variations in the input parameters, 
and it is difficult to draw broad conclusions from one static analysis.  Fixed baseline 
values are assumed for all other financial and technical parameters and multivariate 
sensitivity analysis and Monte Carlo simulation are later performed to analyze the effect 
of variations in 16 of these parameters.  
 Table 5.5 shows the baseline values that are assumed for all other parameters, as 
well as the range of values for each parameter that will be assumed during sensitivity 
analysis and Monte Carlo simulations.  The decision parameters do not have baseline 
values as they are varied in order to create the cost-benefit function.  The baseline 
technology in this analysis is a 50 W peak capacity SHS operating at a 16% capacity 
factor, which costs $725 and provides 5.84 kWh of electricity generation each month.  
All calculations are made over a period of 120 monthly timesteps, corresponding to a ten 








Table 5.5: Parameters of financial service mechanisms for electrification programs.  
Baseline values for all parameters are shown along with the symbols used to represent 
them.  The given discount and interest rates are in annual terms, but the variables used in 
equations correspond to the monthly equivalent rate.  The variable a is omitted because 
its value is normalized to one. 
Parameter Symbol Baseline Low High 
Direct Subsidy s   -300 725 
Monthly Rental Fee ($) r   0 50 
Microloan Interest Rate i   0 100% 
General 
Monthly Income ($) I 50 10 100 
NGO Discount Rate dn 10% 0% 20% 
Client Discount Rate dc 20% 0% 30% 
a aexp 1 1 1 
b bexp 0.8 0.6 1 
x' x' 15 5 25 
SHS 
SHS Cost cost 725 400 1000 
SHS Life (months) tlife 120 120 120 
Maintenance ($/month) main 0.50 0.00 2.00 
Battery Cost ($)   100 100 100 
Battery Replacement Frequency 
(months)   48 36 60 
Montly Battery Cost ($) bat 2.08 1.67 2.78 
Capacity (Wp)   50 50 50 
Capacity Factor   0.16 0.16 0.16 
Monthly SHS Generation (kWh) y 5.84 5.84 5.84 
Loan 
Loan Term (months) tloan 36 12 60 
Fixed Loan Cost ($/loan) fl 10 0 20 
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Variable Loan Cost ($/month) vl 2 0 5 
Default Rate dr 20% 0% 40% 
Average Time Before Default (months) dt 18 18 18 
Rental 
Average Rental Term (months) trent 60 12 120 
Salvage Ratio sr 50% 0% 100% 
Fixed Rental Cost ($/rental) fr 5 0 20 




Figure 5.5: The increase in utility realized by a client is shown as a function of cost to 
the agency under baseline parameter assumptions.  The numbers marking data points 
represent the corresponding subsidy amount ($), monthly rental fee ($) and annual 
interest rate for the subsidy, rental and microloan contract respectively.  The cost to the 
agency can also be thought of as the level of subsidization to the consumer.   
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Figure 5.5 shows the cost-benefit functions for each contract that result from 
varying the decision parameters while holding all other parameters at their baseline 
values.  The numerical data labels denote the values of each decision parameters that 
result in the corresponding agency cost.  For example, these labels indicate that an agency 
seeking to break even on each transaction could do so by offering no direct subsidy, a 
rental contract with a monthly fee of $16.50 or a loan contract with a 19% annual interest 
rate.  Similarly, an agency looking to offer a subsidy with a present value of $150 could 
do so by offering a direct subsidy of $165, a rental contract with a monthly fee of $13 or 
a zero-interest loan.  The amount of the direct subsidy differs from the level of 
subsidization because the subsidy is allocated at the time of purchase and is, therefore, 
time-discounted accordingly.  A negative agency cost implies that the agency is making a 
profit from the transaction in addition to any profit margins that are built into the market 
price of a system.  A negative net utility implies that the consumer receives more utility 
by either purchasing a SHS at full market price or not obtaining a SHS at all.     
It can be seen that for a cost to the agency of -$260 or less, the net utilities of all 
three contracts are less than zero, which implies that the consumer would be better off not 
entering a contract.  It may still be optimal for the consumer to purchase a SHS, however, 
if such is the case they would best off doing so through a direct purchase at the full list 
price.  Both the rental contract and the loan contract generate positive net utility for costs 
greater than -$260.   
The rental contract and the loan contract provide fairly comparable net utility for 
any cost to the agency with the loan contract being slightly preferred until the cost-benefit 
frontiers intersect at a cost of $-55.  This point corresponds with an annual interest rate of 
roughly 25% and a monthly rental fee of roughly $17.  The loan contract is then preferred 
until the total cost to the agency reaches $150, at which point the annual interest rate 
becomes 0% and further subsidization is not possible through a loan contract. The utility 
from the subsidy contract exceeds the utility from the rental contract at a present cost of 
about $380, or a direct subsidy of $400.   
The utility increase enabled by each contract is roughly a linear function of the 
cost to the agency, however the slope of this linear relationship is different in all three 
cases.  Under the direct subsidy, the client gains approximately .55 units of utility (utils) 
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for each additional dollar contributed by the agency.  The gain is approximately .39 utils 
per dollar for the loan contract and .32 utils per dollar for the rental contract.  The 
differences in these values can be explained by the dynamics of each contract, which are 
now discussed to provide further insight into the situations where one contract may be 
preferred to another.      
Under a rental contract, the client is able to obtain a system immediately.  
Decreasing the rental fee allows the client to allocate more of their income to other 
expenditures, thereby marginally increasing their total realized utility in each period.  
Rental contracts would be preferred over subsidies by clients with minimal savings and a 
high discount rate, as it enables these clients to obtain a system immediately whereas a 
subsidy would require them to save for several periods before making the purchase.  This 
effect is also seen in Equation 5.20.   
Under a loan contract, a reduction in the interest rate lowers monthly payments, 
increasing client disposable income and decreasing agency income, similar to a rental 
contract.  However, these effects only take place over the duration of the loan as opposed 
to being spread out across the entire rental contract.  As the client discount rate is 
generally greater than the agency discount rate, this consolidation of payments into 
earlier time periods affects the client more heavily than the agency.  Therefore, under a 
microloan contract, a reduction in income for the agency enables a gain in client utility 
that is relatively larger (less discounted) than it is under the rental contract.  As a result, 
the slope of the microloan cost-benefit frontier is greater than the slope of the rental cost-
benefit frontier.  
Increasing the technology subsidy allows the client to purchase a system earlier 
and use the system during time periods that were previously unutilized.  This provides the 
client with utility from both system usage and other expenditure in an early time period 
that is relatively undiscounted; this has a significant impact on total realized utility.  
Therefore, the slope of the subsidy cost-benefit frontier is greater than it is for the other 
two contracts.     
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5.4.5 Single-factor Sensitivity Analysis 
 We now perform a single-factor sensitivity analysis in order to understand how 
changes in key parameters influence the optimal choice of financial contract.  Figures 
5.6-5.11 show the optimal contract for a given cost to the agency while varying a single 
sensitive parameter.  The ‘direct purchase’ outcome indicates that a consumer will prefer 
to purchase a SHS outright at the full market cost, while the ‘no SHS’ outcome indicates 
that the consumer will not obtain a SHS, preferring instead to apply their income to other 
expenditures.     
For example, Figure 5.6 illustrates the effect of varying the consumer discount 
rate between 0 and 30%.   For a cost of $100 per SHS to the agency, a direct subsidy 
contract provides the consumer with the greatest utility when the consumer discount rate 
is below approximately 5%.  A loan contract becomes optimal for consumer discount 
rates between 5% and 22%, and the rental contract is optimal for consumer discount rates 
in excess of 22%.  It can also been seen if the agency were to profit on each system, the 
consumer would prefer to directly purchase a SHS at the list price when their discount 
rate is below 5%.  The subsidy contract can never generate additional profit for the 
agency as it is assumed that a system can always be purchased at list price on the open 
market.  For consumer discount rates in excess of 5% the agency can generate a profit 
that increases from $0 to $300 by offering a loan or rental contract.  High consumer 
discount rates favor the rental and loan contracts over a subsidy contract because they 
allow consumers to obtain a SHS immediately.  A high consumer discount rate favors the 
rental contract over the loan contract because payments for the rental contract are made 
over a longer period than for the loan contract, and these future payments are discounted 
more heavily.  The vertical right edge of the loan optimality region that occurs at an 
agency cost of approximately $150 is due to the assumed inability of the loan contract to 




Figure 5.6: The effect of varying the consumer discount rate on the optimal financial 
contract for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
Figure 5.7 similarly shows the effect of varying the agency discount rate between 
0 and 20%.  It is seen that an agency with a discount rate below 10% can provide a SHS 
to increase consumer utility while also making a profit of up to $300 through a rental 
contract.  As the agency discount rate increases from 10% to 20% this maximum profit 
decreases to about $200.  An agency with a low discount rate places a relatively high 
value on future income.  They are, therefore, able to offer a low monthly rental fee, which 
benefits the consumer, and still consider the exchange to be profitable.  As the agency 
discount rate increases, the loan contract becomes more attractive since the loan 




Figure 5.7: The effect of varying the agency discount rate on the optimal financial 
contract for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the effect of varying the length of the average rental term from 
12 to 120 months.  The rental contract becomes more favorable for a longer average 
rental term, as the fixed costs of administering the program are spread over a longer 
usage period.  Additionally, consumers obtain utility from electricity consumption over a 
longer period of time.  If the average rental term drops below approximately 50 months, 
then the loan contract and subsidy contracts are generally more effective than the rental 




Figure 5.8: The effect of varying the rental term on the optimal financial contract for a 
given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
Figure 5.9 shows the effect of varying the length of the loan term from 12 to 60 
months.  The loan contract becomes more favorable over a longer loan term as this 
reduces monthly payments and extends the payback period for consumers.  Under 
baseline assumptions, the consumer discount rate is greater than the agency discount rate; 
this delay in repayment benefits the consumer more than it costs the agency.  A shorter 
loan term also increases monthly payments and may prevent consumers from 
participating in the market.  This limits the range of interest rates that a agency is able to 
offer its customers, while still ensuring that they can afford the monthly payments.  For 
example, when the loan term is shorter than 14 months, the required monthly payment 
exceeds the consumer’s $50/month income even in the case of a 0% interest rate.  The 
right edge of the region where the loan contract is optimal is defined by the inability of 
the loan contract to offer an interest rate below 0%, thereby limiting the degree of 
potential subsidization.   
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Figure 5.9: The effect of varying the loan term on the optimal financial contract for a 
given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 look at the effect of varying how consumer utility is 
calculated.  In Figure 5.10, the coefficient that dictates the decreasing marginal returns 
for monetary expenditures is varied from 0.6 to 1.0.  This parameter has a significant 
impact on the optimal contract.  For values approaching 1.0, the consumer has less 
incentive to obtain a SHS, preferring instead to apply their income to other expenditures. 
For values approaching 0.6 the consumer prefers to obtain a SHS even in situations 
where the agency is making a profit on the transaction.  A high value also favors the 
rental contract over the loan contract, as consumers have more disposable income while 
making rental payments than they do while making loan payments.     





Figure 5.10: The effect of varying a consumer’s utility from monetary expenditure on the 
optimal financial contract for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
Figure 5.11 similarly looks at the impact of varying the utility obtained by a 
consumer for one month of electricity consumption from a SHS.  This parameter 
represents the quantity of monetary expenditure that provides the same level of utility to a 
consumer as one month (5.84 kWh) of electricity consumption.  As this value drops, a 
consumer becomes less incentivized to obtain SHS, preferring instead to apply their 
income to other expenditures.  Higher values favor the loan contract because it enables a 
longer period of electricity consumption than the rental contract under baseline 
assumptions.  For values of 14 or less, the consumer prefers to not obtain a SHS when the 
level of total subsidization is too low.  For values greater than 15 they prefer to obtain a 
SHS through a direct purchase when the agency profit from offering a contract exceeds 
$275 per system.  
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Figure 5.11: The effect of varying a consumer’s utility from electricity consumption on 
the optimal financial contract for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
5.4.6 Multi-factor Sensitivity Analysis 
The single-factor sensitivity analysis provides some insight into the relative 
importance of variations in several key parameters.  However, the input parameters that 
impact the financial dynamics of these three contracts may be interdependent.  Therefore, 
the practice of single-factor sensitivity analysis may be uninformative or even misleading 
when there are a large number of interacting sensitive parameters.  
Saltelli and Annoni discuss the reasons that modelers have been hesitant to 
abandon single-factor sensitivity analysis and construct a geometric proof to show the 
shortcomings of this method [213].  They advocate several alternative multi-factor 
sensitivity analysis techniques including regression analysis, an elementary effects 
method and variance based indicators.  Our analysis utilizes the following variance based 
sensitivity analysis as illustrated in Saltelli and Annoni.  This method is also discussed in 
more detail and further demonstrated with several examples by Saltelli et al. [214].      
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A variance based sensitivity index is now used to measure the relative impact of 
variations in each of 16 sensitive input factors on the optimal contract.  Three output 
factors are considered for each given cost to the agency, a binary variable for each 
contract to represent whether or not that contract is optimal.  The sensitivity index, Si, is 
represented as follows, 
 
µ = W ½%W~A|@¾A 				5.22 
 
Here Xi represents a particular input factor, Y represents the output factor and X~i 
represents the set of all other input factors while Xi is held fixed.  Therefore, Si is 
calculated by picking a specific input factor, fixing the value of that input factor and 
varying all other input factors through Monte Carlo simulation.  These factor values are 
randomly chosen from a uniform distribution in the range of +/- 20% of the baseline 
parameter value.  A constant range is chosen to maintain consistency in evaluating the 
relative sensitivity of each input parameter.  The output factor is determined for each of 
these parameter combinations and the mean is calculated.  The value of Xi is then 
adjusted, and the process is repeated.  A mean output value will result for each fixed 
value of Xi, and the variance of these means is taken as representative index of the 
relative impact of input factor Xi.  This analysis is performed for all input factors and the 
indices for each factor are divided by the total variance of all the resultant output factor 
values to obtain normalized values of Si that fall between 0 and 1.  This index measures 
the effect that fixing input factor Xi would have on reducing the variance of the outputs.   
This analysis is applied to the 16 sensitive parameters listed in Table 5.5.  Each 
parameter is varied in the range of +/- 20% of its baseline value and the Si metric is 
calculated.  Therefore the Si value represents the relative impact of the same fractional 
shift in each parameter.  Because of its exponential nature, the expenditure coefficient (b) 
is varied in the range of +/- 6% to maintain the common scale of variations between 
parameters.  This corresponds with  approximately a +/- 20% shift in utility for a monthly 
expenditure of $25.   
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Figures 5.12-5.14 show the Si values for each contract and across a range of costs 
to the agency; only the five most sensitive parameters across the three contracts are 
depicted.  Figure 5.12 indicates that the loan contract is primarily sensitive to changes in 
parameters in the range of a -$300 to $100 cost to the agency.  The most significant 
contributions are due to the default rate and length of the rental term. While the loan 
contract is not directly affected by the rental term length, an increased rental term will 
generally cause a shift in optimality from the loan contract to the rental contract in this 
cost range.  The loan contract is largely insensitive for greater costs, as it is generally not 
viable for levels of subsidization in excess of $300 per system.  Figure 5.13 shows that 
the rental contract is primarily sensitive to variations in the rental term and the consumer 
discount rate.  These effects are seen across the entire cost range of -$300 to $700 per 
system.  The rental contract is also sensitive to changes in the SHS cost for higher desired 
levels of subsidization, as reductions in cost  cause a shift from the rental contract to the 
subsidy contract in this range.  Figure 5.14 similarly shows that the subsidy contract is 
mostly sensitive to changes in the consumer discount rate, the rental term length and the 
SHS cost.  The subsidy contract is not sensitive to variations in parameters for lower 




Figure 5.12: Multi-factor sensitivity metrics for five parameters that affect the optimality 





Figure 5.13:  Multi-factor sensitivity metrics for five parameters that affect the 





Figure 5.14:  Multi-factor sensitivity metrics for five parameters that affect the 
optimality of the subsidy contract are shown as a function of cost to the agency. 
5.4.7 Monte Carlo Simulation 
A Monte Carlo simulation is also executed to understand the range of potential 
results while varying all 16 sensitive input parameters.  For each iteration, a random 
value of each sensitive parameter is drawn from a uniform distribution between the low 
and high values that are outlined in Table 5.5.  Figure 5.15 shows the results of 10,000 
determinations of the optimal contract for a cost to the agency ranging from -$300 to 
$700.  It is seen that for negative costs (profits) to the agency, consumers are often better 
off either not participating in the program or not obtaining a SHS.  As the cost to the 
agency increases the direct subsidy contract becomes increasingly attractive.  The loan 
contract is optimal more frequently for relatively small costs or profits to the agency, 
while the rental contract is frequently optimal over a wider range of costs.  As the desired 
level of subsidization increases the subsidy contract becomes optimal in an increasing 
number of iterations, exceeding 80% for a $700 cost to the agency.   
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Figure 5.15:  Monte Carlo simulation is conducted over 10,000 iterations to determine 
the probably of each contract being optimal for a given cost to the agency.  Values for the 
16 sensitive parameters are drawn from a uniform distribution between the values shown 
in Table 5.5.   
5.5 Discussion  
Small solar home systems (SHS) are rapidly becoming a popular technology for 
distributed rural electrification in many parts of the world because of their relatively 
small unit size, ease of installation and scalability.  A number of studies have analyzed 
the financial viability or socio-economic impacts of SHS in various parts of the world, 
including Bangladesh [14, 15, 54, 85, 86] and India and Sri Lanka [59, 87, 88].  Other 
studies examine factors that have impeded the penetration of SHS [58, 89–92], analyze 
electricity consumption levels for SHS users [93, 94] or discuss user expectations, 
education and experiences regarding new SHS installations [60, 95–97].  Additional 
studies analyze the institutional dynamics of SHS by comparing the relative effectiveness 
of market versus donor-based SHS programs in El Salvador [98] and examining problems 
faced by public-private partnerships in Africa [99].  A set of quantitative quality of life 
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indicators has been proposed to better understand the socio-economic impacts of SHS 
development [100].  Studies have also examined the effectiveness of solar electrification 
in increasing economic productivity of rural micro-enterprises [101] and alleviating 
poverty [102] in Ghana.   
The cost of SHS systems has prevented them from reaching higher levels of 
penetration.  SHS require significant upfront capital investment, and while electricity 
from centralized sources require even greater upfront capital, consumers can generally 
pay for grid electricity on a marginal basis.  In many regions, poor populations simply do 
not have access to the capital required to obtain a SHS.  We have considered three 
specific financial mechanisms that can be used to overcome the large capital requirement 
for obtaining a SHS, thereby increasing access to the poor.  These are technology 
subsidies, rental programs and microloans.  For overviews of different institutional 
strategies that have been employed to promote rural electrification around the world see 
Palit and Chaurey [103] and Zerreffi [104].  Miller also discusses lessons learnt from 
early attempts by the World Bank to provide large-scale loans to support SHS 
dissemination in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia [105].  
5.5.1   Subsidies 
One example of a subsidy approach to decentralized electrification is Brazil, 
which in 2002 initiated an ambitious plan to provide electricity to the roughly 8 million 
Brazilians who did not have electricity access at that time.  Most of these people reside in 
rural regions that are difficult to serve cost-effectively, and therefore electricity access 
had eluded them.  Brazil has taken an organizationally centralized approach to distributed 
electricity provision.  The plan primarily relied on a concession system, where a company 
was given a regional monopoly on electricity distribution under the requirement that they 
meet certain universal service provisions.  These concessionaires are generally 
government-owned or heavily regulated utilities that provide electricity through diesel 
mini-grids and solar home systems.  As many rural residents have a minimal ability to 
pay for electrification, rural grid tariffs are cross-subsidized by other consumers.  In 2007 
the average residential grid tariff across Brazil was about $0.15 per kWh in present U.S. 
dollars, while rural consumers paid about $0.09 cents per kWh on average [206].  Results 
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so far have been largely positive, though development has been slower than was hoped 
and the program is still heavily reliant on the government for subsidies and organizational 
support [104].  
Rural electrification can also proceed without subsidies, as has been the case in 
Cambodia.  It has been estimated that the lone official Cambodian electric utility 
provided electricity access to only 15% of the population as of 2004.  However, in 2006 
other estimates suggested that as much as 90-95% of the population had access to some 
basic level of electricity service.  This difference is primarily explained by a number of 
small, privately operated, rural electricity providers that are unlicensed and unregulated 
by the government.  These providers generally operate diesel powered mini-grids or 
battery charging stations that provide very small quantities of electricity at relatively high 
rates to local customers.  Official grid tariffs are structured on the basis of full-cost 
recovery, and vary from as low as $0.15 per kWh in Phnom Penh to $0.30 in more rural 
regions.  However, many rural consumers pay as much as $1.00 for electricity from 
unregulated sources [207].    The Cambodian experience provides an excellent example 
of how unregulated, free market forces can generate organizationally decentralized 
solutions when a competent centralized option is not available [104].  
5.5.2 Rental 
South Africa has taken a fee-for-service approach to decentralized electrification.  
In 1999 South Africa launched a rural electrification program that follows a fee-for-
service concession model, with the goal of providing 300,000 new solar home systems to 
un-electrified populations. The government provided a significant portion (as much as 
88%) of the required upfront capital cost for the SHS and customers then pay a monthly 
fee to a utility company for their service.  Some regions also subsidize portions of the 
monthly fee.  While subsidies represent a large percentage of the total system cost, the 
absolute cost is often lower than the amount that the government might otherwise 
contribute towards grid expansion for each new connection.   
Eskom, the primary electric utility in South Africa, offers a range of grid tariff 
plans for different classes of urban or rural and industrial or residential customers.  Low-
usage urban consumers are entitled to the Home Light plan, which offers tiered pricing 
 140
rates that range from $0.075 to $0.15 per kWh depending on consumption level.  In rural 
regions, low-usage consumers are charged a fixed rate of approximately $.30 per kWh 
[209].  This policy contrasts the case of Brazil, where subsidized rural tariffs fall below 
urban rates for similar consumers.  The lower level of rural grid subsidization increases 
the opportunity for decentralized technologies to be implemented cost-effectively.  The 
SHS fee-for-service program has demonstrated that small, well-managed, publicly 
supported companies can effectively complement the more traditional large utility model 
in providing rural electricity services at reasonable costs [122].    
5.5.3 Microfinance 
 Taking a micro-loan approach, the Energy Ministry of Ghana initiated a program 
in cooperation with The World Bank in early 2011 that was designed to help improve 
rural electricity access through the installation of new small-scale, solar home systems.  
The project has specifically targeted communities that are not anticipated to receive a 
connection to the national electric grid in the next 5-10 years and are located in the 
largely rural Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana.  Members of these 
communities are eligible to receive loans from local rural banks that are used to purchase 
subsidized solar home systems.  Ghana currently provides subsidized electricity from the 
grid by offering a tiered pricing structure based on consumption level.  This includes a 
so-called lifeline tariff that charges all customers who consume less than 50 kWh in a 
given month a flat fee of approximately $1.25.  The tariff changes to a variable rate for 
higher consumption levels, gradually increasing from $.10 to $.13 per kWh [208].   
5.6 Conclusions 
Our results indicate that distributed technologies such as solar lanterns and solar 
home systems may provide a more cost-effective option than grid extension for providing 
electricity services to sparsely-populated regions where the demand for energy services is 
relatively small.  We have also shown that rental and loan contracts can be implemented 
to make SHS more accessible to rural consumers, and in some cases also generate a profit 
for the provider.   
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A key benefit provided by electric systems is access to lighting; a service that can 
also be provided by non-electric technologies.  We showed that a single solar lantern 
provides lighting more cost-effectively than flashlights or kerosene lamps if annual light 
production exceeds roughly 10klh per year.  At higher levels, enough to power up to ten 
light sources, solar home systems are more cost-effective than electricity from the grid, 
unless grid connection costs are less than approximately $1000 per household.  For 
annual lighting consumption equal to the average consumption level in India, solar home 
systems are more cost-effective than electricity from the grid when marginal grid 
connection costs exceed $2000 per household.   
The grid tariff structure in many countries implies a level of subsidization, 
particularly in regions that have low electricity consumption and where grid connection is 
expensive.  In some cases this implicit subsidy may exceed the entire cost of distributed 
technologies.  In these cases welfare could be enhanced by providing large targeted 
subsidies that make it possible for the rural poor to purchase solar home systems for a 
nominal cost.  Examples, such as the subsidized fee-for-service SHS program in South 
Africa and the microloan program in Ghana, suggest that some governments are aware of 
this trend and have accordingly begun to channel subsidies towards decentralized 
technologies.     
The required upfront cost of solar home systems is beyond the means of many of 
the rural poor. To address this issue, some governments and development agencies have 
provided subsidies and developed micro-loan programs to reduce the cost to the level at 
which many of the rural power can pay.  Nevertheless, these subsidized systems are still 
very expensive for many of the rural poor with the result that adoption rates are low, 
default or non-payment rates are high, and program costs are high as well.  These 
program costs are effectively an additional subsidy to the SHS program; however, the 
subsidies for grid-based rural electrification are often significantly higher.  Overall the 
result is that in solar home system programs, the rural poor pay a high price for each unit 
of electricity consumption and do not receive the same government assistance as those 
who rely on electricity from the grid.  
By considering overall system costs of providing lighting to the rural poor, we have 
shown the cost of lighting for a range of lighting technologies and both solar home 
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systems and grid systems.  By reducing system costs to the level that can be paid upfront 
without financing similar levels of service could be achieved with significantly higher 
levels of subsidies to the rural poor and corresponding reduction in overhead costs of the 
program.  
We also directly compare the effectiveness of three different financial contracts 
that have been used to make solar home systems more accessible to the rural poor.  We 
show that rental and loan contracts are largely analogous and may provide similar net 
utility increases for certain parameter combinations.  A loan contract generally condenses 
higher consumer payments into a shorter period, which may prevent some low income 
consumers from participating.  However, this contract may be preferred to a rental 
contract if consumption continues for a longer period than it does under the rental 
contract.  Loan contracts may also be relatively preferred to rental contracts if the client 
discount rate is low or the agency discount rate is high.  Subsidy contracts may be a more 
effective option if the agency is able to subsidize a significant portion of the total system 
cost.  Subsidy contracts also become more attractive when client discount rates are low 
and agency discount rates are high.  They also benefit from minimal administrative 
expenses. 
Multi-factor sensitivity analysis suggests that optimality of each contract is more 
sensitive to changes in the consumer discount rate than it is to changes in the agency 
discount rate.  It is also shows that the length or the rental term has a significant impact 
on whether or not the rental contract is optimal.  A longer rental term resulting in less 
turnover reduces administrative costs and allows for more extended periods of 
consumption.  
Monte Carlo simulation across a reasonable range of values for all 16 of the 
sensitive parameters illustrates that an agency can generate a profit from a rental or loan 
program when conditions are favorable.  It is also seen that the loan contract is feasible 
across more parameter values when costs or profits to the agency are small and the 
subsidy contract tends to be optimal in the majority of situations when the desired level 





This thesis is focused on understanding the choice between centralized and 
decentralized electricity infrastructure development strategies, with particular application 
to developing countries where millions of people lack regular access to reliable electricity 
and other energy services.  Several complementary analyses of this decision paradigm are 
presented implementing novel tools that span a range of different technical fields 
including network algorithm design, linear and mixed-integer programming and 
stochastic simulation.  The main contribution of this thesis is to develop energy modeling 
frameworks that consider the full range of parameters affecting the determination of 
optimal development strategies, many of which are often overlooked by traditional 
analyses.  These parameters include the true costs of transmission infrastructure as well 
as the implications of outages and system unreliability, infrastructure lead times, 
uncertain development budgets, high discount rates and the unique dynamics of rural 
credit markets.  
Chapter 2 presents a methodology for identifying priority locations for distributed 
electricity generation technologies, such as solar home systems.  An original network 
algorithm is developed to determine a near-minimum length network that is capable of 
spanning a given fraction of population in a region.  These data are then used to calculate 
a metric that quantifies the relative cost-effectiveness of decentralized electricity 
infrastructure development in a given region.  Several case studies are presented to 
demonstrate potential applications of this methodology, and aggregated results are 
presented for 150 countries around the world.  The analysis suggests that the majority of 
the world’s population can be served most cost-effectively by centralized electricity 
networks.  However, it also identifies a number of key regions where distributed 
technologies may be implemented cost-effectively when electricity demand levels are 
below certain threshold values.  The new algorithm presented in this chapter is 
demonstrated through an application to electricity networks, but it could easily be applied 
to similar analysis and planning of numerous other types of country-level network 
infrastructure including water or fuel distribution, transportation and communication.   
 144
Chapter 3 presents another least-cost methodology that approaches the 
centralized-decentralized electrification paradigm from a different perspective.  A mixed-
integer programming framework is developed to determine the minimum-cost 
combination of centralized and decentralized electrification infrastructure that is capable 
of serving electricity demand in a specified region.  A case study of Rwanda is presented 
to demonstrate the model, and a sensitivity analysis is conducted around the cost of 
decentralized generation technology and electricity demand levels.  A tipping point effect 
is found to exist in the case of Rwanda, where the least-cost infrastructure tips directly 
from mostly centralized to mostly decentralized as these two parameters are varied.  The 
impact of varying the geographic resolution of this model is also analyzed, and the 
computational requirements of several different formulations are discussed.  The same 
general tipping points are identified across all four considered geographic resolutions.  
This finding suggests that lower-resolution data may be considered when computational 
resources are limited and only high-level results are desired.  As was the case in chapter 
2, the methodologies presented in this chapter are also broadly applicable to other 
network applications where centralized and decentralized infrastructure development 
options may be considered.  Examples may include the choice between centralized water 
treatment and subsequent distribution versus localized treatment, landline versus cellular 
telecommunications or land-based versus air-based transportation networks.  The model 
is also scalable and could easily be applied to evaluate least-cost infrastructure at the 
regional or village level.   
Chapter 4 builds upon the work presented in chapter 3, by introducing stochastic 
events and probabilistic parameters into a model for serving electricity demand through a 
combined centralized and decentralized electricity infrastructure.   A temporal dimension 
is also introduced to analyze the lead time requirement of different infrastructure 
development paths.  Additionally, results obtained when explicitly modeling stochastic 
events are compared to results obtained through conventional modeling where constant 
parameter values are assumed.  This work is motivated by the fact that the penetration of 
solar home systems is growing rapidly in the densely populated country of Bangladesh, 
which contrasts indications in chapters 2 and 3 that densely populated regions can often 
be served more cost-effectively by centralized infrastructures.  Such empirical evidence 
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suggests that there may be factors beyond those considered in chapters 2 and 3 that 
influence energy related decision making in the developing world.  In contrast to chapter 
3, the model in chapter 4 does not directly determine the optimal infrastructure that is 
capable of serving demand in a region.  Rather, it provides a simulation-based tool that 
can quickly compare the cost and service level provided by various user defined 
development plans.  A distributed infrastructure development scenario is shown to enable 
more immediate electrification, while a centralized scenario provides a higher level of 
service over the considered 20-year time horizon.  It is also shown that the levelized costs 
of generation from the centralized scenario are more heavily influenced by explicit 
stochastic modeling and variations in the available development budget and discount rate.  
These results suggest that caution should be taken to ensure that such factors are 
adequately considered when a first-order, cost-based analysis indicates that a centralized 
infrastructure might be implemented more cheaply than a decentralized infrastructure.  
The simulation model developed in this chapter was demonstrated through an analysis of 
two development scenarios that represent drastically different development paths.  
However, this model could also be applied to understand different outcomes resulting 
from development paths that vary more subtly.  For example, it would be possible to 
analyze the impact of commencing construction on a new generation facility immediately 
as opposed to several years in the future.  It would also be possible to explore how a 
specific development scenario responds to variations in key variables.  Examples might 
include analyses of different demand growth scenarios or a technology learning scenario 
where the cost of a solar home system reduces over time as more units are installed.   
The methodologies presented in chapters 2 and 3 are formulated with the explicit 
objective of determining the least-cost electricity infrastructure, while the work in chapter 
4 also frames results in terms of the cost of electricity provision.  However, no 
assumptions are made as to how the electricity provider – utility, government or private 
organization – will recover costs through tariffs to their consumers.  An implicit 
consequence of this formulation is the assumption that an electricity provider has a 
primary objective of minimizing their costs.  In reality, electricity generators and 
providers may be heavily regulated, subsidized or government-owned and rarely operate 
under true free-market conditions.  As a result, the revenue of an electricity provider may 
 146
be decoupled from their service level or tied directly to their costs of provision.  Due to 
various regulations and mandated social objectives providers may also be restricted in 
their ability to freely vary tariffs based on consumer class and generation technology.  
Therefore, an electricity provider may not be incentivized to pursue a particular 
development strategy even if it offers the lowest-cost means of electricity provision.  The 
dynamics of different electricity markets are not explicitly modeled by the work in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4.  However, it is important to consider how these methodologies and 
results may be affected by different political environments and market structures.      
 Chapter 5 addresses issues that differ slightly from those analyzed in chapters 2, 3 
and 4.  A subsidy-free cost of lighting curve is first developed for a range of different 
electric and non-electric technologies.  The costs of electric lighting in this calculation 
incorporate the true cost of electricity provision as a function of electricity consumption 
and grid connection cost, rather than assuming fixed, subsidized grid tariffs as is common 
in other analyses.  It is shown that kerosene based lighting is the lowest-cost option only 
for very low levels of lighting consumption.  Solar technologies provide a promising 
option for lighting consumption equivalent to roughly one to ten LED lights that are 
operated for four hours per day.  For higher levels of consumption, electricity from the 
grid becomes an increasingly cost-effective option, particularly when grid connection 
costs are low.  However, solar options may still be cost-effective when grid connection 
costs are high.  It is also shown that electricity from the grid is often heavily subsidized in 
low-consumption regions of developing countries, and it is suggested that some of these 
subsidies be allocated to instead support increased penetration distributed generation 
technologies.  Finally, a theoretical model is formulated to quantify the ability of three 
different financial delivery mechanisms, direct subsidies, rental programs and 
microloans, to provide solar home systems to low-income populations.  These 
mechanisms are compared on the basis of their ability to increase consumer utility for a 
given cost to the agency that is administering the financial contract.   A numerical 
analysis based on a realistic range of parameter values suggests that direct subsidies may 
be preferred when a high level of subsidization is desired, while microloan contracts 
becoming increasingly effective when small levels of subsidization or profit are desired.   
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 The results presented by this thesis build upon existing literature in the fields of 
energy policy, energy economics and international development.  They provide a 
resource for international organizations, governments and NGOs to inform decision 









Appendix A: The calculated fractions of both population and nodes that are cost-effectively served by decentralized electricity in 150 
countries are shown for a range of consumption levels, pertaining to the methodology and analysis presented in chapter 2.  
Electrification statistics are also presented for each country.  Electricity Consumption Per Capita Electrified (ECPCe) is equal to 
Electricity Consumption Per Capita (ECPC) divided by Electrification Rate.  Potential Electricity Consumption Density is calculated 
by multiplying Population Density and ECPCe.  The right-most columns of the table indicate the fractions of population and nodes in 
each country that are cost-effectively served by decentralized electricity for each given level of electricity consumption.  The column 
labeled Current ECPCe presents the population and node fractions for electricity consumption levels equal to the ECPCe in each 
country.  These results do not require that per capita electricity consumption be constant throughout each country.  They instead 
correspond to the fraction of nodes, and the fraction of people who reside in nodes, that would be cost-effectively served by 
decentralized infrastructure for given consumption levels.  
 





















































































Chad 9 9 29% 31 268 
Pop. 92 90 85 71 38 24 8 2 2 
Nodes 100 99 99 97 85 78 59 45 45 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
16 39 29% 134 2,139 
Pop. 76 79 79 76 74 6 3 1 0 




79 14 29% 48 3,833 
Pop. 76 76 42 16 4 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 98 98 82 63 34 16 0 0 0 
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Afghanistan 49 8 14% 57 2,807 
Pop. 76 76 50 25 12 4 1 0 0 
Nodes 98 98 88 71 53 31 15 0 0 
Central African 
Republic 
7 22 29% 76 556 
Pop. 75 75 75 75 63 28 8 4 1 
Nodes 100 100 100 100 95 75 51 41 21 
Mali 12 34 29% 117 1,435 
Pop. 73 84 76 48 31 11 4 3 2 
Nodes 97 100 98 92 86 69 58 55 49 
Guinea-Bissau 38 38 29% 131 4,963 
Pop. 71 71 71 44 14 2 1 0 0 
Nodes 96 96 96 81 46 21 17 0 0 
Somalia 20 26 29% 90 1,828 
Pop. 65 78 53 44 34 10 3 1 0 
Nodes 95 99 94 91 84 48 27 15 0 
Sudan 15 76 31% 245 3,765 
Pop. 56 81 72 55 29 12 4 1 0 
Nodes 93 100 98 93 79 59 38 17 0 
Eritrea 44 38 32% 119 5,257 
Pop. 55 74 64 30 15 3 0 0 0 
Nodes 90 97 93 72 52 18 0 0 0 
Niger 14 36 29% 124 1,776 
Pop. 50 80 55 21 10 5 4 3 1 
Nodes 95 99 96 87 81 76 75 71 46 
Mauritania 4 118 29% 407 1,453 
Pop. 50 75 73 69 47 19 8 3 1 
Nodes 96 100 100 99 96 88 81 72 63 
Madagascar 33 44 19% 232 7,569 
Pop. 48 80 76 47 13 6 1 0 0 
Nodes 85 99 98 84 47 31 9 0 0 
Mongolia 2 965 67% 1,440 2,712 
Pop. 48 64 62 58 53 49 44 33 14 
Nodes 99 100 100 100 99 99 98 91 57 
Belize 11 618 93% 665 7,187 
Pop. 47 86 81 81 68 11 1 1 0 
Nodes 68 98 95 95 88 30 10 10 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 
11 434 60% 723 7,903 
Pop. 33 89 87 68 51 30 8 3 1 
Nodes 75 99 99 94 87 72 40 24 11 
Burundi 310 12 29% 41 12,844 Pop. 33 30 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 
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Nodes 71 68 32 21 12 0 0 0 0 
Guyana 3 896 93% 963 2,832 
Pop. 31 58 58 54 44 31 21 8 6 
Nodes 94 99 99 99 97 94 86 71 65 
Guinea 40 75 29% 259 10,321 
Pop. 25 85 73 31 5 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 62 99 96 70 19 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 10 575 78% 737 7,023 
Pop. 24 64 52 38 31 18 8 4 2 
Nodes 87 99 98 95 92 81 65 49 34 
Liberia 46 86 29% 297 13,610 
Pop. 23 77 72 25 9 3 1 0 0 
Nodes 65 98 95 68 40 24 14 0 0 
Namibia 2 1325 34% 3,897 8,719 
Pop. 22 82 79 73 50 43 31 17 12 
Nodes 85 100 100 99 98 96 91 80 71 
French Guiana 2 2150 93% 2,312 3,927 
Pop. 21 73 73 56 51 35 21 12 8 
Nodes 85 98 98 96 95 91 85 73 63 
Benin 68 64 25% 256 17,456 
Pop. 21 63 53 22 5 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 58 96 92 60 20 0 0 0 0 
Botswana 3 1282 45% 2,849 7,394 
Pop. 20 91 90 74 73 39 23 13 7 
Nodes 78 100 100 99 98 91 81 67 53 
Ethiopia 70 34 15% 227 15,851 
Pop. 20 80 48 19 13 6 1 0 0 
Nodes 74 98 89 73 63 41 13 0 0 
Senegal 53 109 42% 260 13,644 
Pop. 18 54 44 18 10 3 1 0 0 
Nodes 68 95 89 68 52 29 16 0 0 
Gabon 6 917 37% 2,478 14,666 
Pop. 15 50 46 46 43 31 15 6 1 
Nodes 68 99 99 99 97 89 68 36 10 
Haiti 248 32 39% 82 20,335 
Pop. 14 20 8 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 53 63 44 14 14 0 0 0 0 
DR Congo 30 84 11% 764 22,839 
Pop. 14 88 80 41 18 6 1 0 0 
Nodes 49 100 98 81 57 29 8 0 0 
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Angola 14 238 26% 915 12,909 
Pop. 14 80 74 60 33 13 7 1 1 
Nodes 63 100 99 96 78 61 46 15 15 
Suriname 3 2982 93% 3,206 9,174 
Pop. 14 40 40 34 31 28 15 9 6 
Nodes 87 99 99 98 97 96 88 80 74 
Burkina Faso 58 34 10% 340 19,847 
Pop. 13 87 80 27 6 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 36 99 97 59 21 5 0 0 0 
Libya 3 3360 99% 3,394 11,485 
Pop. 12 72 57 28 24 20 13 7 5 
Nodes 90 100 99 98 97 95 91 78 70 
Congo 13 111 30% 370 4,855 
Pop. 12 38 18 14 10 8 2 1 0 
Nodes 87 98 93 90 84 77 45 29 0 
Djibouti 24 344 29% 1,186 28,949 
Pop. 10 29 29 29 24 13 1 0 0 
Nodes 48 91 91 91 85 61 9 0 0 
Algeria 14 810 99% 818 11,527 
Pop. 9 59 41 18 11 9 6 3 2 
Nodes 85 98 95 90 87 85 78 65 54 
Ivory Coast 60 150 47% 319 19,020 
Pop. 9 72 41 14 5 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 41 99 82 51 29 11 0 0 0 
Cameroon 39 244 29% 841 33,100 
Pop. 8 72 54 23 14 7 1 0 0 
Nodes 45 98 92 75 60 41 12 0 0 
Laos 33 344 55% 625 20,391 
Pop. 8 89 81 47 14 2 0 0 0 
Nodes 27 99 96 82 38 12 0 0 0 
Cambodia 94 87 24% 363 34,062 
Pop. 7 45 17 10 4 2 0 0 0 
Nodes 52 87 69 60 42 31 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 49 453 72% 629 31,130 
Pop. 7 75 37 26 11 4 1 0 0 
Nodes 40 99 82 73 49 29 15 0 0 
Yemen 64 171 38% 450 28,628 
Pop. 6 39 21 13 6 2 1 1 0 
Nodes 60 91 82 74 60 46 39 39 0 
Tanzania 44 74 12% 617 27,146 Pop. 6 84 60 26 7 2 0 0 0 
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Nodes 28 98 87 61 31 12 0 0 0 
Kenya 63 118 15% 787 49,533 
Pop. 6 44 28 16 8 4 1 1 0 
Nodes 58 93 89 80 66 51 29 29 0 
Kazakhstan 7 5019 95% 5,283 34,988 
Pop. 5 83 72 41 29 23 12 6 2 
Nodes 49 100 100 98 95 91 73 54 30 
Argentina 13 2375 97% 2,448 32,766 
Pop. 5 71 63 37 22 11 5 2 1 
Nodes 54 99 99 94 85 70 54 39 30 
Peru 23 1085 77% 1,409 32,031 
Pop. 5 56 41 24 11 7 3 1 1 
Nodes 57 98 94 87 75 65 46 26 26 
Colombia 42 863 94% 918 38,205 
Pop. 4 52 33 18 9 4 2 1 1 
Nodes 53 98 92 80 67 53 41 31 31 
Morocco 47 650 97% 670 31,822 
Pop. 4 50 27 10 7 2 2 1 0 
Nodes 58 95 84 70 65 49 49 37 0 
Kyrgyzstan 33 1611 95% 1,696 56,285 
Pop. 4 74 62 32 15 8 1 0 0 
Nodes 31 99 95 82 61 45 13 0 0 
Paraguay 17 1316 95% 1,385 23,867 
Pop. 4 61 48 36 22 7 3 1 1 
Nodes 61 97 95 92 83 68 58 45 45 
Jordan 65 1598 100% 1,598 103,638 
Pop. 4 34 27 13 6 5 2 0 0 
Nodes 56 89 86 75 66 62 39 0 0 
Ghana 97 230 54% 426 41,298 
Pop. 4 65 45 12 3 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 21 94 82 41 17 9 0 0 0 
Rwanda 389 20 29% 69 26,855 
Pop. 3 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 21 30 15 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Myanmar 76 82 13% 631 47,976 
Pop. 3 58 34 13 3 2 0 0 0 
Nodes 28 92 77 53 28 23 0 0 0 
Nepal 249 76 44% 173 43,064 
Pop. 3 27 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 23 65 36 14 14 0 0 0 0 
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Nigeria 160 124 47% 264 42,239 
Pop. 3 49 13 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 16 85 42 20 8 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 99 486 65% 748 74,297 
Pop. 3 37 23 8 5 3 1 0 0 
Nodes 45 85 77 60 53 45 30 0 0 
Oman 8 3752 98% 3,829 31,520 
Pop. 3 78 75 42 30 10 4 2 2 
Nodes 62 98 98 93 88 78 65 57 57 
Turkmenistan 12 2601 95% 2,738 32,620 
Pop. 3 88 82 73 47 14 3 1 0 
Nodes 22 99 99 97 86 47 22 13 0 
Bhutan 93 260 60% 433 40,384 
Pop. 3 38 24 6 1 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 31 80 69 40 22 22 0 0 0 
United States 34 12365 100% 12,365 420,410 
Pop. 2 63 57 50 41 28 14 7 3 
Nodes 19 98 97 95 91 82 64 46 26 
Australia 3 10199 100% 10,199 30,597 
Pop. 2 57 33 30 16 8 5 3 2 
Nodes 63 99 97 94 88 79 72 68 63 
Panama 35 1678 88% 1,907 67,594 
Pop. 2 41 34 28 7 5 2 1 0 
Nodes 31 94 92 87 57 47 31 20 0 
Chile 20 3392 99% 3,426 70,056 
Pop. 2 48 33 20 10 4 2 1 1 
Nodes 63 98 95 88 83 69 63 51 51 
Ecuador 55 1053 92% 1,145 63,407 
Pop. 2 54 27 11 7 2 1 1 0 
Nodes 39 95 83 64 56 39 32 32 0 
Tunisia 63 1110 100% 1,110 69,971 
Pop. 2 78 41 9 4 3 1 0 0 
Nodes 23 94 72 42 32 28 14 0 0 
Honduras 71 803 70% 1,147 81,687 
Pop. 2 69 58 10 5 2 1 0 0 
Nodes 23 95 90 48 35 23 15 0 0 
Pakistan 218 385 58% 664 145,014 
Pop. 1 24 8 3 2 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 20 74 52 36 29 20 0 0 0 
South Africa 36 4389 75% 5,852 211,995 Pop. 1 61 27 13 5 2 1 1 0 
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Nodes 46 96 87 78 63 53 46 46 0 
Brazil 23 1987 98% 2,028 46,634 
Pop. 1 57 47 23 9 3 1 0 0 
Nodes 7 98 93 68 36 16 7 0 0 
Venezuela 29 3004 99% 3,034 86,941 
Pop. 1 55 33 19 9 5 1 1 1 
Nodes 38 96 92 84 70 58 38 38 38 
Russia 9 6181 100% 6,181 55,629 
Pop. 1 76 33 21 8 4 2 1 1 
Nodes 56 98 90 83 74 68 62 56 56 
Egypt 89 1268 99% 1,281 114,193 
Pop. 1 8 5 3 3 2 1 1 1 
Nodes 77 89 87 85 85 82 77 77 77 
Mexico 54 1596 93% 1,716 93,321 
Pop. 1 50 29 12 5 3 1 0 0 
Nodes 27 95 86 69 51 42 27 0 0 
Iceland 3 52980 100% 52,980 136,388 
Pop. 1 36 34 32 30 26 14 11 3 
Nodes 45 98 98 97 97 96 91 89 68 
Iran 49 2654 98% 2,708 132,554 
Pop. 1 59 33 14 6 2 1 0 0 
Nodes 18 95 82 61 42 25 18 0 0 
New Zealand 12 9146 100% 9,146 113,872 
Pop. 1 73 71 33 16 9 4 3 1 
Nodes 31 99 99 92 85 75 59 53 31 
Mozambique 27 443 12% 3,692 100,036 
Pop. 1 86 81 35 15 6 2 1 0 
Nodes 17 100 98 79 58 40 25 17 0 
Canada 4 15753 100% 15,753 63,012 
Pop. 1 58 52 21 14 12 4 2 1 
Nodes 37 99 99 93 84 79 54 44 37 
Malaysia 82 3265 99% 3,298 271,131 
Pop. 1 48 33 5 4 1 1 0 0 
Nodes 24 89 79 44 40 24 24 0 0 
Philippines 216 534 86% 621 134,012 
Pop. 1 25 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 11 49 32 17 11 0 0 0 0 
Zambia 16 637 19% 3,353 55,104 
Pop. 1 85 69 66 43 16 2 0 0 
Nodes 7 100 98 97 83 48 12 0 0 
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Cuba 65 1256 97% 1,295 84,485 
Pop. 1 80 24 8 1 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 11 99 60 30 11 11 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 63 1426 95% 1,501 94,596 
Pop. 1 49 30 8 4 2 1 1 0 
Nodes 42 93 85 64 55 48 42 42 0 
Uruguay 20 2288 100% 2,288 46,184 
Pop. 1 60 60 48 31 15 1 0 0 
Nodes 9 99 99 93 82 55 9 0 0 
Guatemala 132 515 81% 636 83,637 
Pop. 1 40 21 6 2 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 14 87 73 42 21 14 0 0 0 
Uganda 156 60 9% 667 103,788 
Pop. 1 40 17 6 2 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 14 76 57 37 20 14 0 0 0 
Tajikistan 47 2190 95% 2,305 109,291 
Pop. 1 78 45 12 7 3 1 1 0 
Nodes 32 98 87 67 58 45 32 32 0 
Lesotho 66 269 16% 1,681 111,726 
Pop. 1 84 68 21 5 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 10 96 88 52 23 10 0 0 0 
Togo 101 95 20% 475 48,032 
Pop. 1 82 53 3 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 9 98 78 15 9 0 0 0 0 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
102 4664 100% 4,664 477,639 
Pop. 0 90 27 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 98 45 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 89 2257 100% 2,257 201,416 
Pop. 0 90 50 15 2 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 100 90 41 7 0 0 0 0 
Malawi 133 99 9% 1,100 146,520 
Pop. 0 46 30 4 1 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 77 65 26 13 13 0 0 0 
Sweden 19 14799 100% 14,799 279,697 
Pop. 0 85 81 43 18 10 3 2 1 
Nodes 0 100 99 90 75 62 42 37 26 
Belgium 341 8137 100% 8,137 2,776,496 
Pop. 0 59 23 5 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 84 51 18 6 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 166 7526 100% 7,526 1,248,549 Pop. 0 81 31 6 2 0 0 0 0 
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Nodes 0 96 49 12 6 0 0 0 0 
Italy 160 5163 100% 5,163 825,093 
Pop. 0 52 18 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 77 38 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 65 3989 100% 3,989 257,823 
Pop. 0 69 46 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 94 83 17 7 0 0 0 0 
Finland 15 16590 100% 16,590 244,998 
Pop. 0 72 59 29 15 9 2 1 1 
Nodes 0 99 97 88 79 68 42 31 31 
Norway 12 27452 100% 27,452 327,861 
Pop. 0 78 70 44 30 19 6 3 1 
Nodes 0 100 99 95 86 73 50 37 21 
Lithuania 56 2719 100% 2,719 152,701 
Pop. 0 61 47 21 3 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 96 91 64 24 14 0 0 0 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
79 2337 100% 2,337 184,294 
Pop. 0 66 50 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 81 64 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia 113 5249 100% 5,249 591,353 
Pop. 0 79 22 8 2 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 97 60 33 12 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 102 4280 100% 4,280 436,251 
Pop. 0 80 73 32 10 2 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 100 98 82 39 10 0 0 0 
Croatia 60 4014 100% 4,014 241,875 
Pop. 0 80 77 15 5 2 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 99 98 50 26 13 0 0 0 
Saudi Arabia 14 6318 99% 6,382 88,764 
Pop. 0 75 67 46 33 15 1 0 0 
Nodes 0 100 98 90 80 56 11 0 0 
Thailand 125 2014 99% 2,034 255,067 
Pop. 0 69 29 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 92 59 12 8 0 0 0 0 
Poland 123 3364 100% 3,364 414,157 
Pop. 0 46 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 78 49 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 119 5242 100% 5,242 621,585 
Pop. 0 70 32 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 90 62 4 0 0 0 0 0 
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China 143 2572 99% 2,598 371,511 
Pop. 0 52 20 4 1 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 83 42 12 6 6 0 0 0 
Belarus 47 3189 100% 3,189 149,727 
Pop. 0 75 40 16 3 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 99 84 54 16 0 0 0 0 
Austria 97 7992 100% 7,992 773,546 
Pop. 0 72 49 7 3 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 99 88 23 12 0 0 0 0 
Spain 67 5905 100% 5,905 394,591 
Pop. 0 52 30 14 2 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 83 68 45 17 11 0 0 0 
Portugal 101 4533 100% 4,533 456,826 
Pop. 0 51 41 13 5 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 75 63 27 14 4 0 0 0 
Denmark 81 6203 100% 6,203 501,456 
Pop. 0 74 72 28 10 2 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 100 99 79 45 11 0 0 0 
Macedonia 80 3942 100% 3,942 313,790 
Pop. 0 69 58 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 92 75 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Albania 104 2202 100% 2,202 228,794 
Pop. 0 74 69 17 3 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 97 95 47 13 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia 122 7350 100% 7,350 898,667 
Pop. 0 71 59 12 3 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 97 91 40 16 6 0 0 0 
Turkey 87 2514 100% 2,514 219,308 
Pop. 0 62 36 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 93 71 16 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 23 5518 100% 5,518 125,945 
Pop. 0 72 71 44 18 8 1 0 0 
Nodes 0 99 98 91 64 40 16 0 0 
Vietnam 238 945 60% 1,575 374,893 
Pop. 0 20 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 68 47 22 15 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 413 7366 100% 7,366 3,043,978 
Pop. 0 26 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 41 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Azerbaijan 86 2150 95% 2,263 195,241 Pop. 0 67 52 5 0 0 0 0 0 
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Nodes 0 95 85 14 0 0 0 0 0 
France 102 6847 100% 6,847 700,802 
Pop. 0 35 17 5 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 85 65 33 10 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 124 1013 95% 1,066 132,036 
Pop. 0 70 41 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 94 70 12 0 0 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe 38 901 42% 2,145 80,806 
Pop. 0 63 62 39 14 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 99 98 80 47 9 0 0 0 
United Arab 
Emirates 
34 12815 100% 12,815 436,282 
Pop. 0 56 33 24 16 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 93 88 78 55 7 0 0 0 
Ukraine 74 2982 100% 2,982 220,896 
Pop. 0 42 25 9 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 86 73 41 8 0 0 0 0 
Germany 228 6718 100% 6,718 1,532,379 
Pop. 0 44 15 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 77 39 4 0 0 0 0 0 
North Korea 178 769 26% 2,958 526,156 
Pop. 0 38 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 71 39 15 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 50 5778 100% 5,778 291,026 
Pop. 0 67 66 30 10 5 1 0 0 
Nodes 0 99 98 80 54 40 11 0 0 
Greece 59 5416 100% 5,416 320,900 
Pop. 0 66 47 28 14 4 1 0 0 
Nodes 0 95 89 79 53 18 5 0 0 
Iraq 67 1711 85% 2,013 134,177 
Pop. 0 48 26 9 5 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 94 79 55 43 13 0 0 0 
Armenia 130 1609 100% 1,609 208,835 
Pop. 0 55 30 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 91 74 15 10 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 74 1505 95% 1,584 117,981 
Pop. 0 61 35 10 4 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 97 81 46 26 12 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 
212 5515 100% 5,515 1,167,491 
Pop. 0 19 7 2 1 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 58 39 26 20 20 0 0 0 
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Syria 109 1215 89% 1,365 148,968 
Pop. 0 47 16 7 3 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 86 57 41 25 0 0 0 0 
Latvia 33 3094 100% 3,094 100,589 
Pop. 0 59 58 31 12 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 98 98 82 50 9 0 0 0 
Israel 294 6206 100% 6,206 1,822,488 
Pop. 0 30 12 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 57 25 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 280 395 77% 513 143,679 
Pop. 0 29 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 63 39 9 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 83 1803 99% 1,821 150,439 
Pop. 0 46 42 15 2 1 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 74 71 39 13 10 0 0 0 
India 352 478 65% 735 259,181 
Pop. 0 24 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 72 51 23 15 0 0 0 0 
Dominican 
Republic 
180 1276 96% 1,329 239,172 
Pop. 0 29 19 2 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 76 63 17 13 0 0 0 0 
Japan 283 6788 100% 6,788 1,918,484 
Pop. 0 12 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 41 29 11 11 0 0 0 0 
El Salvador 298 745 86% 866 258,444 
Pop. 0 17 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 62 47 17 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 471 9570 100% 9,570 4,507,320 
Pop. 0 11 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 32 14 6 0 0 0 0 0 
South Korea 421 8245 100% 8,245 3,474,487 
Pop. 0 12 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Nodes 0 63 31 14 0 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 1136 151 41% 368 418,456 
Pop. 0 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 





Appendix B:  Results of the single-factor sensitivity analysis performed in section 5.4.5 
are shown for 10 input parameters that were not previously presented. 
 
 
Figure B1:  The effect of varying the salvage ratio on the optimal financial contract for a 
given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
 
Figure B2:  The effect of varying the fixed loan cost on the optimal financial contract for 
a given cost to the agency is shown. 
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Figure B3:  The effect of varying the variable loan cost on the optimal financial contract 
for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
 
Figure B4:  The effect of varying the battery replacement frequency on the optimal 
financial contract for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
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Figure B5:  The effect of varying the monthly maintenance cost on the optimal financial 
contract for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
 
Figure B6:  The effect of varying the monthly consumer income on the optimal financial 




Figure B7:  The effect of varying the loan contract default rate on the optimal financial 




Figure B8:  The effect of varying the fixed rental cost on the optimal financial contract 




Figure B9:  The effect of varying the variable rental cost on the optimal financial 
contract for a given cost to the agency is shown. 
 
 
Figure B10:  The effect of varying the SHS cost on the optimal financial contract for a 
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